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FROM: AR - Mr. Jamison July 19, 1954

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

The information contained in the attached document and its annexes was collected and prepared by the Government of the United States as a contribution on its part to consideration by the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics of the threat to the peace and security of the Continent resulting from the international Communist penetration of the political institutions of the sister Republic of Guatemala. The document was prepared for presentation to the Meeting of Consultation convoked under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance for Rio de Janeiro on July 7, 1954.

Events in Guatemala as of this date indicate a determination on the part of Governmental authorities to rid the Government of Guatemala of the influence which has brought that country so close to complete domination by the international Communist movement.

The Meeting of the Organ of Consultation to which these documents were to have been presented has been postponed sine die. Nevertheless, it is the view of the Government of the United States that the governments and peoples of the American Republics, and of other countries, will find it valuable and important to have available this document as a case history of a bold attempt on the part of the international Communist movement to gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere by gaining control of the political institutions of an American Republic.

Most of the facts set forth in these documents are and have been matters of public record. Many, taken by themselves, could appear to represent passing phenomena. When brought together, however, with their implications and consequences analyzed, the facts constitute a meaningful demonstration of the methods used by the international Communist movement, directed by the Kremlin, to subvert an American government. They also constitute a warning to all governments which desire to maintain their independence.

July 9, 1954

PENETRATION OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF GUATEMALA

BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT:

THREAT

TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF AMERICA

AND TO THE

SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF GUATEMALA

Information submitted by the Delegation of the United States of America to the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, serving as Organ of Consultation.

Washington, D. C.
June 1954

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INTRODUCTION

By agreement reached through the Council of the Organization of American States, a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to serve as Organ of Consultation in accordance with Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, will be held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in July 1954.

Article 6 of the Treaty provides that the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in the event the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by, inter alia, any fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America.

The "fact or situation" to be considered by the Organ of Consultation at Rio de Janeiro is the threat to the peace and security of America and to the sovereignty and political independence of Guatemala arising from the penetration of the political institutions of that country by the international Communist movement.

At the meeting at Rio de Janeiro the American Republics will consider, for the fourth time in six years at a major meeting of their regional association, the threat to their peace and security arising from the same source: Soviet Communist imperialism.

At the two Inter-American Conferences held at Bogotá in 1948 and at Caracas in 1954 the American Republics considered the general aspects of the danger: at Bogotá they were concerned primarily with the internal action which each state might take within its own jurisdiction to defend itself and the other republics from the subversive activities of agents of international communism; at Caracas they issued a foreign policy declaration against the intervention of international communism in the Western Hemisphere.

At the meeting of Foreign Ministers held at Washington in 1951, they were concerned with the emergency situation arising from Soviet sponsored military aggression outside the Hemisphere - the armed attack against the Republic of Korea. They agreed upon steps that would "contribute to the defense of the Continent and to United Nations collective security efforts . . . .". They viewed the attack on Korea as an engagement in the global struggle, in which they are inescapably committed, between Soviet communism and the Free World.

At the scheduled Rio de Janeiro meeting in July, the emergency to be considered is one arising from political aggression directed at an objective within the Western Hemisphere, by agents of the same forces that struck without warning at South Korea in 1950. In other words, the danger which during the last six years the American Republics have been considering with growing urgency has become localized in the Central American area in the situation in Guatemala.

In the present memorandum the Government of the United States presents information which reveals the following concerning the means and methods by which the international Communist movement intervened in Guatemala to create this situation:

(1) That agents of international communism: (a) infiltrated key agencies of the Guatemalan Government; (b) established a network of interlocking political, labor and mass organizations through which they control the political activity of large groups of citizens; and (c) used subversion and the exploitation of indigenous political forces and social

and economic problems in conformity with the established tactics and methods of international communism.

(2) That Guatemala has progressively identified herself with the Soviet Union in international affairs.

(3) That the shipment of arms and munitions of war to Guatemala from the Soviet orbit in the M/S Alfhem: (a) fits into the pattern of subversive penetration of Guatemala as part of the same conspiratorial design; (b) was made clandestinely and fraudulently; (c) could have been made only with the authorization of Soviet leaders for purposes related to their struggle with the Free World; (d) placed at the disposal of agents of international communism in Guatemala the means by which to dominate the country by force through the arming of Communist-controlled elements of the population; (e) made of Guatemala a potential source of arms which could be supplied clandestinely to subversive elements in neighboring countries; (f) increased tension and dangerous instability in the Central American area.

The situation in Guatemala is clearly the product of a bold and sustained attempt to establish a Communist-controlled state in the Western Hemisphere. In this way Guatemala has become one of several points of conflict between the Free World and the Soviet orbit, and has created a clear threat to the sovereignty of Guatemala and the peace and security of America.

What at Bogotá, Washington and Caracas it was feared might happen, has happened. International communism has so penetrated the political institutions of one of the members of the American community that the sovereignty and political independence of that country and the peace of America are seriously affected.

This attempt on the part of international communism to breach the inner defenses of the Western Hemisphere confronts the American Republics with a crucial test of their ability, through the Organization of American States, to repel a special and immediate threat to their individual and collective security.

I

WORLD CONTEXT OF GUATEMALA PROBLEM: THE SOVIET THREAT

The significance of particular Communist movements and maneuvers in the Western Hemisphere cannot be understood except in terms of the worldwide conspiracy which they represent and of which they form a part. If these movements in the American Republics in fact expressed and served legitimate national needs and aspirations, if they sprang from the soil of the American Hemisphere, if they were not nourished and directed from beyond the Oceans, they would not have aroused the concern which brought about this Meeting of the Organ of Consultation. If the movement in Guatemala represented an inspiration of the Guatemalan people, or even if it represented merely a political conspiracy by a few Guatemalans to achieve power for themselves in their own country, it would be no business of the other American Republics to concern themselves with it.

It is well known, however, that the Communist leaders in Guatemala, and wherever else in the Hemisphere they may be active, are the servants of a foreign power which has its capital in Moscow. The record of their travels back and forth to Moscow is well known, as is their manner of receiving their instructions and carrying them out in the disguise of local patriots whose only concern is for local reforms. The confessions of those who have defected as servants of the great Moscow conspiracy are available.

In a great conspiracy to drain the strength and resources of our common civilization, the Communists follow the explicit teachings of what they call Marxism-Leninism. These teachings are the world Communist movement's "guide to action". As such they represent a cynical amalgam of political subterfuge and military tactics. Marxism-Leninism sets forth the technique by which a determined minority can use the aspirations and energies of a vast majority of people in a given country to lift itself into power. What we see today in Guatemala is an advanced stage in that process.

The Organ of Consultation must therefore look at the nature of this great conspiracy which, centered in Moscow, has managed to establish its agents in controlling positions in the government of one of the American Republics - so that in effect the lives of the Guatemalan people are becoming, without their knowledge, increasingly subject to the direction of Moscow.

Two things must be distinguished clearly: One is what the Communist movement claims to be when it seeks the allegiance of those it has not yet been able to bring under its control, and the other what it shows itself to be when the necessity for deception has passed because it has achieved the control which it sought. The people of the Americas should know and understand the second so that they may not be misled by the first.

For one thing, wherever the Communist movement has achieved the seat of Government it has established a totalitarian dictatorship by one man or by a handful of men over all the people who live under that government's jurisdiction. These dictatorships are absolute. By a simple decision of government thousands or even millions of people under that government may be condemned to death by starvation or any form of violence. Unless they dance to the dictator's tune, unless they chant his slogans, and unless they bow before his image, they may find themselves violently cut-off from their families and even from their lives, without any recourse even to a pretended process of justice. What they say or what they write, the pictures they paint or the music they compose, is subject to the review of the State and their lives may depend upon it.

One might well ask whether, in return for this deprivation of liberty and even of rights of conscience, there is not some considerable benefit such as the assurance of food, of housing, and of economic security generally. But all available information, and vast quantities of it is at hand, shows that many of those who today languish under the control of the Communist dictatorship are in a state of greater economic misery than they had ever known

before they succumbed to the dictatorship of Moscow.

In this connection it is interesting to note that before the Chinese Communists had conquered the whole mainland of China they were indeed impelled to institute substantial social and economic reforms in the areas that came under their sway. This helped them in the process of increasing their dominion by making it appear that their purpose was benevolent. When, however, they had gained control of the whole mainland area, the outward character of the dictators changed. They threw off the disguise of benign reformers and undertook the imposition of punitive and other measures of control of a barbarity which it is hard for us to conceive, so that today great masses of Chinese peasants and villagers and townsfolk who welcomed the oncoming Communist armies in 1949 have had occasion to regret the Communist success most bitterly.

Now the question arises in whose interests these totalitarian governments govern. In what used to be Russia it is quite clear that the government does not govern in the interest of the Russian people or of the other nationalities under its immediate sway, but simply with a view to maintaining and enhancing the power of the conspiratorial clique which has established itself in the Kremlin and in the government. In other states that have fallen victim to these dictatorships - in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and others - the dictatorships do not in any sense represent local national interests, they do not represent the local patriotism or pride of country, they certainly do not represent any kind of national independence, and they are not even in their essence native dictatorships. These totalitarian governments are the puppets of Moscow and they are dedicated to the service of the conspiratorial clique in the Kremlin. These countries have become slave-colonies.

This is the clear and virtually undisputed picture we see when we look at what Communist government is in actuality as distinct from what the Communist movement claims to be in countries where it has not achieved control. In these latter countries the tactics of deception are quite clear. The Communist leaders are directed to identify themselves with local patriotic movements, with the proud spirit of nationalism and the aspirations of national independence, with movements for clearly needed and justifiable reform, even with the hatred of foreigners. In a country like Guatemala there is the paradoxical spectacle of Guatemalans who, in the service of the Soviet Union, urge other Guatemalans to demonstrations of "patriotic" hostility against their fellow Americans.

To achieve what is basically beyond their strength, the Communists depend for success on their ability to form a "united front" with non-Communists by appealing for popular support on issues of ostensible common interests. Communists in Latin America and elsewhere claim therefore to be interested in the problems of the common man: in his struggles for a better life against poverty and poor working conditions; in his hope for peace, in his pride in national independence from foreign rule, and so forth. By appearing to support the interests of the common man, they endeavor to direct his energies along lines which serve their basic purpose: to discredit the established society and ultimately to seize power on behalf of the Kremlin. At the 19th Party Congress in 1952 Stalin advised his fellow Communists to march under the banners of "bourgeois democratic rights" and of "national independence and national sovereignty".

It is ironic that this conspiratorial movement has been able to masquerade as a defender of basic rights. This ability of the Communists to identify themselves with individual and national aspirations aided by the imminent threat of the Red Army, was what made it possible for the Kremlin to subvert, capture, and enslave the Eastern European satellites after World War II. In each of these countries the path to slavery was the complicity of innocent people who took the fine words of the Communists at their face value. The devil is never more dangerous than when he is soft-spoken.

One of Hungary's leading Communists, Jozsef Reval, explained frankly in a speech to party members in 1949 how the Communists won the election in 1947 when only two years earlier they had been soundly beaten. "We were," he said, "a minority in the Parliament and in the government, but at the same time we represented the leading force. We had decisive control over the police forces." He added that the "Soviet Union and the Soviet army was always there to support us with their assistance". He neglected to tell how voters were disenfranchised and terrorized but he admitted that they were duped. "In the first phase of our transformation," he said, "when we struggled directly and apparently only for ...achievement of bourgeois-democratic tasks, we fought as well for the establishment of conditions which made possible the socialist transformations." "It was correct," he said, "not to show our cards!" Many people were tricked by this deception into supporting the Communists.

Now it is true that, when the whole picture is seen, the situation in this Hemisphere is quite different from what we see in Europe and Asia in one important respect. The purpose of the Communist movement in the European and Asiatic countries adjacent to the Soviet Union and Communist China is to draw them out of the light of their present freedom and into the darkness behind the Iron Curtain. This they can hope to do because the Soviet armed forces of over 4 million men under arms are in a position directly to back up the conspiratorial agents within these countries. The Kremlin, however, cannot hope to draw Guatemala or any of our independent American Republics behind the Iron Curtain. The geographic and strategic situation, if nothing else, does not permit this. Any immediate possibility of this sort is not the subject of our present concern.

It is clear, rather, that the present strategy of the Kremlin with respect to Latin America is that of diverting the attention of the Western Hemisphere from Communist maneuvers elsewhere - in Europe and Asia - of promoting anarchy within and among the American Republics, of weakening their defenses by sabotage and the development of increased possibilities for sabotage, and finally of demoralizing the Hemisphere by discrediting the Inter-American system and throwing the organization of its common defense into confusion.

By creating anarchy in this Hemisphere, where the American peoples have built order, the Kremlin would find itself with a freer hand to carry on its aggressive imperialism elsewhere. It could move forward in its program for the domination of the Free World in Europe and Asia. Then, if it succeeded in this program, and only then, would it be ready actually to make slave-states out of Guatemala and the rest of our countries. At this stage the purpose is still that of disruption and political sabotage, and the target is our traditional American system of orderly and self-respecting international relations.

II

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GUATEMALA

How International Communism Subverted a National Revolutionary Movement

Within the framework of the long-range Soviet conspiracy to penetrate and disrupt the Western Hemisphere, the Central American Republic of Guatemala seems to have been viewed for some time by the leaders of Soviet imperialism as a suitable place to work towards establishing a base on this Continent. The country was small, strategically located, and was going through a period of political transition which might be exploited.

It will be recalled, moreover, that the Soviet Union's plan not to cooperate in establishing a lasting peace after World War II, but to use force, subversion, and deceit to spread communism over the globe had begun to become clear at about the time of the Guatemalan Revolution of October 20, 1944. In fact, the Soviet strategy of undermining genuine nationalist movements for its own purposes had been put in bold relief in Poland on October 3, only thirteen days before the revolution in Guatemala, when a shocked world saw the Red Army stand idle a few miles outside of Warsaw while the Polish Nationalist forces and the city fighting the Nazis under General Bor collapsed. By this cynical withholding of support, designed to pave the way for the Communist-controlled Lublin Government to take power in Poland, the Soviets laid bare its utter contempt of the patriotic and nationalist feelings of people not under the control of international communism.

The Guatemalan revolution, which took place on October 20, was an expression of the nationalist aspirations of most Guatemalans for more political liberties and economic progress. It was an internal Guatemalan affair, and the law-abiding governments of the hemisphere and the world wished Guatemala well in her new experiment. However, the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement which serves its interests saw the Guatemalan situation in another light: as an opportunity to penetrate and corrupt the revolutionary movement in order to carry out the Soviet design in the Western Hemisphere. The central theme of Guatemala's history since the 1944 revolution is how a handful of Communist agents representing the interests of the Soviet Union painstakingly infiltrated and came to dominate the revolutionary movement and rob the Guatemalan people of their legitimate expectations.

In order to accomplish the Soviet design, agents of international Communism began to enter Guatemala soon after the Revolution. Among those who played the leading roles were such men as Alfonso Solórzano, a Guatemalan who had joined the Mexican Communist party and worked with Vicente Lombardo Toledano during his exile in Mexico; Miguel Marmol Chicas, a Salvadoran Communist who had been trained in Moscow in the early 1930's; Abel and Max Cuenca brothers exiled from El Salvador, where they had been leaders of the bloody but unsuccessful 1932 Communist-led insurrection; and Virgilio Guerra, a Salvadoran who is now a Secretary of the Guatemalan Communist party. Another who joined them inside the country was Antonio Ovando Sánchez, a Communist who had gone to Moscow in the early 1930's, returned to be jailed by the Guatemalan authorities. In addition, in the years following the Revolution, such men as Lombardo Toledano, Blas Roca of the Cuban Communist party, Pablo Neruda, the Chilean Communist poet, and many others visited Guatemala to aid the Communist cause.

The agents of international communism who came into Guatemala in 1944 and 1945 infiltrated the new labor organizations and political parties, where they were received because their knowledge of organizational techniques was at a premium in a country where labor unions and free political parties had long been suppressed. Using their influence within the parties, they quickly began the task of training a nucleus of young Guatemalans in Communist ideology and tactics. In 1945 they established a Marxist indoctrination school,

the Escuela Claridad, within the first post-Revolution national labor federation, Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG). Its leading director was Abel Cuenca. There was, however, at this time still opposition to communism within the Revolutionary movement. This opposition focused on the Escuela Claridad indoctrination school. The result was a split in the labor movement, and a group of then anti-Communist unions split off from the CTG to form the Federación Sindical de Guatemala (FSG). In the end, the school was shut down by the Government early in 1946, but Marmol, Cuenca, Solórzano and the others persisted in the efforts, using the classic Communist devices of secret Marxist "study groups", to train prospective Communists in the Revolutionary movement.(1)

These clandestine "study groups" in the Guatemalan Revolutionary parties and the labor unions made international Communist agents of a nucleus of young men in the Revolution, including José Manuel Fortuny, then a Deputy and leading politician in the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), Mario Silva Jonama, a young teacher who was shortly to become Under Secretary of Education and Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, already Secretary General of the leading labor federation at that time, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG).

Founding of a Secret Communist Party: By 1947, matters had progressed to the point where a clandestine Communist party was successfully organized with these younger men. The Party was founded in secret on September 28, 1947, under the name of Vanguardia Democrática and the following year Fortuny was formally elected its Secretary General. On September 28, 1947 this clandestine party held its First Congress in secret and adopted the name of the Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG). Its members hid the nature of their conspiracy by continuing to present themselves to the public as leaders of the pro-Government Revolutionary parties and the labor movement, and as government employees. Fortuny, was, so far as the public could see, a Deputy of the PAR, and twice Secretary General of that Party; Silva Jonama became Under Secretary of Education in 1948; Alfredo Guerra Borges, now the Communist party's Secretary for Propaganda, was an announcer for the national radio station TGW; Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez continued as Secretary General of the CTG, professing to be a member of the PAR.

From the cover of these positions, Fortuny and the rest of those trained in the tactics of international communism in the "study groups" continued the program of infiltration of the Revolutionary movement. The Federación Sindical de Guatemala (FSG), which had resisted communism in 1946 to the extent of breaking away from the CTG over the Escuela Claridad issue, was infiltrated and brought in the Communist orbit by the installation of Manuel Pinto Usaga as Secretary General and José Alberto Cardoza, now a Communist Deputy, as an officer of its Executive Committee. With the CTG already under Communist leadership, the labor movement, though still divided, could be manipulated by the secret Communist headquarters.

At about the same time that the party was secretly founded, the Communists also began to establish the mechanism of "mass" organizations to carry the Communist-line to the youth, women, and students of the Revolutionary movement. In December 1947, the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG) was founded and became the training ground for Communist youth and an affiliate of the international Communist organization, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). In the same year, the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca (AFG) was founded and became the vehicle for Communist indoctrination of women and an affiliate of the international Communist women's organization, the International Federation of Democratic Women (IFDW).

(1) This device was also used as a recruiting method by the Canadian atomic espionage ring, according to the Canadian Royal Commission.

The "mass" organizations also provided a ready means to strengthen the links betwen the young Guatemalan Communist movement and the Soviet international Communist apparatus which controlled it. In April 1949, Fortuny, Gutiérrez and Solórzano went to Paris to attend the Soviet-inspired First World Congress of the "Partisans of Peace" and Fortuny then went behind the Iron Curtain. On returning he presided at the founding of a "Peace Committee" in Guatemala.

Communist Party Comes into Open Under President Arbenz: It was not until after Colonel Jacobo Arbenz was inaugurated President of Guatemala on March 15, 1951, that the Communist party totally divested itself of the veil of secrecy and openly advanced in its campaign to complete its ascendency over the remaining non-Communist elements in the Revolution and to eliminate the opposition in order to achieve control of Guatemalan political institutions. Fortuny had been one of the President's campaign advisers during the election, and less than three weeks after the inauguration, on April 4, for the first time he signed a public manifesto "Secretary General of the Communist Party of Guatemala", thus proclaiming that a Communist party existed in Guatemala. Despite the fact that Article 32 of the Guatemalan Constitution (still the fundamental law of Guatemala) specifically prohibited the functioning of a political organization of a "foreign or international character", the Administration allowed the party thereafter to function openly and to achieve increasing domination of the Revolutionary movement. On June 21, the Communist party held its first public rally in a motion picture theater made available on orders of the Government and with the attendance of high officials of the Government and political leaders, including Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, then President of Congress, now Ambassador to Mexico; Jaime Díaz Rozzotto, then member of the National Electoral Board, now Secretary General of the Presidency; and Alfonso Solórzano, then and now Manager of the Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS).

Meanwhile in May, Louis Saillant, Secretary General of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Secretary General of the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL), went to Guatemala to attend a public congress of transport workers unions and advised the Communist leaders of the Guatemalan labor movement to unite in a single confederation. This was done at a labor congress in Guatemala in October 1951, which established the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and elected the Communist leader Gutiérrez as its Secretary General. The principal members of the CGTG Executive Committee which was elected were also avowed Communists.

The aims of the Communists who went to Guatemala to subvert the Revolution were thus fulfilled in the sphere of labor organization, and there has since been no successful opposition to the Communist leadership in the national labor organization. Shortly after the CGTG four day Congress, Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez left for the WFTU Congress in Berlin and went on to Moscow, returning on January 9, 1952 to Guatemala. On January 25, the Bucharest organ of the Cominform, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy", published the first of several articles on the "Communist Party of Guatemala", thus acknowledging it as the recognized agent of the international Communist movement in Guatemala.

Communists Take Over Agrarian Reform: The next effort of international communism in Guatemala was to subvert and use for their own purposes the Agrarian Reform Program. Most Guatemalans had long viewed the land problem as one of their fundamental problems, for the most cursory glance at census statistics showed that the arable land of the country was concentrated in a very few hands. An Agrarian Reform Program had been one of the legitimate aspirations of the 1944 Revolution and the basis for it had been laid in the Constitution of 1945, before the Communists had achieved power. Colonel Arbenz promised land reform in his 1950 campaign for the Presidency.

Early in 1952, the Communists began to lay the groundwork to exploit agrarian reform to their own advantage. A little over a month after Gutiérrez returned from Moscow, the Central Committee of the Partido Comunista de Guatemala devoted its first plenary session of the year, on February 16-18, to agrarian reform and heard Fortuny label it as the party's first task. After Congress convened on March 1, the Communists used their influence with the other government parties to obtain the election of Gutiérrez as President of the Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform. President Arbenz introduced the Agrarian Reform Law on May 10, and it was to Gutiérrez' Committee that it was referred for hearings and presentation on the floor of Congress. Fortuny, though not a member of Congress, participated actively in the hearings, questioning witnesses and entering into the debate.

The final version of the Agrarian Reform Law which was passed by Congress and signed by President Arbenz on June 17, 1952, did not merely provide for the expropriation and distribution of unused lands to satisfy the arpirations of the Guatemalan people, but also contained within it means to advance Communist power in Guatemala. To administer the agrarian reform, the law established a National Agrarian Council, Departmental Agrarian Commissions, and Local Agrarian Committees which were to be composed of representatives of the government, of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and of the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG). Since the Communist party controlled the CGTG and had the CNCG under its influence, the establishment of these bodies placed the Communists in a position to guide the course of the agrarian reform on every level. For example, José Luis Ramos, the Communist Party's Secretary for Agrarian Affairs, was appointed to the National Agrarian Council as soon as it was formed.

The Agrarian Reform Law also established the National Agrarian Department as the agency responsible for carrying out the decisions of the National Agrarian Council and the President, and for the orderly execution of the law. As soon as this Department was organized on July 1, 1952, the Communists began to infiltrate it. They succeeded, as will be described later, in installing Communist agents, including Waldermar Barrios Klée, the Deputy Chief of the Department, some two thirds of the Department's field inspectors, and important office personnel, in key positions.

Communist Party Establishes Domination over "National Democratic Front": Simultaneously with their successful campaign to gain control of the Agrarian Reform, the Guatemalan Communists redoubled their efforts to establish a "popular front", the tried tactic of communism. In the summer of 1952, the Communist party was accepted as an unofficial member of the coalition of Arbenz' parties that was then known as the "Alliance of Democratic Parties" and its representatives attended the Alliance's meetings with the President. The next step was to achieve legal registration as a party. Simultaneously with its effort to subvert the agrarian reform, the Communist party was engaged in a campaign to bring the Revolutionary parties more tightly under its control through the tried international Communist tactic of the "Popular Front".

Accordingly, in December 1952, the party held its Second Congress (its first in public), reelected Fortuny as its Secretary General, and changed its name to the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo - PGT). Under this name, it was registered as a legal political party by the Director General of the Civil Registry. With its new status as a legal party, the Communist PGT was then able to participate in the January 1953 Congressional elections as an official member of a "Democratic Electoral Front", which succeeded the former "Alliance of Democratic Parties". In

this way Fortuny and Pellecer were presented as candidates for Deputy of the Arbenz parties for Guatemala City and Escuintla, respectively. While Fortuny failed to be elected, Pellecer was successful.

Following the 1952 elections, the Communists next worked successfully towards the conversion of its temporary "Democratic Electoral Front" into a permanent "National Democratic Front" which would group all of the Revolutionary forces under their influence in accord with the classic communist "united front" tactic. The Revolutionary parties, weakened by years of Communist infiltration and undermining, readily fell in with the Communist cry for "unity" and allowed the Front to be enlarged by the Communist-dominated CGTG and the Communist-controlled CNCG, thus giving the Communists preponderant control of it. This was a major achievement for the Party, because out of the ten representatives of the Front who meet regularly with President Arbenz to decide questions of national policy, four are avowed Communists and the remainder follow the Communist line.

Guatemala's "National Democratic Front" thus has marked similarity to the Communist-penetrated "Popular Fronts" created by international Communism in Spain, France, and elsewhere in the 1930's and with the so-called "democratic fronts" set up after World War II in the countries of Eastern Europe preparatory to their complete subjugation to the Soviet Union. The establishment by the Communists of a "National Democratic Front" in Guatemala appears to be close to a repetition of the Communist tactics in creating the "Fatherland Front" in Bulgaria, the "Hungarian People's Front", the "People's Democratic Front" in Rumania. The great influence the Guatemalan Communists wield through this device is revealing of the extent to which communism has subverted the bright hopes held by the Guatemalan people ten years ago at the time of the Guatemalan Revolution.

Extent to which Guatemala has been Infiltrated by International Communism

Today, almost a decade after Soviet Communism first began to subvert the Revolution, the International Communist movement has most of Guatemala's political life within its grasp. The Guatemalan Government is deeply infiltrated and its policies profoundly influenced by leaders of the Communist Party, PGT, who travel frequently to Moscow. The Guatemalan labor movement is controlled by this Party and is a branch of the Communist labor international, the WFTU. The Guatemalan peasant organization is also part of this Communist organization. The principal youth, women's and other "mass" organizations are affiliated with the Guatemalan Communist organizations in their fields. The Guatemalan armed forces are now equipped with arms obtained from the Soviet orbit and the Guatemalan police have persecuted and all but destroyed the organized anti-Communist movement.

Infiltration of Government: At the top level of Government the Communist party openly enjoys the support of President Arbenz, who identified the Communists in his March 1, 1953, annual message to the Guatemalan Congress as "democratic" and "progressive" forces and said that to isolate those forces would be equivalent to "suicide" for the Revolutionary Movement. It was under his Administration that the Communists came into the open and climbed to their present position of power, a feat which could scarcely have been accomplished by a new party without popular backing except for the favor of the President and the support of his Administration.

At the levels of Government under the Presidency, Communist infiltration has become so effective that the Communist PGT is now able to sway Guatemala's policies through the standard Communist device of the "National Democratic Front", which is largely replacing the Cabinet as the policy-making body. The extent to which this has occurred is reflected by a speech of the Communist leader, Carlos Manuel Pellecer, on April 4, 1954, in which he revealed that the tactics of the Guatemalan delegation at the Caracas Conference this March were decided upon at a meeting attended by President Arbenz, Foreign Minister Toriello, and the representatives of the "National Democratic Front".

The number of Communists and Communist sympathizers on the directing committees of the Front leaves no reasonable doubt whatever that this policy-forming body is under Communist domination. At a meeting in February, two of the members, José Manuel Fortuny and Alfredo Guerra Borges, were Communists representing the PGT, two others, Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez and Max Solomón, Communists representing the CGTG. The six remaining members included such fellow-travelers as Leonardo Castillo Flores, who went to Moscow in 1947 after attending the Vienna WFTU Congress, and Major Marco Antonio Ramos, President of Congress who went to Budapest, Communist Hungary, during the same year to attend a meeting of the World Peace Council. There has never been an instance in which the "non-Communists" are known to have opposed the Communists. Since this Communist-controlled group decided such important policies as Guatemala's tactics at Caracas, there is little significance in the argument that no member of the Cabinet is a Communist.

As in the Government agencies, the Communist PGT has made its deepest penetration into the National Agrarian Department, which administers the Land Reform Law in conjunction with the Communist-influenced Agrarian Committees. The Deputy Chief of the Department, as stated above, is Waldemar Barrios Klée, member of the Communist PGT, who is in charge of the Department during the absences of the Chief, Major Alfonso Martínez, former Private Secretary to President Arbenz. The Secretary General of the Department is Sra. María Jorge de Fortuny, the wife of the communist leader Fortuny. At least fifteen of the Department's inspectors, who carry out decisions on the ground, have been identified as Communists and seven are publicly listed as such. An independent Guatemalan newspaper, El Espectador of September 21, 1953, estimated that 85 percent of the Department's employees were Communists, a statement which is possibly on the liberal side.

The field of Government information is also heavily infiltrated by Communists who control the Government press and radio propaganda to such an extent that it follows the Soviet line in international affairs and openly supports the Communist PGT and Communist-front labor and mass organizations at home. Carlos Alvarado Jones, Director General of Radio Broadcasting and Manager of the Guatemalan Government's station TGW, is an avowed Communist. Raúl Leiva, Chief of the Press Section of the Secretariat of Publicity and Propaganda in the Presidency and Medardo Mejía, editorial writer for the Government-owned daily newspaper Diario de Centro América, follow the Communist line so unrelentingly as to leave no doubt that they are Communists. As a result of such penetration, Guatemalan official propaganda follows closely the line of international communism including such fantastic charges as that bacteriological warfare was used in Korea.

The infiltration of Communists into the field of public education is such that Rafael Piedra Ibarra, a registered member of the Communist PGT and visitor to the USSR in 1951, is Secretary General of the national teachers' union, Sindicato de Trabajadores en Educación de Guatemala (STEG). The Publicity Office of the Ministry of Public Education is directed by Edelberto Torres, a Nicaraguan Communist intellectual who went to the "Peace" Conference at Pekin, Communist China, in 1952.

The Communist penetration of the social security system is carried out under Alfonso Solórzano, the Communist manager appointed in 1951. He now masquerades as a member of the leftist Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (PRG) and sometimes publicly clashes with the Communist party, PGT. But, like his former associate Lombardo Toledano, he does not cease to voice full support of Soviet objectives.

The Communist party has also installed one of its members, Hugo Barrios Klée, as Deputy Inspector General of Labor and infiltrated its members in other Government agencies. Although many of the Communists in the Government are known, it is almost certain that the full list has not been revealed

because the Communist party in Guatemala, as elsewhere, has never made public the names of all of its members.

Infiltration of Congress and the Arbenz Parties: In the Legislative Branch, the Communists exert their principal influence through their dominant position in the "National Democratic Front", which directs the voting of all of the Administration parties. The Communist PGT holds only four seats, a fact with little significance because the party was not an open party in the 1950 elections and had been legally registered less than a month in the 1953 elections. (A party spokesman has already announced that the party will demand that the "National Democratic Front" allocate it more seats in the next elections.)

The Communist deputies, however, are exceptionally powerful. By decision of the "National Democratic Front" Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez is First Secretary of the Congress and President of the Agrarian Reform Committee, while José Alberto Cardoza is President of the Committee on the Labor Code. Carlos Manuel Pellecer has, since he became a Deputy in 1953, emerged as the leading Administration spokesman in Congress. This Communist influence on Congress is so great that in June 1952, nineteen Deputies, including Julio Estrada de la Hoz, then President of Congress, addressed a message of solidarity to the Communist North Korean Government, reiterating the discredited charges that bacteriological warfare was used in Korea. In March, 1953, the Guatemalan Congress observed a minute of silence in homage to Stalin, becoming the only legislative body outside of the Soviet orbit known to have honored him at the time of his death.

The success of the Communists in influencing the Congress through the "National Democratic Front" is explained in part by the presence of Communist sympathizers and crypto-Communists who have infiltrated the other parties supporting the Arbenz Administration. The current Secretary General of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), the largest pro-Arbenz party, is Julio Estrada de la Hoz, who showed his Communist leanings in signing the message to North Korea and in other instances. His predecessor, Francisco Fernando Fernández Foncea, rose in Congress in October 1953 to say that all of the Revolutionary parties were destined to become part of the great world Communist movement. The Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (PRG), second of the "non-Communist" parties, which have been inveigled into the Communist-dominated Front, is headed by Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, the Minister of the Interior, who has collaborated with the Communists most of his political life. The party's newspaper, Diario del Pueblo, is run by Alfonso Solórzano, and the party is being organized on increasingly Communist lines by Abel Cuenca. Solórzano and Cuenca have long Communist histories and played a leading role in the infiltration of Communists into Guatemala in the first years after the 1944 Revolution. The Administration party, the Renovación Nacional, is now badly split but its dominant figure has been for several years Jaime Díaz Rozzotto, Secretary General of the Presidency, who greeted the Korean Armistice at a rally on July 31, 1953, as another step towards the establishment of a "Socialist world".

Infiltration of Labor and Mass Organizations: The labor movement is not only infiltrated but is completely under Communist control and riveted to the international Communist movement by its affiliation with the WFTU. The sole national labor federation, CGTG, has avowed Communists in its leading positions: Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez as Secretary General, José Alberto Cardoza as First Vice Secretary General, Virgilio Guerra as Secretary for Organization, and at least four other members of the Executive Committee. One of these is Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Secretary for Labor Conflicts.

The CGTG is strongly re-enforced by the national peasant organization, the CNCG, whose Secretary General is Leonardo Castillo Flores, a Communist sympathizer. He is Vice President of the National Peace Committee in Guatemala and went to Moscow in 1953 after attending the WFTU Congress in

Vienna. At least one member of the organization's leaders, Berto Delio Castro of the Consultative Council, is an avowed Communist, and probably only lack of a full public list of members of the PGT prevents identification of others.

The most influential youth, women's and mass organizations are also under Communist control. The National Peace Committee, the Guatemalan branch of this well-known international Communist movement, has as its Secretary General Mario Silva Jonama, a Secretary of the Communist PGT. The Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG) has as its Secretary General Edelberto Torres Rivas, who speaks and acts like a Communist, and visited Moscow last year. The Alianza Feminina Guatemalteca (AFG) has as its Secretary for Organization, Irma Chavez de Alvarado, the head of the women's commission of the Communist PGT. Each of these organizations also has many other Communists and sympathizers among its leadership.

Influence on the Judiciary: The Communist infiltration of the Judiciary Branch of the Guatemalan Government has not, so far as is known, yet been direct, but even here a measure of indirect control has been imposed and it has become increasingly subservient to Communist policy, as will be shown in the subsequent section. Marcial Mendez Montenegro, who was installed as the new President of the Court in February 1953, is sufficiently inclined towards the Communists to head the Guatemalan delegation to the Communist-front "Second Continental Conference of Democratic Lawyers" held in Guatemala City in 1953 and to go to the airport in May 1954 to greet Obdulio Barthe, the Paraguayan Communist leader who came to live in Guatemala after being released from a Paraguayan jail.

Contacts between the Guatemalan Communist Party and the International Communist Movement

There can be no reasonable doubt that the Guatemalan Communist party and the organizations in control are instruments of the international Communist conspiracy. Seven of the eleven members of the Political Committee of the PGT are known to have gone to the Soviet Union, six of them having made trips in the past two years. Fortuny took his most recent trip from November 5, 1953, to January 12, 1954. Principal leaders of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG), the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos de Guatemala (CNCG), the teachers' union STEG, the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), the Alianza Feminina Guatemalteca (AFG), and the Frente Universitario Democrático (FUD) have also gone to the Soviet Union in the past two years and returned to Guatemala where their subsequent actions have been closely integrated with Soviet policy.

Apart from the travel of these agents of international communism, close links are kept between the Guatemalan Communist and Communist-front organizations and the Soviet-controlled international Communist organizations. The Communist Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) is clearly in contact not only with Moscow but with the Bucharest headquarters of the Cominform, which publishes "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy." Articles on the PGT appear in this newspaper. The paper is read by Communist leaders everywhere to determine the international Communist line.

The CGTG and CNCG are affiliated with the international Communist labor organization, WFTU, whose headquarters are in the Soviet sector of Vienna. At the Vienna Congress of the WFTU on October 10-21, 1953, Gutiérrez was called upon by the Chairman of the Session, N. M. Shvernik of the Soviet labor union delegation, to open debate and Guatemala was listed first in a salute by this Communist Labor Congress to various labor organizations for achieving "unity of the labor-union movement". The AJDG is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth with headquarters in Bucharest, Communist Rumania. The AFG is affiliated with the International Federation of

Democratic Women with headquarters in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The FUD is affiliated with the International Students Union with headquarters in Prague, Communist Czechoslovakia. The National Peace Committee is affiliated with the World Peace Council, whose headquarters are also in Communist Czechoslovakia. Between each of these organizations in Guatemala and the corresponding Soviet-controlled international organizations flows a stream of correspondence amounting to directives. In this way the Guatemalan Communist movement is able to keep up to date on the Soviet line and to follow it in Guatemala.

III

INTERNAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GUATEMALA

International Communist Methods Used to Remake Guatemala in the Pattern of the "People's Democracies" in Eastern Europe

In infiltrating the internal political life of Guatemala, it has been an objective of the international Communist movement to establish in that American Republic a secure base for its disruptive activities in the Western Hemisphere. In order to accomplish this, the Communist party in Guatemala has drawn heavily on the well-proven techniques used to establish the police-state "People's Democracies" in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania after World War II.

In these Eastern European countries, the Communists used their power and influence on the government to destroy Constitutional government and to suppress or undermine every form of opposition. Since the inauguration of President Arbenz in 1951, a parallel process has been going on in Guatemala which is rapidly emerging as a police state on the Communist model.

The destruction of free government in Guatemala, like the infiltration of the Communists themselves, has been well planned and well camouflaged. After the Revolution, the Guatemalan people elected a Constituent assembly which, before the Communists had gained influence, framed a new Constitution to meet their aspirations for a more democratic government. This Constitution, which went into effect on March 15, 1945, provided for the separation of government functions into Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches and guaranteed civil liberties. The Constitution was designed by those who drafted it to provide a framework in which peaceful change of the government would be possible through elections.

Suppression of the Opposition: When the Communists achieved their open influence on the Guatemalan Government, they began a campaign which has progressively undermined the Revolutionary Constitution and suppressed the opposition. The first step was the intensifying of the propaganda campaign to discredit the opposition and to identify opposition leaders with foreign powers and interests, a technique used, for instance, to prepare the way for the arrests of Cardinal Mindzenty in Hungary and the Rumanian National Peasant leader, Juliu Maniu. In 1951 and 1952, the Communist press and the massive Communist propaganda apparatus in the labor unions, the mass organizations and the official and subsidized press heightened their attacks on the anti-Communists in the country, alleging that they were lackeys of foreign interests and were planning to subvert the government. The object of this propaganda, as similar Communist propaganda in Eastern Europe, was to make it appear that all who dared to question the government's Communist-influenced policies were traitorous.

Subsequently, the highest levels of the Government publicly refused to admit that there could be a loyal, Constitutional opposition. In his March 1, 1953, message to Congress, President Arbenz said that a line had been drawn in the sand and "on one side are those definitely with the Revolution and on the other those definitely against it. As in all great historical decisions the middle position has no place." In a speech before the Communist-front "Second Continental Conference of Democratic Lawyers" in Guatemala City last October, Augusto Charnaud MacDonald stated succinctly:

To be anti-Communist is to be anti-government.

The parallel attitude of the Arbenz Administration and the Communist propaganda apparatus of classifying the opposition as traitors and subversives established the climate in which an active suppression of the opposition could be undertaken. The anti-Communist movement in Guatemala grew in influence after the Communist party came into the open in 1951, and on March 23, 1952, the anti-Communist parties and civic groups held a mass demonstration of about 20,000 people in Guatemala City. At about this time, there began intensification of police persecution of the anti-Communist in a fashion that evokes memories of police procedures in the Soviet satellite area. In 1952, anti-Communist leaders began to be suddenly arrested without charges, hidden from their families, and tortured in police dungeons. The student anti-Communist leaders Mario Paíz Herrera and the Quinonez brothers were arrested, and as their later testimony to the press showed, held incommunicado and tortured. After an abortive uprising in the provincial town of Salamá, in March, 1953, the police not only arrested those involved in the rebellion but also seized the opportunity to arrest more members of the opposition leadership, alleging that they were involved: Mario Sandoval and other leaders of the Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticommunistas (CUA), the principal student opposition organization; Luis Valladares y Aycinena, Secretary General of the Partido Unificación Anticommunista (PUA), the principal opposition party; and many other prominent anti-Communist and opposition leaders. Other anti-Communist leaders, including Carlos Simons of the Comité Cívico Nacional (CCN) and the prominent attorney, Juan Cordova Cerna, took refuge in foreign embassies or fled the country.

In a manner markedly parallel to the techniques used in Eastern Europe, the Guatemalan authorities charged that the Salamá uprising was part of a concerted foreign plot to overthrow the government and that these men were implicated in it. The Guatemalan Government notified the United Nations of these charges on April 1, 1953, but it has never substantiated the charges or brought the culprits in their jurisdiction to trial. The jail in Salamá has become a miniature concentration camp where some 66 persons, including the student leader Mario Sandoval, are still held without trial after spending over a year in prison.

In 1954, with the Communists in a stronger position than ever, the drive against the opposition continued. Again, the Government used the "international plot" theme, asserting in a statement released by the Information Office of the Presidency on January 29 that evidence had been gathered showing that the Nicaraguan Government had supported, and the "Government of the North" had acquiesced in, a plot by Guatemalan exiles to overthrow the Government. On the basis of these allegations, police not only arrested opposition leaders involved in the "plot", but also the leaders of the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores Libres (UNTL), a small unregistered group of anti-Communist workers formed in 1952 to challenge the Communist control of the Guatemalan labor movement. Among those arrested in this move were Ruben Villatoro, President of the UNTL, Guillermo Davila Cordova, a prominent attorney, Horacio de Cordova, Director of the radio program "La Hora Anticomunista", and Roberto Vizcanio Sinibaldi, director of Radio Continental. All of these were later put across the Mexican and Honduran border by the police and related to the press how they were brutally tortured in order to extract confessions from them.

Additionally, during this period there was an increase of attacks by groups of hoodlums on centers of opposition activity. This technique was flagrantly used in Eastern Europe; for example, in the Rumanian elections of 1946, Communist thugs broke into the headquarters of the opposition parties and raided the offices of the opposition newspapers without police interference. In Guatemala, a parallel development has taken place. The "Casa de Libertad", headquarters of various anti-Communist organizations, were raided by hoodlums on Christmas Eve, 1953, furniture was smashed, and anti-Communist newspapers were taken away. Masked hoodlums have also broken

into the premises of at least two anti-Communist radio stations, attacked employees and smashed equipment, the latest of these episodes having occurred during the night of April 21, 1954 at Radio Internacional while police in the immediate vicinity did nothing to interfere.

A new climax to the drive against the opposition accompanied the suspension of Constitutional guarantees on June 8, 1954. The Government itself here provided proof of the emptiness of the claims that it enjoys the support of the Guatemalan people. It was nakedly using force for suppression. The available reports indicate that hundreds of persons, mostly of humble origin, were arrested and now crowd the jails. A bulletin of the Guardia Civil states that on June 9, a squad of police were sent to arrest four persons near Lake Amatitlan and were met with resistance from more than forty peasants who killed two policemen with machetes and seriously wounded another. Police sent in reinforcements, and on the next day they killed five peasants in the skirmish. In Guatemala City, house [illegible] have been ransacked by police without warrants. Police acting under direct instructions from the Communist leader Gutiérrez, have arrested a newsman on the street. The press also show anti-Communists were arrested and later their mutilated and beaten bodies were found in various parts of the city. One such body was that of Oscar Luna, interim head of the Comité Obrero Anticomunista whose corpse was found floating in Lake Amatitlan after his arrest by police. Large numbers of other anti-Communists took refuge in the Salvadoran Embassy.

Under the suspension of Constitutional guarantees Guatemala rang down the Iron Curtain by prohibiting the entry and departure of people from the country and by imposing censorship of the press under Raúl Leiva, Chief of the Press Office of the Presidency, who never deviates from the Communist line.

The drive against the opposition in the three years since the inauguration of President Arbenz, recently climaxed by a form of reign of terror, [illegible] violated the traditions of Constitutional government as the [illegible] Constituent Assembly conceived of it after the 1944 Revolution. The [illegible] has used the principal opposition party, the Partido Unificación Anticomunista, the leading students' organization, the Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunista and lesser opposition organizations such as the [illegible] and the Trabajadores Libres. There is, thus, no effectively organized opposition group, political or labor, in the country. Many Guatemalans have inevitably come to feel as a result of the Government's policies and action that legal and Constitutional opposition to the Arbenz Administration is impossible and that the only way to remove the influence of the alien influence of international communism on the country is through extra-legal action. Thus, by a three year campaign of suppression against legitimate opposition, the Guatemalan Government, working in harmony with the Communists, destroyed the main basis of Constitutional government in their country and created a situation in which an attempt at an uprising was inevitable.

Communist Undermining of the Armed Forces: Another international Communist tactic which has lately come to the forefront in Guatemala is the use of the Communist-controlled labor movement to undermine the position of the regular Army. In Czechoslovakia, it will be recalled, it was the armed terrorist squads of the Communist-controlled labor unions which in 1948 took the leading part in installing a government subservient to Moscow and ringing down the Iron Curtain on Czechoslovakia.

In Guatemala, the Communists have conducted a long campaign to have the labor unions armed, ostensibly to defend the country but actually to create a force to overbalance the Army, which is non-Communist. Colonel Arbenz once partly armed the labor unions in 1949 during the insurrection of the Guardia de Honor in Guatemala City when he opened Government arsenals to

them "to defend the government". Since that time the Communists have shown on a number of occasions that they still entertain the thought of arming the unions. In 1952, when tension surrounded the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law, the Communist leader, Carlos Manuel Pellecer, announced that armed "defense brigades" would be formed within the CGTG to defend the Arbenz Government. Although nothing developed from this, the idea was kept alive. In 1954, the Union of Lot Buyers (Unión de Compradores de Lotes), one of the smaller Communist-controlled organizations, petitioned the Superior Defense Council for military training.

After the arrival of arms from the Soviet orbit on the M/S Alfhem on May 15, 1954, the Communist demands for armed labor unions was renewed. On June 4, Leonardo Castillo Flores, Secretary General of the National peasant organization, CNCG, called on the CNCG affiliates to create a basis for a "peoples army", and Cesar Montenegro Paniagua, a Communist deputy, boasted that if the anti-Communists rose against the Government "we will cut off their heads".

The danger that armed Guatemalan Communist-controlled unions and the peasant units will use their power to complete the transformation of Guatemala into a Western Hemisphere "People's Democracy" despite the non-Communist character of the Guatemalan officer's corps, is very real. It is well to remember that when the Communists finally overthrew King Michael of Rumania on December 30, 1947, the non-Communist units of his guard in the Rumanian Army were confined to barracks and disarmed while truckloads of members of the Communist-controlled labor unions roamed the streets.

Destruction of Legal Protection of Guatemalan Society: In addition to the striking down of the opposition and the undermining of the Armed Forces, the Communists in Guatemala took an active part in undermining another potential force of opposition, the independent judiciary. This occurred on February 6, 1953, when the Guatemalan Congress dismissed the President of the Supreme Court and all but one of the other members. On February 5 the Supreme Court had handed down a decision by a vote of 5-4 that the Court would consider whether or not Article 98 of the Agrarian Reform Law, which prohibited appeals to the Court, was Constitutional, since the Constitution guaranteed the right to have recourse to the Courts. That evening Congress was summoned into session and the Communist deputy Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez took the leading part in a debate, after which in the middle of the night the Justices who had voted affirmatively were dismissed for "notorious misconduct, negligence and unfitness".

Now, in dismissing these justices at Communist instigation, the Congress in effect destroyed the independent judiciary for it set itself above the Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the Constitution. Since the Communists, through the "National Democratic Front", exert a dominant influence over the government parties in Congress, they are in an excellent position to have the final word on Constitutional law and the separation of the powers contemplated by the framers of the Constitution after the 1944 Revolution has come to an end.

Communist Encouragement of Lawlessness: The success of the international Communist movement in other fields has been accompanied in Guatemala, as in Russia itself in 1917-18, by a systematic encouragement of lawlessness to disrupt the social organization of the country as a means of facilitating the final imposition of the Communist dictatorship.

This tactic of encouraging disorder is best seen in the violence and disorders that the Communists have instigated on Guatemala's Pacific Coast in connection with the application of agrarian reform. The Agrarian Reform Law provides only for the expropriation of uncultivated land, but the Communist leadership assigned Carlos Manuel Pellecer,

the most fiery of their agitators, to stimulate the peasants to seize land whether it was cultivated or not. On January 19, 1953, the day after the Congressional elections were over, well-organized peasant bands began invading private farms in the Pacific Coast Department of Escuintla and seizing lands which had not been given to them under the Agrarian Reform Law. These invasions lasted several months, until the crop planting season arrived and it was too late to seize further lands. In the 1953-54 season between the crops, such bands, personally exhorted by Pellecer, started earlier in their lawless invasions of property and destruction of crops. Between December and April, thirty or more farms in the Department of Escuintla alone were invaded and private property seized. Violence broke out as various peasant groups clashed and scores of people, most of them humble peasants, died of machete wounds. In January, the situation in the Department appeared so close to getting out of control that Major Alfonso Martinez, Chief of the National Agrarian Department, went to Escuintla to attempt to restore a semblance of order. Recently, there have been signs that the Communists are attempting to stimulate similar lawlessness in other parts of Guatemala. In early April, Pellecer went to the Western Department of Quetzaltenango but was initially unsuccessful there. On April 30, a disorder arising from the implementation of the Agrarian Reform occurred in the Eastern Department of Chiquimula in which at least five people were killed. It was revealed in the press that in one locality the Secretary General of the Local Agrarian Committee, the Manager of the branch of the National Agrarian Bank, the chief of police, and the National Agrarian Inspector were all members of the Communist Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT).

IV

EXTERNAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GUATEMALA

Guatemala as a Focus of Infection Spreading to the Surrounding Area

The growth and consolidation of the Communist apparatus in Guatemala has been accompanied by a progressive extension of its influence over most of that country's principal political institutions, as indicated in the foregoing sections. From this vantage point the party has not only manipulated the machinery of government to further its objectives within the country but also achieved success in shaping the international posture of Guatemala.

The Guatemalan Government by sheltering the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo has placed within the grasp of the international Communist movement an instrument located in the vital center of the American Continent with which to carry out its operations in the Hemisphere.

Guatemala affords the international Communist organization with a laboratory in which to develop techniques of infiltration and subversion adapted to the conditions prevailing in the Western Hemisphere and a base from which to project the experience gained. Evidence exists that this design is being carried out -- especially in the Central American area. The official Guatemalan press and radio afford media for the dissemination of Communist propaganda in the region. It is demonstrated by the programs of the government-owned radio station TWG which are beamed abroad and by the distribution of printed material in neighboring countries. Much of the output is directed at exploitation of the masses and of national social and economic movements in other countries, a field which has proved so fruitful for the international Communist organization in Guatemala.

Through attendance at meetings in the other American Republics and correspondence, officials of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) have been in direct contact with leaders of Communist-front parties in other Central American Republics, presumably serving as advisers in a manner similar to that in which more experienced Communists in earlier times aided in the growth of the PGT in Guatemala. Guatemala has also become a focal point for exiled Communists from other American States. From this refuge these exiles, banded in organizations such as the Partido Democrático Revolucionario Hondureño and the Movimiento de Nicaraguenses Partidarios de la Democracia, both of which are Communist-infiltrated in Guatemala, engaged in activities which perpetuate tension in the area. More recently, Guatemala has promoted the organization of groups called "Sociedad Amigos de Guatemala" in several of the American Republics. These groups serve as a facade for the dissemination of Communist-oriented propaganda, drawing in the innocent as well as the Communists and fellow-travellers in the typically Communist tactic. Hence, the links between the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo and Communist-front parties in other countries and the variety of Communist and leftist political exiles in Guatemala provide a network through which the Guatemalan experiment can be extended to other American countries.

It is against this background that the recent shipment of substantial amounts of arms assumes special significance. For the center of propaganda, indoctrination and conspiracy has now gained a new element - military potential.

Guatemalan Efforts to Create Discord in the Area

Indications already exist that Guatemala is being used as a base from which to sow discord in the area. In May 1954 a well-organized strike gripped the northern coastal region of the Republic of Honduras, threatening the

economy of the country and the stability of the Government itself. A significant feature of the strike was that it was well-organized and financed in an area where the local labor leadership had neither the experience in organization nor the money to undertake such a vast operation. It may be significant that the strike was preceded by the assignment in March and April of special Guatemalan Consuls to the area. A few days before the strike the Guatemalan Military Attaché in El Salvador made a mysterious trip into Honduras, visiting the area. Four days before the beginning of the strike a Guatemalan military airplane landed at Puerto Cortes without prior authorization. During the course of the work stoppage clandestine radio stations have encouraged the strikers in their activities. Strike leaders have made frequent visits to the Guatemalan Consulates. Communist-dominated labor organizations in Guatemala have encouraged the strikers with moral and financial support. On May 27, the Government of Honduras issued a statement regarding the strike in which it announced that international Communist agents had infiltrated the ranks of the strikers. Among the reasons given for this conclusion was the fact that numerous messages had been received from Communist organizations in Guatemala, admonishing the Honduran Government to respect the "patriotic strike" against "imperialist domination". Two of these organizations were the Communist-controlled Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and Communist-influenced Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG), most of the rest being from their affiliates and from Communist-controlled mass organizations. Earlier, the Government of Honduras had withdrawn the exequaturs of the several Guatemalan Consuls 1/ in the strike region for "having conducted themselves in a manner incompatible with the consular functions by having attempted under cloak of their official position to foment ideas and practices threatening the Republic's democratic form of government and dangerous to public order and tranquility".

In El Salvador the attention of Guatemalan Communist elements have been directed particularly at university student groups. Working through the exile group Asociación Democrática Salvadoreña (ADS) in Guatemala and the Asociación General de Estudiantes Universitarios Salvadoreños (AGEUS) in El Salvador, Communists in Guatemala have sought to unify oppositionist groups and to increase anti-government propaganda and agitation within El Salvador.

In addition to incidents leading up to labor unrest in Honduras, there are other indications that the Guatemalan diplomatic service and military attachés are being used as a "cloak" to extend Communist ideology in the area. Evidence of this design is to be found in Communist-oriented literature appearing in neighboring countries traceable to the Guatemalan missions, as well as in the relations which Guatemalan diplomatic representatives maintain with Communist-front political and cultural organizations in the countries to which they are accredited. In breaking relations with Guatemala in May 1954, the Nicaraguan Government cited as the reason the fact that Communist propaganda had entered Nicaragua during the last several years under Guatemalan official seals and that the Embassy had been distributing the material. During the same month the United States protested to the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington the distribution under diplomatic frank certain printed materials containing attacks on the United States and responsible officials of the United States Government. In another instance during April 1954, the Guatemalan Ambassador to Costa Rica addressed a meeting of the Communist-controlled Confederación General de Trabajadores Costarricenses, despite the previous warning that his appearance would be embarrassing to the Costa Rican Government.

1/ Raúl Pérez, Consul at San Pedro de Sula (recognized August 25, 1951)
José María Aguilar Muniz, Consul at Puerto Cortes (recognized April 6, 1954)
Alfonso Cabrera Letona, Provisional Consul at Tela (recognized March 3, 1954)
Pedro Díaz Maroquin, Consul at Nuevo Ocotepeque (provisionally recognized April 24, 1954)

Guatemala's Position in the Organization of Central American States and the Organization of American States

There are few fields inwwhich the cynical influence of Communist leaders is brought into sharper focus than in the policies followed by Guatemala within the inter-American system. The ascendancy of this influence is particularly manifest in the gradual self-imposed isolation of that country within the Organization of American States (OAS) on vital issues of peace and security. The culmination of this trend was reached recently when, contrary to the spirit and practice which has governed the settlement of differences between members of the American family of nations, Guatemala in a studied move circumvented the procedures available to it within the Western Hemisphere.

In the summer of 1952 the Foreign Minister of El Salvador proposed that at the first session of the governing body of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) consideration be given to the menace posed by international communism in Central America. Confronted with a favorable response to this proposal on the part of the other members, the Guatemalan Government in April 1953 chose to withdraw from the Organization rather than to take a public stand on the Communist issue. In the statement announcing this decision, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister stated:

> "Replying to the consultation which my Government democratically undertook in relation to the meeting of Central American Foreign Ministers, the democratic organizations have coincided in demanding of the Government that it retire from the Organization of Central American States, considering that to remain in the Organization would compromise, under existing circumstances, the sovereignty, the national independence and the free realization of the objectives of the Guatemalan Revolution."

The decision followed, as indicated by the Foreign Minister Osegueda, consulation with the "democratic organizations" of the country. One of these organizations was presumably the Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG), which shortly thereafter changed its name to Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). The advice received from this organization is embodied in a declaration issued by its Central Committee on October 9, 1952, in which it stated:

> "We, the Guatemalan Communists, erred in not having pointed out the black prospect offered by the Organization of Central American States in time, and we were careless in not having analyzed before now the motives behind the fascist Salvadoran officials in so warmly supporting the Organization of Central American States constitution. A denunciation before the masses of the evil possibilities offered to international conspirators by the San Salvador Charter would have stimulated popular mobilization against the designs of imperialism and Central American feudal reaction, unmasking their agents, such as Canessa and halting their provocative, anti-democratic plans. Nevertheless, there is still time for our people to mobilize and combat the fascist proposal of Canessa with ardor and unmask the true nature of the Organization of Central American States, while protesting against the hateful persecution unleashed by the Osorio Government against the Salvadoran people, joining in the difficult and bloody battle which the workers, the peasants, the artisans, the students and the progressive professionals are waging in our brother country."

At the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March, 1954, Guatemala made clear its position on the vital issue of Communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere. In the formulation of the agenda for the Conference, Guatemala was the only American Republic to oppose inclusion of the topic, an act which was praised in the December 11, 1953

issue of the Bucharest newspaper of the Cominform, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy." Similarly, it cast the only negative vote against the anti-Communist resolution adopted at Caracas. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that this vote was accompanied by a renunciation of its adherence to the resolutions against Communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere of Bogotá and Washington, making Guatemala the only country in the Hemisphere not to take a stand against the Communist menace. In a further demonstration of the international Communist orientation of the Guatemalan foreign policy, the Delegation abstained in the vote on the resolution against racial segregation introduced by Panama because of the phrase "as one of the ways to fight international communism" and absented itself from the session at which the Conference, at the initiative of Cuba, paid homage to the United Nations' dead in Korea. At least a partial explanation for these unprecedented actions is to be found in a speech delivered shortly after the close of the Conference, when Communist Deputy Carlos Manuel Pellecer revealed that Foreign Minister Toriello before leaving for Caracas had met with the President and the "National Democratic Front", the Communist-dominated alliance of parties and labor groups supporting the Arbenz Administration, to work out the line to be followed by the Guatemalan Delegation at the Conference.

The policy of the Soviet Union with respect to collective security arrangements for the defense of the Free World is well known. A parallel exists between this policy and the stand taken by the Guatemalan Communist Party on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The failure of the Guatemalan Government to complete its ratification of the Treaty coincides with this stand, if it is not directly attributable to it. As early as July 12, 1950, Sr. José Manuel Fortuny expressed the party's position on the Rio Treaty in an attack published in the Communist organ Octubre. On March 25, 1954, during the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Guatemala withdrew from the Pan American Union its instrument of ratification of the Treaty, making it the only country which has failed to complete its ratification of the Treaty. A month later the Political Committee of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo explained:

> "The Declaration imposed by the North Americans at Caracas twists the interpretation of the Rio de Janeiro Pact, placing it at the service of interventionist plans. The Communists and the workers of Guatemala denounced this Pact as a result of a foreign policy contrary to the national interests and impregnated with the false idea that 'nothing can be done against the wishes of Washington'. At that time no one wished to pay heed to the voice of the Communists and the working class, but now it would be difficult for persons of democratic ideas and patriotic sentiments not to understand clearly that the Rio de Janeiro Pact cannot result in any good for Guatemala and that on the contrary, it can be utilized by the forces of international reaction to the detriment of the aspirations of our people."

The corrosive influence of Guatemalan Communist leaders on the international posture of Guatemala is most strikingly revealed in the course of action which it took following the uprisings of June 18, 1954. Confronted with a situation which it alleged was an act of aggression on the part of Honduras and Nicaragua, the Guatemalan Government chose not to present its complaint initially to the Organization of American States where the charges could be quietly and thoroughly investigated in the spirit which has traditionally governed these matters in the American family of nations. Instead, it went directly before the Security Council of the United Nations, where it placed its complaint couched in terms calculated to aggravate rather than ameliorate the situation. At this juncture the studied move on the part of Guatemala to circumvent the inter-American

system and the objectives of the Soviet Union to discredit the effectiveness of the Inter-American system and thereby to weaken the solidarity of the American Republics coincided. This was made clear when the Soviet Representative resorted to the veto to frustrate the desire of the remaining members of the Security Council to entrust the matter to the Organization of American States.

Soviet Propaganda Line Reflected by Government Officials and in the Official Press and Radio

As an instrument of international communism, the Communist organization in Guatemala not only secretly seeks to promote Soviet ends within the Hemisphere but publicly echos the world-wide propaganda line set by the Kremlin, thereby adding its voice to those who seek to sow distrust and disunity in the Free World. In so doing it counts with the active participation of Guatemalan Government officials and with the support of the official and pro-Government press and radio.

One of the standard propaganda lines during the past few years has been that of the "peace offensive", which originated in its present from at the World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Paris in 1949 and has since been a major vehicle of Soviet propaganda throughout the world. To carry out the objectives of this movement, the Guatemalan Communist organization established a National Peace Committee after the 1949 Congress, with subsidiary units throughout the country. Officials of the Guatemalan Government have closely identified themselves with this organization and the official and pro-Government press has given widespread publicity to its activities. A recent example of how the Peace Committee contributes to the world-wide propaganda objectives of Soviet communism is illustrated by its participation in the "Campaign for Negotiations" in response to the Budapest World Peace Council's appeal for negotiation of outstanding international questions between the United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR and Communist China. The pro-Communist press and the Diario de Centro América, a government organ, gave active support to the campaign, reporting on the progress made in the collection of signatures and on meetings held to promote the movement. On October 3, 1953 the Diario de Centro América published an article on a meeting to gather signatures in hospitals of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS) and carried a front page photograph of participants, showing Sr. Oscar Edmundo Palma and Srta. Atala Valenzuela, two Communists who visited Moscow in 1953 and 1952, respectively. Two days later, in its October 5th edition, the Diario de Centro América reported a meeting at the provincial capital of Escuintla at which Captain Terencio Quillén, the Departmental Governor, presided in his capacity as President of the Departmental Peace Committee. A principal speaker on this occasion was Sr. Raúl Leiva, Chief of the Press Section of the Guatemalan Government's Information Office.

Another Soviet propaganda line echoed prominently in Guatemala centers on the charges against South Korea, bacteriological warfare and the massacre of Korean and Chinese prisoners. In June 1952 Guatemalan leftist organizations observed a week of "Solidarity with the People of Korea" to mark the second anniversary of the Korean War. This observance was characterized by the vociferous repetition of distorted and mendacious versions of Korean developments. The various activities received generous publicity from the official and pro-Government information media. One of the principal features of the observance, as previously mentioned, was a declaration issued by a group of nineteen Deputies, including the President and First Vice-President of the Guatemalan Congress, condemning "imperialist aggression in Korea" and expressing their "solidarity with and sympathy for, the glorious and heroic Korean people against whom have been used the most infamous means of mass extermination, including bacteriological warfare, by the invaders . . .". The Communist film "Bacteriological Warfare in Korea" has been shown on repeated occasions in connection with Communist-sponsored programs, some of which have taken place in Government-owned buildings. The Nuestro

Diario, a pro-Communist newspaper supporting the Arbenz Administration, announced on September 6, 1952 that this film would be an item on the program of the opening of the new Indoctrination School of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), largest of the parties supporting the Arbenz Administration.

The signing of the truce in Korea was reported in the official Diario de Centro América through a bulletin of the National Peace Committee which said in part, "The National Peace Committee, in making known the joy and enthusiasm to this news which is a conquest of the world peace movement, calls upon all Guatemalans who love peace to participate, as a sign of the joy that fills us, with all persons, democratic organizations, civic and beneficent institutions, political parties and the people in general in the Day of Celebration for the Signature of the Korean Armistice: Friday, July 31." Virtually all the top half of the front page was devoted to the activites of the Cominform "peace" movement and statements by its leaders, thus stressing its supposed connection with the conclusion of the truce. Subsequent issues of the paper continued to link the Korean truce with the "peace" movement, prominently displaying messages from Communist-front organizations and labor unions congratulating the "peace" movement on its achievement and headlining their plans for a monster celebration. The official daily's editorials reflected the same parallelism between the conclusion of the armistice and the "peace" movement. The Communist-sponsored rally and torchlight parade in celebration of the armistice took place on July 31, 1953. The rally was held in the auditorium of the Government's girls' school "Belen". It had as its keynote that the truce in Korea represented a great victory for the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea and the "World Peace Movement" over "American imperialism". Among the principal speakers at the demonstration were: Colonel Carlos Paz Tejada, introduced as ex-Chief of the Armed Forces and a member of the World Peace Council; Sr. Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, Communist deputy and Secretary General of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG); Sr. Leonardo Castillo Flores, Vice President of the National Peace Committee and Secretary General of the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG); Sr. Francisco Fernando Fernandez Foncea, deputy and then Secretary General of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), the leading Administration party; Sr. Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, Minister of the Interior and Secretary General of the Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (PRG), the second largest Administration party; Sr. Jaime Díaz Rozzotto, Secretary General of President Arbenz' executive office and Secretary General of the Partido Renovación Nacional (PN); and Sr. José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT).

The pro-Communist actions of the present government officials and the official press on the Korean issue, described in the preceding paragraphs, stand in marked contrast to the anti-Communist position taken only a few months after the invasion of South Korea by the Guatemalan delegate in the Council of the Organization of American States on the United States proposal for a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider measures to protect the Hemisphere against the aggressive policy of international communism. On that occasion, the Guatemalan representative stated:

> "It is inconceivable and unacceptable that the countries of America, which have fought since their independence for the maintenance of the postulates of liberty and democracy, should not stand up to the world situation which threatens them. And in this connection I believe of great importance for us to consider that the postulates of the dialectics of history, as absolute truths, constitute a blind orthodoxy and the infallibility of the Politburo a tyranny."

It is regrettable to note that even at that time opposition to Soviet Communist designs was not looked upon with favor by the Guatemalan Government: the delegate, Ambassador Antonio Goubaud Carrera, was shortly afterwards recalled by his government because of such anti-Communist views.

The Soviet propaganda line on Indo-China is also being reflected by the Communist-controlled or oriented organizations in Guatemala. On December 19, 1953, the Communist-controlled Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) sponsored a "Day of Solidarity with the Viet-Namese People". A government-owned auditorium was used for the celebration. In its main editorial on April 29, 1954 the official news organ, Diario de Centro América, reviewed a recent speech by Chou Enlai at Geneva concluding that "If the nations attending the Conference agree with him, undoubtedly world peace will be guaranteed".

The ability of the Communist leaders in Guatemala to use the Government of that country in furthering the objectives of the international Communist movement is demonstrated by two other striking examples. It is evidenced in the so-called "doctors plot" incident in Moscow in 1953 where the party and official press, despite obvious embarrassment, held steadfastly to the Soviet line while it threaded its way through the succeeding and contradictory explanations of that incident. It is also found in the proceedings of the National Congress following the death of Stalin. Not only did thirty-one Deputies join in a cablegram to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR expressing their condolence on "the occasion of the death of the great leader Joseph Stalin, an irreparable loss for the universe for the popular liberation of world peace", but also the Guatemalan Congress observed a minute of silence in tribute to the Soviet leader at his death.

The actions and attitudes recounted above taken separately might give the appearance of being of little consequence. Fitted together they indicate a pattern. The design is one of identity with the aims and purposes of the international Communist movement on the part of the Guatemalan Communist party, of toleration and protection of the party on the part of the Guatemalan Government, of growing influence of the leaders of that party in the councils of state of the Republic, of using Guatemalan territory as a base from which to extend the influence of international communism in the area.

V

SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO GUATEMALA

Very recently, a new link between international communism and Guatemala was revealed: the large shipment of armaments to Guatemala from the Soviet orbit.

On May 15, 1954, the Swedish vessel, M/S Alfhem, docked at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, to discharge a cargo of armament which had been loaded at Stettin, Poland. The procurement of armament by Guatemala from the Soviet orbit on the vessel, M/S Alfhem, was the result of protracted clandestine negotiations, in which Soviet orbit suppliers and agents of the Guatemalan Government collaborated in elaborate precautions, which included the use of fraudulent shipping documents, to keep the identity, the origin and the destination of the cargo secret.

The M/S Alfhem sailed under blind orders on a misleading course, not receiving instructions to enter Puerto Barrios until within a short distance of the port. After the vessel anchored in the harbor, the extraordinary efforts to prevent public identification of the cargo and its country of origin were continued. In the end, Guatemalan authorities chose to admit publicly that the shipment consisted of military equipment, but they gave differing versions of the amount of the armament and its origin.

The details of this transaction are given in Annex D. The facts may be summarized as follows:

1. It is known that José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT), departed without previous announcement for Moscow on November 5, 1953, returning to Guatemala on January 12, 1954. Six days after Fortuny's return to Guatemala, Major Alfonso Martinez, Chief of the Guatemalan National Agrarian Department and former Private Secretary to President Arbenz, was called away suddenly from settling agrarian reform disputes and on January 18 flew to Switzerland, returning in February. There is reason to believe that Major Martinez travelled from Switzerland to Czechoslovakia and that in those two countries he made financial and shipping arrangements which supplemented arrangements probably concluded by Fortuny at an earlier date in Moscow. It is a known fact that armament cannot be shipped from a country inside the Soviet orbit without the consent of the highest political authorities in Moscow.

2. It is known that in March 1954 the Bank of Guatemala sold foreign exchange in the amount of $6,064,000 compared with average monthly sales for the previous year of less than $1,000,000. It is known that the monthly sales of the Bank of Guatemala have exceeded $2,000,000 only twice in the last two years. It is believed that payment for the armament, in accordance with arrangements made by Major Martinez or other Guatemalan representatives in Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, was effected through banks in the United States to Western European banks, and thence to Communist Czechoslovakia.

3. It is known that the M/S Alfhem was chartered to Alfred Christensen, Stockholm, by Angfartygasktiebolaget Bohuslanska Kusten, of Sweden. It is known that the Swedish charterer had acted in the past as agent for the Czechoslovakian Government shipping monopoly, CECHOFRACHT. In this case, he received money for the hire of the M/S Alfhem from the London representative of CECHOFRACHT, who made the payment with funds drawn from a Czech sterling account. These funds were transferred to Christensen through the London firm, E. E. Dean & Company and a London bank. It is clear, therefore, that Christensen acted as cloak or agent for CECHOFRACHT, which was in effect the charterer of the M/S Alfhem. Agents who handled the shipment in Stettin were: a) METRANS, a Czech Government monopoly for international forwarding of freight and b) SPEDRAPID, a Czech shipping and brokerage organization, which represents METRANS in Poland.

4. It is known that the M/S Alfhem arrived at Stettin, Poland, on April 9, 1954, that cargo was loaded at Stettin on a 24 hour a day schedule, that the loading, according to the captain, was handled by a Polish Government agency, "Morska Agencia". It is known that the bill of lading showed the shipper to be John Milles & Brothers, of London, a firm which the British Board of Trade has been unable to identify or locate. Although the bill of lading listed the cargo as "15,424 cases of machinery equipment, machinery spare parts, laboratory and chemical glass, etc., as per specification", it is known that the bill of lading was falsely manifested, and that the owner, on May 21, 1954, cancelled the ship's charter because the cargo was "loaded under false description".

5. It is known that the M/S Alfhem departed Stettin "for Dakar on order" on April 17; that the vessel made one stop at Copenhagen enroute to Puerto Barrios; that it received orders on April 23 to proceed to Curacao; that on May 7 it received ordersto proceed to Puerto Cortes, Honduras; and that on May 13 it received orders to proceed to Puerto Barrios for unloading. It is known that the M/S Alfhem, in fact, pursued a direct course from Stettin to Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, for unloading.

6. It is known that extraordinary measures were taken while the cargo of the M/S Alfhem was being unloaded at Puerto Barrios, to prevent public identification of the cargo and the country of origin. A guard of troops was maintained around the vessel and the dock, so that it was impossible for unauthorized persons to approach the discharge area. The local shipping agent was prohibited from boarding the ship and was not given access to its papers. Press representatives who attempted to obtain photographs had their film summarily confiscated. When Guatemalan officials finally announced in public statements that the cargo was armament, describing it variously as to amount and source, the shipment already had received widespread official and public notice in this Hemisphere and in Western Europe.

7. Most of the cargo discharged by the M/S Alfhem was carried aboard 119 freight cars to Guatemala City, where it was transferred to military trucks by soldiers and delivered to ordnance depots of the Guardia de Honor Regiment and Base Militar of the Guatemalan Army, in Guatemala City. Four other loaded freight cars were drawn off at a siding near Puerto Barrios and the contents delivered to the airport on trucks.

8. The total cargo discharged by the M/S Alfhem included some 15,424 cases, weighing 4,122,145 lbs., or about 2061 short tons. The cargo is believed to have included rifles, machine guns and miscellaneous other types of military equipment.

Guatemala is estimated to maintain armed forces and a civil guard totalling approximately 10,000 men. The combined total of military and quasi-military forces maintained by Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua is estimated to be about 11,000 men. Before the arrival of armament on the M/S Alfhem, Guatemala is estimated to have possessed: a) more than one and one-half times the number of small arms required to arm the Guatemalan army and civil guard; b) more artillery pieces, includir armored vehicles, than any other country in Central America.

Even though the military potential of the Guatemalan armed forces, already great, was significantly increased by the Alfhem shipment, Guatemala has been seeking additional large quantities of arms in the United States and Europe. These efforts continued not only while the negotiations for arms from Soviet sources were being carried out, but even after the Alfhem shipment had been delivered.

Guatemalan interest in acquiring arms from non-Soviet sources has been directed towards four principal categories of equipment, namely, aircraft, military vehicles, small arms and ammunition. However, efforts to procure armament from non-Soviet sources appear to have been directed principally toward the acquisition of other types of military equipment than the infantry type of armament received from Soviet suppliers on the Alfhem. Attempts to procure aircraft, which centered on F-51 fighters, F-8-F fighters, British jets and AT-6 trainers, became intensified during the early months of this year.

In the category of military vehicles, Guatemala has been chiefly interested in half-tracks. Twelve of these, together with eight armored cars, are now the property of the Guatemalan Government in England. British licensing requirements have prevented their export.

Guatemala has also tried to obtain hundreds of small arms, particularly sub-machine guns, rifles and pistols, ammunition, many thousands of rounds of 20mm and mortar shells, 1,000,000 rounds of 7mm and hundreds of thousands of rounds of other miscellaneous calibers. Some of the small arms and munitions have found their way to Guatemala, but the majority are as yet unacquired or blocked in foreign countries.

VI

IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO GUATEMALA

When it first became known that a shipment of arms had been sent to Guatemala from behind the Iron Curtain, covertly and surrepitiously, the Government of the United States identified this fact as "a development of gravity". The additional facts regarding this shipment, outlined in the preceding section and given in greater detail in Annex D to this memorandum, fully confirm this estimate of the situation.

It is evident that the Communists have succeeded for the first time in transferring a large amount of arms to a source of Communist influence in the Hemisphere. An examination of the implications of this transition clearly demonstrates that the receipt of the arms is significant to Hemisphere security in much greater measure than as a simple addition to Guatemala's supply of military equipment.

The Communist Pattern of the Transaction

Experience with and a knowledge of Communist methods reveals that any purchase of arms from the Soviet sphere necessarily implies a contract in which the purchase price is far greater than the mere payment of cash. The Alfhem shipment was no ordinary or normal business arrangement. The Communist techniques of fraud and deceit figure in every detail of the Alfhem operation. The scheme involved a deal between suppliers of arms in the Soviet orbit and a government over which Communists are increasingly exercising their influence. Devices of duplicity and deceit were employed to hide its true character. We do not know, and perhaps some of the highest officials of the Guatemalan Government do not know, all the terms and conditions of the contract, terms and conditions which may affect not only the people of Guatemala, but Guatemala's neighbors and the rest of the Hemisphere.

One thing can certainly be assumed - although arrangements for the sale of the armament were made in Czechoslovakia, the delivery made through Poland, transportation arranged by a Swedish charterer, and payment for the hire of the ship made with Czech funds by means of a "straw charter" arrangement with a London firm, the agreement to export arms was made in Moscow.

No such transfer of a significant amount of armament from a Soviet satellite to the part of the world where states are free and independent could have taken place without an affirmative determination by the international Communist strategists of the Soviet Government that the transaction was of advantage to the Soviet cause. The details of the arrangement could only have been accomplished with the closest collaboration between the officials who control sources of arms in the Soviet orbit, the agents who acted in their behalf as manipulators of the transaction, and those who executed the operation, apparently in the name of the Guatemalan Government.

The Cost of Arms Assistance from Behind the Iron Curtain

The new arms and equipment which the Guatemalan Government has acquired from the Soviet orbit bear dangerous implications for the Guatemalan people, and perhaps for the Guatemalan Government itself. It cannot be assumed that the Guatemalan officials responsible, including President Arbenz himself, really believe that the deal was one from which the armed forces alone will benefit in behalf of genuine Guatemalan interests. The record of the international Communist conspiracy clearly demonstrates that each maneuver is part of a general pattern, and that no act is taken without ensuring that its consequences will serve the interests of the

movement. These arms were not made available, even though money may have been transferred by the Guatemalan Government, without assurance that they would contribute to the accomplishment of the Kremlin's international conspiratorial aims.

The history of Soviet efforts to manipulate and control for their own purposes every grant of assistance in the form of arms and munitions of war which they have ever given is well known. Their record in those countries which have fallen under Soviet controlled Communist domination is as apparent as it is tragic.

But their efforts have also been carried far beyond these areas. It is well known that the Soviet Union, which supplied armament to the Republican forces in Spain, used the occasion of the Spanish Civil War to infiltrate the Republican forces to promote the expansionist interests of the USSR. As another example, it is well known that, during 1948-49, Israel received arms from Czechoslovakia, and cash was paid. It is now clear that the Soviet bloc sold these arms to accomplish the political purposes of creating trouble in the Middle East. But it now appears from the trial of Rudolf Slansky, purged Secretary General of the Czech Communist Party, that more was expected: Israel was to be made a Communist state. That this expectation did not materialize was through no lack of effort. The failure of the Soviet Union to achieve its further aims may be said to be due to the success of the Israel Government in keeping Communists from achieving positions of advantage in the government and in the country. That saving factor has not been present in Guatemala, where the international Communist conspiracy has made certain that its agents and those who act in its behalf have secured positions of influence and control.

The Importance of the Alfhem Arms to the Communists in Guatemala

An immediate effect of the arms shipment was to strengthen the position of the Communists in Guatemala. These Communist leaders and their fellow travellers seek only that which will improve their ability to dominate and control the life of Guatemala. The credit which they have gained because of these arms supplied from sources within the Soviet orbit will not be allowed to remain unpaid.

Statements made by Guatemalan Government spokesmen as to the purposes for which the arms were intended have their echo in the context of a deal surrounded by fraud and Communist conspiracy. It is against this background that any assertions regarding the nature and purpose of the arms delivery must be judged.

The Communist-controlled political, peasant and labor organizations began demanding arms shortly after the shipment arrived from the Soviet orbit. Only a few days after the arrival of the Alfhem shipment, the Secretary General of the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG) called upon provincial affiliates to be prepared to " . . . firmly defend democratic liberties with the glorious army of the revolution". Meetings of the CNCG were called to decide upon measures to be taken against "reactionaries and interventionists" and to create a basis for a "peoples army". The government-owned Diario de Centro América on June 4 reported the organizing of a "revolutionary guard" to join the national army in defense of the Arbenz Government. One of the groups involved asked the President for military instructions so that in a moment of danger they could be given arms. It is not surprising that the independent press of Guatemala, before the suspension of constitutional guarantees on June 8, expressed concern that such "peasant brigades" would increase insecurity. Nor could this sense of insecurity be relieved by

subsequent assertions by the CNA that there was no question of workers replacing the army, since "thousands" would place themselves under army order in any emergency.

Recent reports reveal that members of the Communist Party (PGT) have been armed along with members of the labor and peasant organizations and the largest political party, the PAR. Armed peasant groups have stopped cars along the highways and brandished sub-machine guns. Vendors of the Communist newspaper Tribuna Popular have been reported as touring Guatemala City in jeeps armed with sub-machine guns. It is not yet known to what extent the Communist organizations have been armed under the emergency program.

In view of the foregoing and of Communist penetration in Guatemala, the existence of the arms contained in the more than 15,000 cases, raises the possibility that, at a given moment, the strength of the elements which are under Communist influence can be greatly increased. Actually, the attitude of President Arbenz toward giving military training requested by the interested groups and to provide the necessary arms for such training, can be judged by the incident described in Section III above, when he, as Minister of Defense, opened the arsenals to the labor unions. The Communist record elsewhere in the world leaves room for no doubt that the arms obtained under such an arrangement will be used to promote national and international strife. This is the pattern of Communist seizure of power from within, in the many countries which have been brought under Soviet domination.

The International Implications of the Concealed Shipment of Arms

The shipment of arms to a country having a Communist penetrated government and which already maintains a military establishment larger than that of any other country in Central America carries serious implications. Such an increase in the military potential of such a government is properly a matter of concern, not only to its neighbors, but also to all of the American States which have fully accepted the commitments and principles of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Charter of the Organization of American States. Guatemala, not its neighbors in Central America, is the only American Republic which is not a party to at least one of the more important of the inter-American agreements which constitute the framework of inter-American security.

It is recalled that in 1950 the Government of Guatemala's toleration and support of subversive activities against other governments was carefully investigated by a Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States (then acting as provisional Organ of Consultation). Among the interesting facts which were verified by this Committee, which served as the basis of a recommendation to the Guatemalan Government, was the following: that among the armament confiscated as a result of a revolutionary attempt carried on against the Government of the Dominican Republic by means of revolutionaries landed in an airplane at Luperon were "...fifteen 45 calibre Reising sub-machine guns (model 50) whose serial numbers correspond exactly to those of precisely the same quantity of weapons acquired from the United States of America by an agent of the Guatemalan Government and exported in January 1949 with the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense as their destination". President Arbenz was Minister of Defense in Guatemala at the time.

The false manifest and the pretense that the ship was carrying normal commercial cargo were intended to deceive the owners, as well as the officials of any governments who might seek, in the exercise of legal functions, to ascertain the nature of the cargo. The concealment of this shipment

to Guatemala on a freighter flying the flag of a government not dominated by the USSR necessarily implies the need for vigilance on the part of all the American Republics to keep the international Communist movement from further spreading its military influence in the Hemisphere.

This deal has challenged the basis upon which ships move freely in international commerce, since it was completely carried out with falsity and concealment. The Alfhem shipment illustrates how a ship of a friendly state, in violation of the laws of that state and of good faith usages and practices of international trade and commerce, can clandestinely supply arms and ammunitions to a center of Communist influence in the Americas. Labels and other superficial appearances of legality must not be permitted to hide another such transaction. The American States are on notice that the Communists carry out their designs by fraud and deceit, under the cover of false charters, false shipping agents, false manifests, false bills of lading, and many other methods for hiding the true nature of the operation.

The further introduction of Iron Curtain arms into Guatemala would be a serious development if it were done openly, but it becomes even more dangerous when it must be assumed that further attempts will be made to accomplish the purpose clandestinely. The threat will be increased by other deliveries of arms into hands which, if given the opportunity, would use them or permit them to be used in the international Communist cause.

The Reason Guatemala Was Not Able to Obtain Arms in the Free World

The Guatemalan Government takes the position that since the United States refused to sell arms to Guatemala, the country had to procure them where it could. It is true that the United States has in recent years declined to license exports of arms to Guatemala and has encouraged other governments to do likewise. The United States adopted this policy because of uncertainty as to the purposes for which the arms might be used. Having observed the pattern of Soviet revolution in the so-called "satellite" states, the United States has foreseen the danger that these arms might fall into the hands of the Communists, who, individually or through labor and other front organizations which they control, might employ them to advance the Soviet conspiracy in Guatemala and within the area.

The use of arms for such purposes is evident in the historical design of Communist penetration in other countries. Confirmation that this design existed in the Guatemalan situation has been reflected in the fears which have been expressed recently to the United States by Guatemala's smaller neighbors that the Guatemalan Communists, whose agents have been infiltrating across the border, were trying to subvert their governments. It is inconceivable that the United States, faced with this menace and dedicated as it is to the strong position against intervention of international communism in the Hemisphere and to the prevention of the spread of Soviet communism throughout the world, could have adopted a policy which would have put arms within the reach of the most successful Communist party in this Hemisphere.

United States policy towards Guatemala in military matters is not the result of any discrimination against the Guatemalan people or against Guatemala as a nation. On the contrary, the avenues have been left open for the Guatemalan Armed Forces honorably to defend their country and to participate in the defense of the Hemisphere. To this end the United States has maintained Army and Air Force Missions in Guatemala, and the Inter-American Defense Board still has Guatemala as a member.

However, in the matter of armaments, it is the Guatemalan Government itself which denied the Guatemalan Armed Forces arms from the United States and other Western sources. The Government had two mutually exclusive choices:

(a) To desist from aiding the Communists in accord with OAS resolutions and open up United States and western European sources of supply;

(b) To seek arms clandestinely from the Soviet World and accept the conditions the Soviets attached.

The Guatemalan Government chose to follow the second course, thus aligning itself inevitably with the cause of international Soviet communism.

The United States has prevented arms from reaching Guatemala simply because it feared they would be misused. Misuse as envisaged in this policy has meant use by the Communists against the Guatemalan Government, or against the Guatemalan people or against a friendly foreign government or people.

Guatemalan Government spokesmen state that military equipment supplied by the United States to Nicaragua and Honduras under the grant aid program puts them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their neighbors. They state further that this equipment is finding its way into the hands of elements hostile to Guatemala and is even being actually used against them by the rebels.

The United States is providing military equipment to Honduras and Nicaragua and eight other American Republics which have concluded bilateral military assistance agreements with the United States. Guatemala is ineligible by law to participate in this program because it has not completed ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. By the terms of these bilateral agreements United States military equipment being provided thereunder is to be used by the recipient countries solely for the purpose of preparing certain units of their armed forces for hemisphere defense missions. They are not directed against any peoples in this Hemisphere but against extra-continental aggression. Moreover, the United States provides a military assistance group, consisting of United States officers, to train foreign military personnel in the use of the equipment. These agreements are consistent with the planning of the Inter-American Defense Board and with Resolution III of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Washington in 1951.

VII

THREAT TO WESTERN HEMISPHERE PEACE AND SECURITY
ARISING FROM THE GUATEMALAN SITUATION. ACTION REQUIRED.

The information presented in this memorandum speaks for itself.

Added to the long list of peoples who have succumbed to similar techniques, Guatemala is fast becoming another case history of how a few carefully placed and well-disciplined Communists can control the political activity of large groups of citizens for the purpose of usurping the powers of Government. The clandestine introduction of arms from the Soviet orbit into the country confirms the degree to which these techniques have succeeded in Guatemala.

The Situation in Guatemala as a Point of Conflict
Between the Forces of Freedom and the Forces of Oppression

The persons who are bringing about this result represent the apparatus of a foreign political party, masquerading as a normal patriotic political party, purporting to serve the genuine interests of the Guatemalan nation. They in fact serve a system that is alien to the traditions and interests of Guatemala and the other American Republics. They speak for a way of life in which the individual is ruthlessly subordinated to an absolute and arbitrary authority. They consitute within the Western Hemisphere the advance guard of the forces that are attempting by subversion and aggression to expand the sway of this system throughout the world. The Free World is today facing this threat on many fronts.

The objectives and methods of the international Communist movement are incompatible with the principles, purposes and rules of international conduct of the American States. The Charter of Bogotá states that the American States are convinced that "The historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations". In various instruments of the inter-American system the American Republics have expressed their determination to press forward toward more perfect political and social institutions guaranteeing to their citizens an increased measure of personal freedom, economic well-being and social and cultural advancement. The essential value of these agreements lies, again in the words of the Charter of Bogotá, in "the desire of the American peoples to live together in peace, and, through their mutual understanding and respect for the sovereignty of each one, to provide for the betterment of all, in independence, in equality and under law".

These principles of freedom, human dignity and cooperative international action, of an expanding concept of human relationships, cannot be reconciled with the aims and methods of the Moscow leaders of the international Communist movement.

Each American Republic has reason to know that it is a target of subversive activities of the agents of international communism, and to be familiar with their methods and tactics. Individually and as a community of nations the American Republics have recognized the existence of the threat to their individual and collective interest arising from these activities.

They agreed on measures to combat the threat of international communism at the Conference of Bogotá in 1948 in Resolution 32, which states

that international communism is "incompatible with the concept of American freedom"; at the Meeting at Washington in 1951 in Resolution 8, which states that a high degree of international cooperation among the American Republics is required looking to the eradication of any threat of subversive activities of international communism "which may endanger democracy and the free way of life in the American Republics"; and at the Conference of Caracas in 1954 in Resolution 93, which declares that the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement would "constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America...".

The Underlying Significance of the Communist Penetration of Guatemala and of the Arms Shipment

The other American Republics have watched with growing concern the relentless process by which elements affiliated with the international Communist movement have penetrated the social, political and governmental life of Guatemala. As recently as the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March of this year, the Western Hemisphere witnessed what amounted to a public acknowledgment of subservience to international communism by representatives of the Guatemalan Government.

This attitude of dependence was again seen three months later when, aware that the Communist penetration of Guatemala was being discussed by the American Republics for possible consideration at a Meeting of Consultation, the Arbenz Government obtained the support of the Soviet Union in its allegation that the uprising in the country against the Government was "an open aggression on the part of the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, instigated by the interests of the foreign monopolies which have been affected by the progressive policy of my Government". The 60th veto cast by the Soviet Union in the Security Council of the United Nations to prevent referral of the complaint to the Organization of American States, one of the most cynical in the entire history of the arbitrary exercise of that power by the Kremlin, wrote a sad chapter in the alienation of Guatemala from the American community of nations.

It is in the context of the penetration of Guatemala by international communism and of the consequent pro-Soviet orientation of the Government, that the shipment of arms and munitions of war to that country from the Soviet area assumes its true significance. With this development the situation in Guatemala became a source of further tensions and fears within that country, in the area, and in the Hemisphere.

The shipment of arms came as an open defiance of the warning against intervention by international communism in the Western Hemisphere issued less than two months before at the Conference at Caracas. The shipment adds further evidence to that upon which the decision at Caracas was based, of the intensified efforts made by the international Communist movement within the American Continent.

The ominous significance of this development is that it is the first instance in which those responsible for the policies and actions of international communism have boldly attempted to establish a foothold behind the inner defenses of the Western Hemisphere. The move is backed by the formidable resources and aggressive ambitions of the forces of Soviet communism.

Guatemala has in this manner become a point of conflict between the Free World and the Soviet orbit, and a pawn available to the leaders of the international Communist movement. The situation in Guatemala involves the issue of whether international communism can establish a Communist-controlled state in the Western Hemisphere. Should this effort be successful, there can be no doubt that the Soviet leaders would have attained a victory of incalculable value in the pursuit of their ambitions. They would have penetrated the very heart of the Western defense area. They would have opened a wide breach to accelerated efforts of the same kind.

Moreover, beyond the specific objectives it seeks in Guatemala, it is evident that the Soviet Union's strategy with respect to the Western Hemisphere at this time is to create a climate of confusion and distrust, to aggravate existing differences between American Republics, and, in brief, to create anarchy on the Continent. It hopes by these means to delude the Western Hemisphere into looking inwardly rather than to the other parts of the world where Soviet aggression and imperialism is on the march. Its moves within the American Continent come at a time when there has been an upsurge of Soviet Communist activity in several parts of the world. It is evident, therefore, that these moves fit the pattern of a diversionary maneuver of political sabotage. The Soviet Union hopes to distract the attention of the United States and other American Republics from the evidence of Soviet expansionistic activity elsewhere.

In the Guatemalan situation the American Republics therefore face a challenge to the ability of the Western Hemisphere to maintain intact its inner defenses by repelling a bold threat to the sovereignty and political independence of Guatemala and the other American States. Moreover, although the specific problem may appear as a marginal incident in the context of the world struggle, the success or failure of the Organization of American States will also have effects, for good or evil, upon the world wide unceasing struggle between the forces of freedom and oppression.

The Basis of Collective Inter-American Action

It is evident that the menace arising from the state of affairs in Guatemala will increase if remedial steps are not taken. Prompt and vigorous action is required to assist Guatemala to become free and to eradicate the threat to the peace of America.

The problem confronts the Organization of American States with its first real test, since its reorganization at the Rio and Bogotá Conferences, of its capacity to deal effectively with a threat from outside the Continent aimed at the attainment of an objective within the Continent.

There is every reason to think that the Organization of American States will once again vindicate the confidence and hopes placed in it by its members. In agreeing to deal collectively with threats to their peace and security, the American States did not expect that their defenses would thereby be weakened. They rightly trusted that the opposite would be true: that their defenses would be greatly strengthened.

Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance provides that

> "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

This agreement is an integral and essential part of the inter-American regional system in which the American community of nations takes just pride. Article 6 of the Treaty says in effect that a threat to one is a threat to all, that the peace and security of the American peoples is interdependent and indivisible. On this foundation, the Article reflects the determination of the American States to take timely and effective steps to deal with threats to their peace and security, to be vigilant to arrest threatening situations before they grow to the point where more drastic measures become necessary.

It is this farsighted undertaking that looks to collective preventive and remedial action that has been invoked in the Guatemalan situation.

The Organ of Consultation will have a specific target, namely, the agents of international communism responsible for the situation. The objective will be to remove the cause of the danger without unnecessary harm to the Guatemalan people, who are the victims of this common foe of all the peoples of America.

The agents of the apparatus of international communism, whose loyalty belongs not to Guatemala but to the leaders of an alien political party, should be removed from positions of trust and influence. This is something that Guatemala must do in her own behalf. The American community should make an earnest appeal to the people and Government of Guatemala to join with the other American Republics in eliminating from the Continent the threat of international communism to the security and sovereignty of the American nations.

But much more than appeals are needed. The situation calls for agreement on measures, in the words of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, "for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent". The American Republics can stop the travel of agents of international communism between Guatemala and territory dominated by the international Communist movement. They can take steps to insure against a further introduction of arms and implements of war into Guatemala. The situation can be kept under constant and collective surveillance through an appropriate body of the Organization of American States and through a continued exchange of views and information among the American governments.

The Nature of the Action Proposed

The now well-known veil of allegations and assertions, compounded of Communist propaganda slogans woven into the fabric of legitimate national needs and aspirations, cannot be permitted to obscure the central issue created by the Guatemalan situation. Any positive action the Organ of Consultation may determine upon will doubtless be subjected to attack on the grounds that it constitutes intervention, that it is political warfare against ideas and ideals, that it restricts the right of Guatemala to procure arms for its own self-defense, and that it infringes the right of each nation to work out its economic independence and to recreate its social and political order in its own indigenous way.

Legitimate national interests need no defense against action by the Organ of Consultation. The American Republics will readily vindicate the rights of each member of the American community to govern its affairs as it sees fit, and will as readily join in their defense. They will equally join in defense against the intervention in the Western Hemisphere of an international conspiracy that in fifteen years has brought about the transformation of more than fifteen independent nations into Soviet colonies. The latter is the issue before the Organ of Consultation.

In consecrating the principle of non-intervention so unequivocally and unreservedly in Article 15 of the Charter of Bogotá, the American Republics very wisely provided in Article 19 of the same instrument that "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation" of that principle.

The consultative process and the action contemplated under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance are designed to preserve the national dignity of Guatemala, her independence, sovereignty,

and right to self-determination, free from international Communist intervention. This objective is to be accomplished within the framework of the legal processes and safeguards of the Treaty. These processes and safeguards afford full guarantees that the objectives of the Treaty alone, and no others, shall be pursued and that the decisions of the Organ of Consultation shall reflect the collective judgment, formulated in accordance with orderly and legal procedures, of the governments of the American Republics.

It is the earnest desire of all the other American States that Guatemala resume her rightful place as an American Republic dedicated to the defense of America against all forms of foreign intervention. Guatemalan independence must, in truth, be restored.

There is no quarrel between the Guatemalan people and the American community.

There are, as may be expected in the relations between States, existing differences between Guatemala and other States. These can appropriately be settled, as has been proposed to Guatemala in specific cases, through recourse to procedures of peaceful settlement. If direct negotiations fail to bring about a solution of those differences, the American Republics believe in recourse to such procedures. The machinery and the procedures are available. This is the American way; this is the way of the Charter of the Organization of American States. There is no dispute between Guatemala and any other American State that cannot be settled with justice in this way.

The program of action outlined above is moderate and self-restrained in view of the gravity of the problem and its serious implications for peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. The program does not begin to tap the resources available to the Organization of American States. The formidable arsenal of Article VIII of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro - which includes "recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force" - is scarcely touched.

The program does, however, demonstrate one thing of vital importance at this time - the firm determination of the American Republics to eradicate the threat.

ANNEX A

THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

June 1944	Provisional Government headed by General Federico PONCE Vaides established, after student demonstration overthrows Government of General Ubico.
July-September 1944	First revolutionary parties and labor unions formed; Ponce attempts return to authoritarian Government.
October 20, 1944	The Guatemalan revolution: students and young army officers, including Captain Jacobo Arbenz, overturn Ponce government.
March 15, 1945	New Guatemalan Constitution goes into effect: forbids formation and functioning of political organizations of international or foreign character.
August 1945	Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) founded as first national labor organization; international Communists among its advisers. Shortly thereafter Escuela Claridad, Communist training school within the Confederation, is established.
January 1946	Government closes down Escuela Claridad; Communists continue indoctrination through study groups.
September 28, 1947	First Communist Party founded secretely under name of Vanguardia Democrática; José Manuel Fortuny and other leaders continue to represent themselves to public as Non-Communist political and labor leaders.
December 1947	Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca (AFG) Communist-front women's organization founded. Later affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Women, international Communist group.
December 21, 1947	Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG) Communist-front youth organization founded. Later affiliated with World Federation of Democratic Youth, international Communist organization.
1948	José Manuel Fortuny elected Secretary General of secret Communist party, Vanguardia Democrática.
April 1949	Fortuny and Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, Secretary General of CTG, attend First World Congress of Partisans of Peace in Paris; Fortuny goes on to travel behind the Iron Curtain.
July 18, 1949	Colonel Francisco Xavier Arana, moderate Chief of the Armed Forces, assassinated near Lake Amatitlán; 1st Regiment revolts but is surpressed by Government, led by Minister of Defense, Lt. Col. Arbenz; assassins never brought to justice.
August 1949	Fortuny and Alfonso Solórzano, back from Iron Curtain trip, participate in foundation of Guatemalan National Peace Committee, Fortuny presiding over meeting.
September 28, 1949	Secret Communist Party, Vanguardia Democrática, holds First Party Congress; reelects Fortuny Secretary General; adopts name Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG) but remains underground.

May 25, 1950	Fortuny and ten others formally resign from Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) in which they had remained despit two and a half years' membership in secret Communist party.
June 21, 1950	Fortuny founds newspaper "Octubre" whose sub-heading is "For a Great Communist Party; Vanguard of the Workers, and the Peasants and the People"; paper carries hammer and sickle emblem.
June 1950	Gutiérrez founds Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (PROG), an openly Communist-line party.
Summer 1950	Fortuny becomes campaign manager for Lt. Col. Arbenz in presidential elections.
March 15, 1951	Arbenz inaugurated President.
March 23, 1951	Alfonso Soldrzano, leading Communist personality, appointed Manager of Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social) (IGSS).
April 4, 1951	Fortuny signs public manifesto for first time as "Secretary General of Partido Comunista de Guatemala".
May 1951	Louis Saillant, Secretary General of international Communist organization WFTU, and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, go to Guatemala; advise unifying the Guatemalan labor movement.
June 21, 1951	PCG holds first public meeting in theater provided at government orders; high government officials attend.
July 8, 1951	Gutiérrez states in press interview he is a Communist.
October 12-14, 1951	Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) founded as single national labor federation; Gutiérrez elected Secretary General; Arbenz sends congratulations to the CGTG founding Congress.
October 25, 19[illegible] - January 9, 1952	Gutiérrez attends WFTU Congress in Berlin; visits Moscow.
January 12, 1952	Gutiérrez, back in Guatemala, announces dissolution of his party, PROG; states he will join Fortuny's PCG; and advises followers to do likewise.
January 25, 1952	Cominform Bucharest newspaper "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" publishes articles on PCG, in effect publicly announcing recognition of Fortuny's party as authorized agent of international communism in Guatemala.
May 10-June 17, 1952	Agrarian Reform Law proposed by President Arbenz is steered through Congress by Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, whose President is Gutiérrez.
Summer 1952	PCG leaders participate unofficially in meetings of the Administration political coalition.
December 11, 1952	PCG holds Second Party Congress, reelects Fortuny as Secretary General; changes name to Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT).
December 19, 1952	PGT registered as legal political party.

1952 - 1953	Six members of Political Committee of Communist Party (PCG later PGT) visit USSR: José Manuel Fortuny, Mario Silva Jonama, José Luis Ramos, José Alberto Cardoza, Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, and Virgilio Guerra.
January 16-18, 1953	Communist PGT runs in Congressional elections as part of "Democratic Electoral Front", the coalition of all parties supporting President Arbenz.
February 19, 1953	Communist PGT opens "Jacobo Sanchez" training school for cadres.
March 1, 1953	President Arbenz in annual message to Congress, obviously alluding to requests Communist party be prohibited from functioning under Article 32 of Constitution, states Government will assure freedom for "all, absolutely all" political beliefs; Communists cheer this passage as assurance of support of Communist party.
March 12, 1953	Guatemalan Congress observes minute of silence in tribute to Stalin, at time of his death.
1953	"National Democratic Front" succeeds "Democratic Electoral Front" and CGTG and CNCG are later added to political parties comprising Front; leaders, including four Communists and four or more fellow-travellers, meet regularly with President Arbenz.
April 4, 1953	Guatemala withdraws from Organization of Central American States when it became clear that the agenda of the first meeting would include an item on "resisting the subversive action of international Communism".
June 22-28, 1953	Guatemalan leftists organizations observe week of "Solidarity with People of Korea", a principal feature of which is a declaration by 19 Deputies, including the President and Vice President of the Congress, condemning "imperialist aggression" against North Korea and charging bacteriological warfare used in Korea.
August 8-9, 1953	Party Organizational Conference held, claims party membership doubled since December 1952.
August 15, 1953	Communist PGT establishes daily newspaper, Tribuna Popular.
November 5, 1953 January 12, 1954	José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of Communist party, visits Moscow.
November 10, 1953	Guatemala is only state to vote against inclusion of the item "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics" on the Agenda of the Tenth Inter-American Conference.
December 19, 1953	Communist-controlled Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) sponsors "Day of Solidarity with the Viet-namese People".
December 1953-April 1954	Communist leader Carlos Manuel PELLECER instigates peasants in Department of Escuintla and elsewhere to seize private lands; violence ensues.
January 1954	Anti-Communist leaders, accused of plotting, arrested or flee country; followed by intimidation of anti-Communist radio stations.

January 12, 1954	Fortuny returns from Moscow.
January 18, 1954	Major Martinez, Chief of National Agrarian Department and former Secretary to President Arbenz, leaves Guatemala suddenly, purportedly for Switzerland.
January 29, 1954	Minister of Czechoslovakia presents credentials to President of Guatemala.
February 1954	"National Democratic Front" meets with President Arbenz and Foreign Minister Toriello to decide tactics at Caracas Conference; four of Front's ten representatives present are avowed Communists, at least four others fellow-travellers.
March 1-28, 1954	Guatemala sends delegation headed by Toriello to Caracas Conference; is only Government to vote against anti-Communist resolution; abstains on Panamanian resolution on racial discrimination on grounds it used phrase "as one means of combatting international Communism"; states it considers without validity the anti-Communist resolutions adopted at the Bogotá Conference of 1948 and the Washington Foreign Ministers Meeting of 1951; absents itself from Conference tribute to United Nations' war dead.
March 1, 1954	President Arbenz in annual message to Congress, indicates clear support of Communists; indentifies them as "democratic" and "progressive" forces, says that to eliminate them would be equivalent to suicide of revolutionary movement.
March 25, 1954	Guatemala withdraws from Pan American Union its instrument of ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which it had submitted to the Secretariat pending result of consultation on Guatemalan reservation.
March-April 1954	Guatemala appoints special Consuls to posts in northwest Honduras.
April 10-18, 1954	M/V Alfhem loads 2,000 tons of arms and munitions at Stettin, a port administered by Communist Polish Government; arms are falsely manifested, as machinery, hardware, chemical and optical glass, etc.
April 18-May 15, 1954	Alfhem on voyage to Guatemala, frequently changing destination en route; first ordered Dakar, orders changed successively to Curaçao, Puerto Cortes, Honduras and finally Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.
April 25, 1954	Political Committee of PGT attacks Rio Treaty stating that it cannot result in any good for Guatemala.
May 5, 1954	Strikes break out in northwest Honduras in region where Guatemalan Consuls assigned in March-April; Honduran Government declares three consuls <u>personae non gratae</u>; accuses Communist-dominated Guatemalan labor organizations of supporting strike.

May 15, 1954	Alfhem arrives at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala; begins unloading arms cargo under guard.
June 8, 1954	President Arbenz, with approval of Congress, summoned in night, suspends Constitutional guarantees; a type of reign of terror begins; hundred reported arrested, including humble farmers, on suspicion of anti-communism; bullet riddled or beaten bodies of persons arrested by police found on streets and highways; houses searched, censorship imposed.

ANNEX B

THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO

(The Guatemalan Communist Party)

A BASIC STUDY

(Revision May, 1954)

THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO,

THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY,

A BASIC STUDY

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SUMMARY

The Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (The Guatemalan Labor Party--PGT), a Communist party modeled on and guided by the Soviet Communist Party, is the most influential single political organization in present-day Guatemala. Its influence on Guatemalan political life is probably greater than that exercised in any other Latin American country by any local Communist party. The characteristics of its growth and successes provide perhaps the most revealing insight into the adaptation of international Communist strategy to the Latin American environment.

The PGT is a party of young ladino[1] "intellectuals," of the lower middle class. Its founders and present leaders are young schoolteachers, ex-university students, journalists, white collar workers and former employees of United States and foreign enterprises in Guatemala. This was the sector of society most frustrated under the archaic social structure of Guatemala, a small Central American state of some 3,000,000 inhabitants which until after World War II remained a backward dictator-ridden agricultural country where 2 per cent of the landholdings covered 70 per cent of the arable land, and over half the population consisted of illiterate Indians living apart from the main currents of twentieth century life.

In the intellectually fermenting years of the 1930's and of World War II, many of these intellectuals became attracted to nationalism and Marxism as offering a way out for Guatemala.

The mold of the Guatemalan Communist movement was the 1944 Revolution and the 1945-51 administration of President Juan José AREVALO, a self-proclaimed "spiritual socialist" schoolteacher. The Revolution, which overthrew the last vestiges of the 13-year regime of General Jorge UBICO, originally had the support of all of the middle classes but its leading element was the lower middle class intellectual group which sought to apply their nationalist and Marxist theories to bring about Guatemala's social transformation. Conscious of inexperience, they relied heavily for direction in labor and political organization on foreigners and Guatemalan exiles who had been involved in Communist activities in Latin America and who flocked to Guatemala after the 1944 Revolution, largely unnoticed by the outside world. These Communist personalities, including such figures as Alfonso SOLORZANO, A Guatemalan labor lawyer closely associated with Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano in Mexico, and Miguel MARMOL, a Salvadoran labor organizer, educated a younger generation of native Guatemalan "intellectuals" in Communist doctrine by such devices as establishing an indoctrination school in the new national labor federation, disseminating Communist propaganda in the Administration's "revolutionary" political parties and establishing Marxist "study groups".

Guatemala's post-war Communist party crystallized as a clandestine organization hidden with the Guatemalan "revolutionary" parties and labor unions supporting the AREVALO Administration. According to its present leaders, it was first successfully founded on September 28, 1947, under the name of the Vanguardia Democrática as the precursor of the Guatemalan Communist Party which held its first congress two years later. Its leader from 1948 onward was José Manuel FORTUNY, then a 32-year-old ex-law student, former radio newscaster, and ex-employee of the British Legation and of an American company, Sterling Products Inc. At the time, he was ostensibly an officer of the Partido Acción Revolucionara (PAR), a leading Administration party. Other probable members of the first clandestine Communist organization were also members of the PAR, the other Administration parties, and the labor unions. On September 28, 1949, a day from which the present Communist party dates its anniversaries, this secret Communist group held its First Party Congress and adopted the name of Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG). But it was not until May 1950, in the last year of the Arévalo Administration, that Fortuny and his group withdrew from the PAR. The following month they founded a newspaper Octubre as the frank precursor of an open Communist party, and at the same time Víctor Manuel GUTIERREZ, a 29-year-old schoolteacher turned labor leader, founded a Communist-line party under the title of the Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (The Revolutionary Workers Party of Guatemala--PROG).

(1) A ladino in Guatemala is a person who has adopted European cultural standards (e.g. Western dress) and may be racially a pure Indian as well as a person of mixed blood.

When Colonel Jacobo ARBENZ, a radical leftist-nationalist Army officer, assumed the Presidency on March 15, 1951, the PCG began to make rapid strides toward becoming an open party. In April Fortuny began publicly signing documents as "Secretary General of the Partido Comunista de Guatemala." In June, on the first anniversary of the newspaper "Octubre," the PCG held a public ceremony attended by several high government figures and proclaimed its intention to become a legally registered party. In October, Guatemala's labor unions were consolidated into the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) with Gutiérrez, by that time an avowed Communist, as its Secretary General. In January, 1952, after a trip to Moscow, Gutiérrez dissolved his PRUG and joined the PCG which shortly thereafter achieved recognition in the Cominform Journal published in Bucharest. In October, the party was included with the other Administration parties in the "Democratic Electoral Front" for the impending Congressional elections. In December, the party held its Second Party Congress, changed its name to the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) and was shortly thereafter entered on the Civil Registry as a legally constituted political party.

The PGT, as it thus emerged, is a Communist party modeled on the Soviet Communist Party of the Stalinist era. Its statutes concentrate power in the hands of the Secretary General and the Political Committee whose dictates are binding on subordinate regional party organizations and cells (basic organizations) which are scattered through most of Guatemala with the heaviest concentration in the capital.

Statistics on party membership have never been made public, but the best evidence in the spring of 1954 indicates that 3000 would be a minimum and 4000 a likely figure. In addition to registered PGT members, however, there is an indeterminate number of influential intellectual Communists who have apparently not joined Fortuny's PGT and sometimes appear to be quarrelling with it on organizational and tactical grounds though not on ultimate objectives.

The PGT leadership, headed by Fortuny as party Secretary General, consists of characteristically young ladinos of the lower middle class. The known ages of the eleven-man Political Committee range from Fortuny's 37 to 24, with the exception of one member who is 47. Seven of the eleven were university students or schoolteachers (some with sidelines in journalism or office work) before entering politics while the remaining four were skilled workers including a printer, a carpenter and a tailor. There are no pure Indians and none who have been previously employed in industry or transportation.

The party leadership is closely tied to Moscow. Fortuny and at least five others of the eleven on the Political Committee have visited Moscow and the key personnel of the Communist-controlled labor and "mass organizations" have also been there. There is a constant flow of propaganda material and instructions from Moscow and from the Soviet-controlled international labor and "mass" organizations to Guatemala.

The PGT publicly recognizes its debt to what it terms the "example" of the Soviet Communist Party and its aims and tactics must be viewed in the framework of the orthodox Communist thesis of the "inevitable victory" of Communism throughout the world rather than on the local plane of gaining control of the Guatemalan Government as quickly as possible. In international affairs, the party has emphasized as its first task the "Peace" campaign which is defined as preventing the harnessing of Guatemala to the "war chariot of imperialism"--i.e. preventing Guatemala from taking its role in the defense of the Western democratic community grouped around the United States. As the corollary in domestic Guatemalan politics the PGT has announced as its first task the implementation of Guatemala's 1952 Agrarian Reform Law which is designed to transfer much of the country's potential arable land to new small farmers, and as its second the heightening of the struggle against United States "monopolistic" companies operating in Guatemala. These domestic programs tend toward the breakdown of the established order and are thus simultaneously adapted to the immediate objective of weakening Guatemala's position in the Western community and the ultimate objective of preparing the ground for the Communists' coming to power.

The PGT leadership attempts to achieve its objectives largely through indirect influence and control over government agencies, political and labor organizations and Communist front youth, students' and women's pressure groups. In the government, as illustrated by its 1951-54 growth, the party's chief asset is the sympathy of President Arbenz, with whose approval key government posts are filled with party workers and sympathizers. A key instrument is the "National Democratic Front", the formal alliance of the political parties and labor organizations supporting Arbenz which is dominated

by the Communists and has all but replaced the Cabinet as a policy making agency. The National Agrarian Department is the stronghold of avowed PGT members; the government educational and propaganda systems have been infiltrated with numbers of Communists; and the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security with its large cash income is dominated by Solórzano and his group.

The PGT's ability to influence the government is greatly enhanced by its control and influence over organized Guatemalan labor which takes in well over 100,000 workers as compared to a total vote in the 1950 Presidential Elections of 415,000. In the CGTG, the Secretary General is Gutiérrez, head of the PGT Central Committee's Labor Union Commission, and most of the officers in key positions on the Executive Committee are PGT members and the party's control of the organization is effective. To a somewhat lesser extent, the PGT exerts influence over the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG), the national federation of small farmers, tenants and those organized farm laborers not incorporated in the CGTG. Its principal leaders have been associated with such Communist causes as the "Peace" movement and its program is closely in line with those of the PGT.

The principal "mass" organizations which support the party's efforts are the National Peace Committee, whose Secretary General is Mario SILVA Jonama, Secretary of the PGT and head of its Education Commission; the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), the youth organization whose Secretary General is Edelberto TORRES Rivas, a 1953 visitor to Moscow, and one of whose most influential leaders is Huberto ALVARADO, member of the PGT Central Committee and head of its Youth Commission; and the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca (AFG), the women's organization whose Secretary General is Dora FRANCO y Franco, a Communist and one of whose founding members was Sra. de ARBENZ. These organizations with the aid of the Administration parties and the labor unions have recently set themselves a goal of 125,000 signatures on a "Peace" petition, thus giving an indication of their ability to simulate "mass support" for Communistic causes.

The PGT has thus become in 1954 the most influential single organization in Guatemalan political life, and has established its dominion over the key institutions in Guatemalan political life, with the exception of the Armed forces, which, however, have not opposed Communism. The momentum it has achieved indicates further successes unless there is a change in the world situation or a successful but unforeseeable revolt by the Guatemalan Army or some other group. The party still has a few weaknesses: It still relies to a great extent on the good will of the Guatemalan President and his replacement by one less sympathetic to Communism would be a serious blow; it is still faced to some extent with the danger that the Guatemalan Revolution will turn into opportunist un-Communist channels since the indoctrination of most of the current sympathizers outside of the Party is only superficial; and in the last analysis it is dependent on the international Communist movement for guidance and cohesion and probably could not long survive a major Soviet set-back. However, the PGT has the salient advantage that it alone has the political initiative with the Administration parties tending increasingly to follow in its ideological wake while the opposition has for the past 18 months increasingly become sterile and ineffectual. Moreover, the path of Agrarian Reform and extreme nationalism on which the Arbenz Administration has hurried has been directed at breaking down the existing order without an immediate substitute, a situation which cannot but enhance the Communist position.

SECTION I

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISM

THE "INTELLECTUAL" STRATUM AS THE INCUBATOR OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1. The Guatemalan Environment: The post-World War II Communist movement in Guatemala crystallized in one small segment of the social organism, the lower middle class ladino "intellectual" group of schoolteachers, poor students, journalists and the like, and this did much to shape its future growth. The appeal of Communism to this group may be traced to its frustration at the failure of the Guatemalan community to make substantial progress for at least two generations prior to World War II in adjusting its political, social and economic structure in harmony with the ideals of the modern world.

Guatemala remained until after World War II essentially a backward, coffee-growing agricultural country in which a few landlords controlled large groups of illiterate Indian laborers. The 1,500,000 Indians who make up half of the country's population,(1) according to recent anthropological surveys, have continued to live separated from the main currents of modern life entrenched in ancient customs traceable to the Maya era. The country's population (about 2,800,000) and its area (about 42,000 square miles) are both roughly comparable to those of the State of Tennessee, but in 1948 the per capita share of the gross national product in Guatemala was less than one-tenth that in the United States. Illiteracy, by Guatemalan statistical standards, still stands at about 70% and probably less than 5% of the adult male population has an education comparable to a U.S. high school education. The bases of the society, in short, changed very little in the four centuries since the Spanish Conquest in 1529 despite some abortive efforts at modernization in the late nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries.

Conditions in Guatemala, furthermore, were materially different than those which led to the growth of Communist parties in Western Europe. The Guatemalan society, despite its social backwardness, had no true tradition of social revolution, although like other Latin American countries it had its share of "revolutions" which were seldom more than military coups transferring power from one clique to another. The landowning classes and the bulk of the middle classes were unresponsive to the broad appeal of social change and resistant to the narrower attraction of Communism, and there was no industrial proletariat to speak of. There was no corps of experienced, Moscow-trained Communists to take charge of developments nor an underground party. The Marxist-oriented among the lower middle class, thus, represented virtually the only element in the social environment favorable for the cultivation of a Communist growth.

2. Attempts at Social Transformations (1870-1932): In the last two generations before World War II there were several unsuccessful efforts to overcome the archaic structure of Guatemalan society. The first of significance was made by General Justo Rufino BARRIOS dominant figure of Guatemalan politics from 1871 to 1885 and President for the last eleven of those years. This was a time when Guatemala was beginning to feel the impact of the ideas of the liberal revolutions and movements that had swept across the Western World in the previous half century with the industrial revolution and when the feudal society established with the Spanish Conquest was weakened. Barrios, a dictator, attempted a start at bringing Guatemala into line with the thought of his day by fostering an embryonic state school system, severely restricting the temporal power of the Church, establishing a national military academy, improving communications and other reforms.

Despite his efforts, Barrios did not succeed in overcoming the inertia of the society. In his effort to establish a business-like agricultural structure he expropriated communal lands of the Indians, pieced together large plantations, introduced the commercial growth of coffee and encouraged immigration to develop the new economy. The probably unforeseen result was that the Indian further lost his independence and became to a large extent the victim of "debt-slavery." The decaying landowner-Indian relationship of the Spanish heritage was thus revived and perpetuated in another form.

(1) The 1950 Guatemalan census gives 54 per cent as the percentage of Indians in the country, based on cultural rather than racial characteristics. Anthropologists generally agree that the percentage of pure or nearly pure Indians is higher. The remainder of the population is considered in the census as ladinos, that is persons of European culture, most but not all of whom are of mixed Spanish and Indian blood.

Barrios also established the first of a long series of "Liberal" authoritarian regimes which were to last through the era of General Jorge Ubico (1932-44). Ironically, the professed admiration of Barrios and some of his "Liberal" successors for U. S. and Western European democracy (July 4 and July 14 have since been maintained as Guatemalan national holidays) was later to prove a factor in turning the intellectuals opposing the "Liberal" dictatorships away from Western democracy.

After Barrios' era, an indirect but equally unsuccessful challenge to the existing structure slowly developed in the form of a small middle class. Without altering its basic internal structure, Guatemala assimilated in the late Nineteenth and first part of the Twentieth Centuries some of the technological advances of the outer world. Foreign capital started work on, and a U. S. company completed and still owns, the International Railways of Central America (IRCA). The United Fruit Company began what was to become the largest productive enterprise in the country. Commercial products of expanding U. S. and European industries entered the Guatemalan market in increasing quantities, demands were created for modern medicine, and eventually the introduction of automobiles and airplanes began a transformation of this small mountainous country's communications.

The middle class which evolved to furnish the merchants, professional men, educators and technicians to service these assimilations had the most contacts with the outside world and became the social stratum most conscious of Guatemala's social backwardness. However, this class eventually divided into one segment which was drawn to the idea of progress by evolutionary means and another segment drawn to reform by revolutionary means. The majority of the middle class obtained in the years 1871-1944 a sufficient stake in the economy to be content to hope for modernization by evolutionary means. The minority, made up of those "intellectual" elements such as schoolteachers, whose resentment of Guatemala's backwardness was sharpened by lack of ties to the existing structure, became something of an insoluble lump in the Guatemalan social organism. This was not perhaps because of any conscious desire for separation on the part of the "intellectuals" but more probably because the archaic social structure would not provide the necessary solvent. Frustrated in their desire to provide ideological orientation to an evolutionary society, they lived traditionless on the periphery of the national life, often with makeshift personal lives and prey to the facile "isms" which seemed to provide a formula for quick solution to the problems they perceived.

3. The Intellectuals 1932-1944: During the 1930's and World War II, when liberal ideas of social experimentation were waxing in the industrialized countries and nationalism was sweeping the under-developed areas, Guatemala was living under the authoritarian regime of President Ubico, and the Guatemalan lower middle class "intellectuals" who were to play a leading part in post-World War II political developments were bitterly opposed to the regime and disposed to be drawn to these "isms". Nationalism paradoxically provided much of the fertile soil from which international Communist ideology was to grow in Guatemala. The eventual contradictions between these two "isms" remained imperceptible to most of Guatemala's radical intellectuals, for nationalism with its overtones of equality and sovereignty of peoples provided a ready means to blame Guatemala's backwardness on foreign "imperialist" exploitation while Communism provided a dialectic explanation of "imperialism" and a concrete cause dedicated to overcoming it.

The thinking of Guatemala's intellectuals during the 1930's and the early 1940's thus became covered with a glaze of nationalism and Marxism, a scrambled compound which was short of the full strength of militant Communism. This was the time that leading intellectuals, partly escaping the atmosphere of the Ubico regime and partly separating themselves from the frustrations of an intellectual's role in Guatemala, scattered abroad. Dr. Juan José AREVALO, the schoolteacher who was to become Guatemala's first post-war "Revolutionary" President, was in Argentina where he further evolved the pro-Communist ideology he was to label "spiritual socialism;" Luis CARDOZA y Aragón, the leading poet and critic who was to serve many Communist-front post-war causes, was associating with leftist circles in Paris; Alfonso Solorzano Fernández, who was to play a role in the ideological orientation and organizational training of the younger Communists and who is now Manager of the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security (IGSS), was in Mexico, as a labor lawyer and organizer working directly with Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, the Communist labor leader; Jorge GARCIA Granados, son of one of Guatemala's leading political families who was later to turn back to a moderate leftish line after participating in Guatemala's early post-war leftist political parties, was associating with extremist revolutionary circles in Mexico; and Roberto ALVARADO Fuentes,

who was to be instrumental in the organization of Guatemalan Communist-oriented groups and to rise to the Presidency of the Guatemalan Congress, was a radical pro-Communist in Chile. Although several of these men were themselves moderately well-to-do, their Guatemalan following was drawn from the poorer students and lower middle class "intellectual" elements.

At home in Guatemala the nationalist-Marxist approach must have achieved an important role in the intellectuals' outlook, although the authoritarian Ubico regimes prevented organized expression of it. Enrique MUNOZ Meany, the late pro-Communist Foreign Minister and Minister to France, taught several of Guatemala's future Communist party leaders at the law school of San Carlos University, the national university, in the early 1940's, and at the Boys Central Normal School. The fact that the University of San Carlos and the Boys Central Normal School provided from its students of the early 1940's the majority of the present leaders of the far leftist nationalist movement and the Communist and pro-Communist organizations suggests the fashionableness of the Nationalist-Marxist mode of thought in the pre-war and wartime era.

World War II gave a great impetus to the revolutionary forces which were to open the way for the crystallization of an organized Communist movement. The slogans of the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations disarmed the natural defenders of the existing Guatemalan authoritarian system and fired the ambition if not the understanding of wide segments of the middle strata of society. For many intellectuals, to judge by their subsequent writings and actions, the war was a vindication of faith in the superiority of the Socialist (i.e. Soviet) system over "Fascist dictatorship" by which they understood, with little discrimination, the Ubico authoritarian system at home and the complex police states abroad.

For another important group, the younger Army officers who were also mostly recruited from the lower middle class, the war provided another type of stimulus. The presence of United States Army Air Bases and the sending of Guatemalan officers to U. S. service schools helped to focus the general dissatisfaction against the Ubico regime by contrasting the superior material status of foreign officers and the advanced technological development of a modern nation with the miserable pay and primitive methods in vogue in Guatemala.

B. THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF A GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. Origins in the 1944 Revolution (1944-46): The catalyst which accelerated the ferment in the Guatemalan intellectual group and eventually molded an organized Communist movement was the Guatemalan Revolutions of June and October, 1944, which overthrew President Ubico and General Federico PONCE Vaides, the head of the successor Provisional Government, and which ended the 70-year era dominated by "Liberal" dictatorships.

The June uprising in 1944 against President Ubico consisted almost solely of demonstrations by the students of the University of San Carlos, young teachers and professional people; it was, in short, a revolution of "intellectuals" and not of the masses and was only partially successful. General Ponce was installed as head of the Provisional Government and soon started a policy of repression. The Revolution was not made secure until October when a second student uprising was joined by young Army officers and the Provisional Government was overthrown. A governing board (Junta) consisting of Major Francisco Xavier ARANA, who led the key Guardia de Honor regiment in the Revolution, Captain Jacobo ARBENZ of the Escuela Politécnica, who was credited with being the strategist of the insurrectionists, and Jorge Toriello, a civilian, were installed as a triumvirate.

Meanwhile, following the June uprising, the intellectual group had started the organizations which were to incubate the Communist movement. Prior to the Revolution no labor unions, other than controlled workingmen's national aid societies had been permitted, but in July a schoolteachers' union, the Asociación Nacional de Maestros, was founded and evolved in January 1945 into the Sindicato de Trabajadores Educacionales de Guatemala (STEG). The railway workers' union, SAMF, successor to an earlier railwaymen's mutual benefit society of the same initials, came into being and in August the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) was founded as the country's national labor federation. This was the time that the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL), the "students' party," and the Partido Renovación Nacional (RN), the"teachers' party," were founded with a leftist

orientation in support of the Presidential candidacy of Dr. Arévalo, who had returned from his exile in Argentina.

Within this leftist-nationalist movement there was at first no Communist organization. The old pre-1932 Communist Party of Guatemala had been smashed by President Ubico who feared an uprising such as occurred in El Salvador. Several of its leaders had fled to Moscow, others had been jailed in Guatemala, and at least one Jacobo Sánchez, had died in the hands of Ubico's police. There was thus no native organization to provide continuity and it was necessary to reconstruct the party from the base.

The seeds of the future Guatemalan Communist Party were initially planted within the CTG. In establishing and carrying forward this organization it was necessary to draw on advisers on labor organization which Guatemala was unable to provide. Those who came forward were not from Western organizations but largely Central Americans who had had associations with Communism. The principal foreign group consisted of Salvadoran exiles, including Miguel MARMOL Chicas, a Salvadoran Communist who is still associated with the local labor movement; Abel and Max CHELCA Martínez, brothers exiled from El Salvador in 1932 for Communist activities, the latter of whom is now a member of the Political Committee of professedly non-Communist Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca; and Virgilio GUERRA Méndez, now a member of the Communist Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) Political Committee. They were joined by Antonio OVANDO Sánchez, a leader of the pre-Ubico Guatemalan Communist Party who had gone to Moscow in the early 1930's and was later jailed by Ubico; and by Alfonso Solórzano Fernández, the labor lawyer who had worked with Lombardo Toledano in Mexico.

These persons, who had had labor union organizing experience in other countries, served as the advisers to the young CTG in which they quickly established an indoctrination school called the Escuela Claridad with Abel Cuenca as director. Its ostensible purpose was to train labor leaders, but its Communist orientation soon became obvious. (Ovando Sánchez was quoted in 1950 as boasting that he had begun to form the Communist Party in the Escuela Claridad.) The school had the close support of the schoolteachers' union STEG, but its Communist orientation alarmed the SAMF railway union and certain other unions with the result that a factional fight split the CTG. The SAMF and other unions withdrew to form the Federación Sindical de Guatemala (FSG) in January 1946, and during the same month the Arévalo Administration formally shut down the Escuela Claridad with a decree citing it as being in contravention of Article 32 of the Guatemalan Constitution which forbids "political organizations of a foreign or international character." After the closing of the school, Communist indoctrination continued through Marxist "study groups" clandestinely organized within the labor movement and the political parties.

Communist and Communist-oriented figures also exerted an influence in the indoctrination of Guatemala's political organizations in their first years. Among the residents were Edelberto TORRES, Sr., the Nicaraguan Communist; Armando FLORES Amador, also a Nicaraguan Communist; Miguel Angel VASQUEZ, a Salvadoran Communist; Pedro Geoffrey RIVAS, a Costa Rican Communist figure; and Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, a Guatemalan who had returned from Chile where had had been involved in Communist activities.

In the turbulent and disoriented first period of the post-World War II "Revolutionary" era, the Communist doctrines taught by the Escuela Claridad, in the "study groups" and by the Communist-oriented figures in the country exerted a considerable appeal to the young students and others who were looking for a unified and firm ideology. In 1944 the average known age of the present Political Committee of the Communist PGT (except Virgilio Guerra who was 38) was just over 23 years, and their political philosophy was then probably not fully formulated. José Manuel Fortuny, the present Secretary General of the PGT, then 28, was the eldest and was employed as a part-time law student and radio newscaster. Bernado ALVARADO Monzón, the present Secretary for Organization, Alfredo GUERRA Borges, now Secretary for Propaganda, and Carlos René VALLE, currently on the Political Committee, were nineteen-year-old students at the time of the Revolution. Victor Manuel Gutierrez, now the country's top labor leader, and Mario SILVA Jonama, both on the present Political Committee, were at the time of the Revolution schoolteachers in their early twenties, and Carlos Manuel PELLECER, also a member of the PGT Political Committee, was 24. José Alberto CARDOZA, a printer, and Antonio ARDON, a tailor, both now Political Committee members, were apparently in their mid-twenties during the Revolution. All of these young men had much the same background: they were of mixed Spanish-Indian blood; their

families were relatively poor, and they had attained an educational level higher than the average Guatemalan in these circumstances (see Biographic Summaries - Appendix 2).

2. Growth Inside of Political and Labor Organizations (1946-1950): It took three years after the October 1944 Revolution for this group to crystallize into a permanent Communist organization operating clandestinely within President Arévalo's leftist "revolutionary" movement and seven years (until January 1952) for the Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG) to emerge as the sole and recognized Stalinist-Communist party of the country. At first one group, led by Fortuny, was active within the leftist Administration parties, particularly the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) which was formed in 1945 by a fusion of the FPL and the RN.(1) Within the PAR they achieved a considerable influence. Fortuny was twice acting Secretary General and others of his group obtained offices on the Executive Committee.

Meantime, another group led by Gutiérrez and consisting of persons associated with the Escuela Claridad gradually came to dominate the labor movement. With the withdrawal of the SAMF from the CTG and the formation of the FSG in January 1946, the teachers' union STEG remained as the most militant union within the CTG and came to dominate it. Gutiérrez rose rapidly from the STEG Executive Committee to the STEG Secretary Generalship and to the Secretary Generalship of the CTG. That organization retained its original affiliation with the WFTU and the CTAL in contrast to the CIO, the AFofL and the British Trade Unions Council which withdrew from the WFTU on the grounds that it was Soviet-dominated.

The Communist-oriented group also gradually infiltrated and won over the FSG although the FSG had originally been formed in protest to the ascendancy of Communist doctrines in the CTG. The instrument of the FSG leftist turn was Manual PINTO Usaga, a Communist-line opportunist leader who rose from the SAMF railroad workers' union to be the FSG Secretary General, and José Alberto Carloza. By February 1947 a Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS) was founded to coordinate the actions of the CTG and FSG and lay the foundations for a new united organization. By 1950 the FSG affiliated with the WFTU and the CTAL and in October 1951 its entry into the Communist orbit was complete.

Fortuny's extreme leftist "political" group and Gutiérrez's extreme leftist "labor" group worked closely together in the revolutionary movement and some of the younger leaders, such as José Luis RAMOS, were active in both. Their activities were more in the nature of two aspects of a single current than the activities of separate entities.

In the midst of these developments, the political education of those who were to found the Communist party went forward. In addition to Solórzano, Alvarado Fuentes, and the other Guatemalan Communist-oriented personalities who had returned from exile, there was a large influx of visiting Communist leaders between 1945 and 1950 to help advance the ideological and organizational skill of the young Guatemalan extremists. Among them were César GODOY Urrutia, leader of the Chilean Communist Party who came first in 1945; Pablo NERUDA, the Chilean Communist poet; Eduardo HUBNER, a Chilean Communist figure; Virginia BRAVO Letelier, a Chilean Communist teacher; Blas ROCA of the Cuban Communist Party; and Vicente Lombardo Toledano of the CTAL in Mexico.

During most of these years of the development and indoctrination of the young revolutionary leaders there was no established or recognized Communist organization in Guatemala, a factor which probably eased the inner struggle of those being converted. It was an era where there could be "Communists" without any demand for them also to be "Communist Party Members."

3. The Founding of the Communist Party in the Late Arévalo Administration (1947-51): Apart from the time which transpired until a Communist organization was ready to crystallize, the political climate of the Arévalo Administration was not favorable for the open organization of a Communist party and the early steps towards the establishment of one were of a conspiratorial character.

President Arévalo pursued a devious and often apparently whimsical policy towards Communists which, in retrospect, may be summarized as encouraging participation of Communists

(1) The FPL and the RN later withdrew, resulting in three parties, the PAR, the FPL, and the RN.

as individuals in the Administration political and labor groups and discouraging the formation of an open organized Stalinist party. In the organization of the first political parties and labor unions and in the evolvement and early implementation of the Social Security Law (1946) and Labor Code (1947), he not only tolerated but worked closely with Communist-oriented figures. During his Administration virtually all of the future Communist party leaders were at one time or another on the public payroll, one of them, Mario Silva Jonama, rising to be Under Secretary of Education, and another, Alfredo Guerra Borges, to be editor of the official gazette (then the Diario de Centro América). President Arévalo not only countenanced the visit of Latin American Communist figures to Guatemala, but personally aided Latin American Communists in their travels in other countries. In his political speeches and writings, the President maintained that as a "spiritual socialist" he rejected a purely materialistic (i.e. Communist) concept on the grounds that the dignity of man was more important than his economic needs, but this did not prevent him from finding a common viewpoint and a workable arrangement with Communist figures on such meeting grounds as social reform and opposition to United States "imperialism." Moreover, his talk of playing one Administration political camp against another in order to retain the decisive voice for himself aided the growth of the Communist movement which benefited from the inability of most parties to forsake its support in the delicate balance.

President Arévalo, nonetheless, from time to time took concrete steps to impede the growth of an open Communist organization. In February, 1946, there was his closing down of the Escuela Claridad. From 1946 to 1948 and again in 1949-50 he kept Carlos Manuel Pellecer, most fiery of the young extremists, out of the country as Secretary of Legation in Paris despite Pellecer's repeated efforts to be transferred home, and the assignment of Alfredo Guerra Borges and Abel Cuenca to diplomatic missions in this period suggests further use of this device to impede Communist organization. In May, 1947, he sent Abel and Max Cuenca out of the country, and on October 4 of that year his police put the Salvadoran Communists Virgilio Guerra, Miguel Marmol, and other foreign Communists across the Mexican border, thus momentarily breaking up the group that had taught at the Escuela Claridad and served as advisers to the CTG. (They made their way back quietly shortly thereafter.)

It was in this atmosphere that the first successful attempt to form a Guatemalan Communist Party was made on September 28, 1947 under the name of the Vanguardia Democrática. It was, in essence, a conspiratorial group. Its probable leaders, of whom Fortuny is the only one definitely identified, were to the outside world high officers of the PAR and the labor unions. Fortuny was formally elected Secretary General of the group in 1948. There was no announcement of its formation and its membership, except for Fortuny, has never been revealed. In a press interview almost four years later, on July 1, 1951, Fortuny set the September 28, 1947 date as the day of the founding of the organized Communist party, but until 1950, the final year of Arévalo's Administration, the existence of a Communist party was a successfully guarded secret.(1)

On December 21, 1947, young leftist followers of the Administration's "revolutionary" movement, among them a group later to be identified as Communist, founded the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), a youth organization now affiliated with the International Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). One of its first leaders was José H. ZAMORA, a Salvadoran, who was ousted from the Secretary generalship in 1950 and proceeded publicly to accuse Mario Silva Jonama, Antonio SIERRA González, Octavio REYES, and Huberto ALVARADO of forming a Communist group within the organization. The charge suggests that from the beginning the AJDG was an offshoot of the still-clandestine Communist Party.

In the spring of 1949, Fortuny and Gutiérrez, both ostensibly still members of the PAR, traveled to Europe where they attended, in April, the first World Congress of the Partisans of Peace in Paris. Gutiérrez, after a brief trip back to Guatemala, also attended the Milan Congress of the WFTU where he was elected a member of the Executive Committee and mixed further with the leaders of international Communism. Fortuny, who was elected a member of the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress at Paris, went on to tour the "Peoples Democracies" of Eastern Europe.

(1)Although Fortuny's statement dates an organized party from 1947, the present Communist party, the PGT, dates its anniversaries from the First Party Congress on September 28, 1949. It publicized September 28, 1953 as the "Fourth Anniversary of the Party."

After their return, there was a marked increase in the tempo of the effort to create an open Communist Party. During the summer there had been the assassination of Colonel Arana, the 1944 triumvir who had become Chief of the Armed Forces, by persons sympathetic to the Presidential ambitions of Colonel Arbenz, and an abortive uprising by Arana's supporters in the Army which Arbenz put down with the help of labor unions. The time was propitious for the extreme left. In September, 1949, Gutiérrez resigned from the PAR. During the same month, on September 28, the clandestine Communist Party, the Vanguardia Democrática held its First Party Congress and purged its ranks. It was presumably at this congress that the name Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG) was adopted, and that Fortuny was re-elected Secretary General. The present Guatemalan Communist Party numbers its anniversaries from this event.

On May 25, 1950 when the campaign for a successor to President Arévalo was already under way, Fortuny announced his resignation from the PAR of which he was then a member of the Executive Committee. Along with his resignation there were those of Mario Silva Jonama, PAR Secretary for Propaganda; Bernado Alvarado Monzón, Secretary for Youth Affairs; Antonio Ardón, Secretary for Social Matters; Humberto ORTIZ, Secretary for Rural Affairs; Pedro FERNANDEZ and Alfredo Guerra Borges, ex-members of the Political Committee; and José Luis Ramos, Regelio LOPEZ and Carlos René Valle. A month later, on June 21, 1950, this group brought out a newspaper entitled Octubre whose initial sub-heading was "For a Great Communist Party, Vanguard of the Workers, the Peasants and the People." The group, however, still did not openly profess themselves as the Communist Party and was known as the "Octubre Communists."

Fortuny's "Octubre Communist" group which was then the visible manifestation of the still secret PCG, was distinct from but not opposed to another Communist political organization, the Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (PROG), which was also founded in June, 1950 by Gutiérrez as a Communist type party for the further indoctrination of political and labor leaders. It was Fortuny's idea to proceed as rapidly with the establishment of an open Communist party while Gutiérrez's statements indicate that he thought that a further period of ideological training in a Communist-front party was necessary.

The outgoing Arévalo Administration did not impede these developments but it moved to disassociate the "Octubre Communists" from the public Administration. Mario Silva Jonama was removed as Director of the national radio station TGW, where he had gone after leaving the Ministry of Education, and Alfredo Guerra Borges was dismissed as editor of the official gazette. In the summer of 1950 the Supreme Court, which was responsive to Administration policy, decided that Fortuny's term on the National Electoral Council had expired, overruling his contention that he should not be limited to filling out the term of his predecessor but should have a full term.

On September 6, Octubre announced the founding of an evening Marxist indoctrination school named "Jacobo Sánchez," after the Communist "assassinated" by Ubico. It was under the direction of Alfredo Guerra Borges and Gutiérrez, though not of the Octubre group, was an instructor. The school, however, was promptly shut down by Colonel Elfego MONZON, Arévalo's Minister of the Interior.

Despite these frictions with the authorities, the "Octubre Communists" as well as the PROG worked loyally with the revolutionary parties in the Presidential campaign of Colonel Arbenz, President Arévalo's chosen successor. Leaders of these two organizations and of the trade unions under their influence formed the Comité Politico Nacional de los Trabajadores (CPNT) which propagandized for Arbenz and the Administration's Congressional candidates, among the successful ones of whom were Gutiérrez and José Alberto Cardoza of the PROG, Humberto Ortiz of the Octubre Communists, and Cesar MONTENEGRO Paniagua of the FSG and SAMF who was later openly to join the Communist ranks.

4. The Communist Party in the Arbenz Administration (1951-53): With the inauguration of President Arbenz, on March 15, 1951, Fortuny's Communist Party started on the final phase of its emergence as an open and legal Communist Party. On April 4, Fortuny signed a press statement as "Secretary General of the Partido Comunista de Guatemala;" this was the first avowal that an organized Communist Party existed in Guatemala. In May there were further open contacts with international Communist figures when Lombardo Toledano, Secretary General of the CTAL, and Louis SAILLANT, Secretary General of WFTU, attended a Guatemala City Conference of Latin American Land and Air Transport Workers' Unions and

counseled local labor leaders on forming a single Guatemalan labor federation. On June 21, the first anniversary of the publication of Octubre, the party held a public rally in a theater furnished by the Government under a law permitting the use of theaters for "cultural" affairs, and with high officials of the Government in attendance. It was announced that the party would seek to be entered on the Civil Registry in order to attain status as a recognized party under the electoral laws.

There remained one organizational problem to be solved: the co-existence of Fortuny's PCG and Gutiérrez's PROG, both of which were Communist in ideology but only the first of which professed itself Communist. In July, in a press interview, Gutiérrez stated flatly that he was a Communist. In October his CTG and the FSG joined in the establishment of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and he was elected its Secretary General at the head of an Executive Committee in which the key positions were held by Communists. In November he attended the WFTU Congress in Berlin, going on to Moscow. Upon his return in January, 1952, he announced the dissolution of the PROG and advised its members to join Fortuny's PCG.

On January 25, 1952 the Cominform's newspaper, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" published in Bucharest, Rumania, carried an article summarizing the findings of the Central Committee of the PCG on the shortcomings of Octubre. The publication of this article, in effect, confirmed the acceptance of Fortuny's PCG by the international Communist movement as the authorized Communist party in Guatemala.

During 1952 the representatives of the PCG began to be reported in the press as sitting in on President Arbenz's political conferences with the representatives of the other leftist Administration parties.

Early in the year there was a further upsurge in contacts with the international Communist movement. In March Blas Roca, Juan MARINELLO, and Salvador AGUIRRE, leaders of the Cuban Communist Party, visited Guatemala. In late May, Mario Silva Jonama, member of the PCG Political Committee, left for Moscow and the preliminary meeting of the Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conference in Pekin, returning in early October. In September José Alberto Cardoza, who had followed Gutiérrez into the PCG, attended the main Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conference in Pekin, coming and going through Moscow.

Meanwhile, the party had played a leading part in the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law of July 17, 1952, which was steered through Congress by the Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, whose Chairman was Gutiérrez. The party leadership saw the Agrarian Reform as the vehicle to control the rural areas and at this time a decision was taken abandon restrictions on membership and to receive as many applicants as possible to create a "mass party."

In October the PCG announced that it would hold its Second Party Congress in December, and when this took place on December 11-14, a number of basic organizational decisions were taken: to change the party name to the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (the Guatemalan Labor Party--PGT) in order to sidestep the resistance to the word Communist and probably to ease the legalization of the party; to expand the party membership; to register the party in the Civil Registry; and to transform the weekly Octubre into a daily paper. The Congress also approved statutes for the PGT modeled on the standard organization of Stalinist Communist parties (see Section II, A), and re-elected Fortuny as Secretary General at the head of a Political Committee of eleven members and a Central Committee of twenty-one members.

On December 19 the PGT was registered as a political party in the Civil Registry despite the protest of anti-Communist groups that both the Constitution and the Electoral Law specifically forbid "political organizations of a foreign or international character." It presented a list of 532 members, thirty-two over the minimum required, to support its registration petition. The PGT then participated in the January 1953 Congressional elections as a member of the Administration's "Democratic Electoral Front." One of the PGT candidates, Pellecer, won in the Department of Escuintla and the other, Fortuny, lost in the Department of Guatemala, the Opposition stronghold.

On February 17, 1953 the PGT reopened the "Jacobo Sanchez" School as a party cadre school. By August 15 the party had collected some $10,000 from its Basic Organizations (cells) and launched a daily morning tabloid, Tribuna Popular. ($10,000 is an inadequate

sum to finance a daily newspaper in Guatemala and many observers believe it is Government-subsidized.) In the PGT drive to increase party membership, the Party's first National Conference on Organization on August 8-9 claimed a 100% rise in the number of members since the December, 1952 Party Congress.

The PGT had by then become an open and major organization in Guatemalan political life. During the remainder of 1953 and early 1954, the party grew in numbers and influence. In November, it felt itself strong enough to present candidates independently of the other Administration parties in six selected municipalities and elected four mayors, including that of the important Pacific slope center of Escuintla. Party membership grew, and although totals were not announced, the party press identified new cells in the countryside.

Meanwhile, pursuing the "popular front" tactic, the PGT had taken a lead in transforming the "Democratic Electoral Front" of the 1953 Congressional elections into a permanent "National Democratic Front", whose council met with President Arbenz on policy questions and increasingly took over the Cabinet's policy-making functions. In a speech, on April 4, 1954, for instance, Carlos Manuel Pellecer revealed that Guatemalan tactics for the Caracas Conference had been decided upon at a meeting between Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello, the President and the representatives of the Front. The Front came under effective Communist domination by the addition of the Communist-controlled CGTG and Communist-influenced CNCG to the political parties which originally composed it. At one meeting in 1954, four of the representatives were avowed PGT members, four were established as Communist sympathizers by trips to Moscow, participation in the "Peace" movement, etc., and two were political collaborators with the Communists.

SECTION II

THE STRUCTURE
OF THE
MODERN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

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MODERN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

A. PARTY ORGANIZATION

1. The Central Party Organization: The Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo is organized along the centralized authoritarian lines on the model of the Soviet Communist Party under Stalin, and the party discipline deriving from this organizational form has been a unique asset in the Guatemalan political environment where other entities tend to be lax and haphazard. The Party is now organized under statutes drawn up by the Political Committee, adopted with no known change at the Party Congress in December 1952, and entered on the Civil Registry the same month.(1) They do not incorporate the changes in terminology made by the Soviet Communist Party at its Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952 (e.g. the change of the name of the Political Bureau to the Presidium), but are substantively identical with the organization of Stalinist Communist Parties prior to the Nineteenth Congress.

The Party is in effect ruled by its Political Committee, currently composed of eleven members, which in turn is dominated by the Secretariat, currently composed of six members. The Political Committee which is elected by the Central Committee "directs the Party's activities when the Central Committee is not in session." The Secretariat, which is elected by the Central Committee from among members of the Political Committee, "is responsible for the daily work of the Party leadership, for organizing the execution of the resolutions of the Central Committee and Political Committee, for the assignment and training of leaders." The Secretary General of the Central Committee by statute heads the Secretariat and presides over the Political Committee.

The Political Committee and the Secretariat form the heart of the Party, for the more unwieldy Central Committee, which is supposed to meet in plenary session every three months, has never been recorded as doing anything but ratifying the work and reports of the party leaders. The Central Committee, currently composed of twenty-one members, is elected by the Party Congress which is "the Party's highest authority" but is "normally called by the Central Committee every three years" and thus has little direct influence on daily party activity.

The Central Committee in addition to its Political Committee has standing Commissions on Organization, Propaganda, Education, Labor Unions, Women's, Peasants', Finance and Youth Affairs. As will be seen, those concerned with activities outside of the Party serve to organize the party's influence in "mass organizations."

The Party Propaganda Commission publishes a daily, Tuesday through Sunday, tabloid-sized newspaper Tribuna Popular and has announced a bi-monthly magazine Octubre. Since February, 1953, the party has been conducting the "Jacobo Sánchez" evening school to train party cadres. The Organization Commission publishes a monthly Boletín de Organización.

2. Regional and Local Organizations: The subordinate party organizations in essence are abbreviated reproductions of the centralism of the national party headquarters. The statutes provide for Departmental and Municipal organizations, and Regional, Sectional and District organizations as the next or "intermediate" echelon of the party structure. An Assembly, which meets once a year or oftener, is again the "highest authority" of these organizations, and Departmental, Municipal, Regional, etc., Committees are elected. However, real power is vested in a Secretariat which is elected by these Committees from among their members and which "shall be the executive bodies of the respective organizations." The supremacy of the Party's national leadership is specifically provided for by obligating the "intermediate" organizations to "make certain that the resolutions of higher Party organs are carried out."

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(1) The October draft statutes are the only ones available for study and the subsequent material is based on them.

The foundation of the Party structure is the "Basic Committee," popularly referred to as the "cell," to which every member must belong. It elects its own Secretaries and has the functions of carrying out the Party's propaganda, to report to higher headquarters on the "sentiments and needs of the worker," to carry out organizational and recruiting works, and to enforce discipline.

Some thirty party Basic Organizations were identified by name in Communist publications in 1953-54. These cells were named "Octubre," "Juan Pablo Wainright," "Pedro Molina," "Mao Tze Tung," (in the Department of Suchitepéquez), "Dmitri Shostakovich," "Estrella Roja," "Bandera Roja" (Guatemala), "Dolores Ibarruri," "Maxmiliano Gorki," "Georgi Dimitroff," "José Marti," "Francisco Morazon," "Mariano Galvez," "Tecún Umán," "Decreto 900," "José Manuel Fortuny," "Espartaco" (Jutiapa), "9 de Mayo," "5 de Mayo" (Retalhuleu), "1 de Mayo" (Alta Verapaz), "Enrique Muñoz Meany" (Chimaltenango), "Julius Fucik," José Díaz," "Jesus Menendez," "Popul Vuh," "Kaibil Balan," "Luis Sánchez Batten," (Solclá), "Martires Rosenberg," "Francisco Barrundin," "Justo Rufino Barrios," and "Pavel Korchaguin."

It has positively been stated at various times in the Party press that the Party has cells in the Departments of Guatemala, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Jutiapa, Santa Rosa, Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu, Sololá, Chimaltenango, Quezaltenango, Escuintla, Peten, Chiquimula, Zacapa and Izabal. These are fifteen of Guatemala's 22 Departments. There are probably also organizations in other Departments.

3. "Democratic Centralism," the Party's Discipline: The statutes of the PGT specifically provide that the Party structure is based on "democratic centralism" which they define in a key statement as "subordination of the minority to the majority; of the members to the decisions of the Base Committee; of lower organs to higher organs; and all organs and organizations to the Central Committee." Since, as outlined above, the Central Committee is effectively dominated by its Political Committee and eventually by the Secretariat and Secretary General, the term "democratic centralism" covers up in Guatemala as elsewhere an effective authoritarian rule of the party by its leading elements.

A rigid disciplinary system is provided in the statutes for individual members. They must pay dues regularly (a duty of symbolic as well as financial importance); respect and unconditionally carry out party decisions after they are taken; and defend the party unity and combat any divisionist activity. If party members hold elected offices they must hand over their entire salary to the party and "The Party, taking into consideration their previous salaries, will pay for their new necessities and the representation expenses connected with their positions which will allow them to live decently within the Party's means." Party cards are renewed annually, at which time dues must be paid up to date; the last exchange took place in December, 1953 - January, 1954.

B. THE PARTY LEADERSHIP(1)

1. The Apparent Supremacy of Fortuny: The PGT leadership in 1954, composed totally of ladinos, represents a welding together of Fortuny's "political group" and Gutiérrez's "labor-PGT" group, and despite the doubts of some that Fortuny is the leading Communist, an analysis of the available evidence indicates that he is in a position effectively to exercise control of the party machinery.

Fortuny himself, at the December 1952 Congress, held onto the key position of Secretary General and, as such, is the presiding officer of the Central Committee, of the Political Committee and of the Secretariat. Moreover, the other four Secretaries of the Central Committee--Alvarado Monzón, Guerra Borges, Silva Jonama, and Ramos--are ex-members of Fortuny's Octubre group. They in turn control key Commissions of the Central Committee. Alvarado Monzón is head of the Organization Commission which supervises the party machinery; Guerra Borges is temporarily in charge of the Propaganda Commission and is editor of the Party newspaper; Ramos is Chief of the Peasants' Commission which plays an important role in Agrarian Reform Policy, and Silva Jonama presides over the Education Commission which has charge of party indoctrination.

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(1) A listing and biographic sketches of the principal party officials appear in Appendices A and B.

By contrast Gutiérrez and the group which is now active in the CGTG has a secondary place in the formal party hierarchy. None of them are Secretaries. Gutiérrez, Cardoza, and Virgilio Guerra, leaders of the old labor group are members of the Political Committee and the first is head of the Labor Union Commission. Pellecer, who was associated with the Octubre group but whose principal activity is in the CGTG, is also a member of the Political Committee. While the labor group thus has important positions in the PGT leadership, it does not have the controlling positions that the Fortuny group has.

In the background there is reinforcing evidence of Fortuny's leading role in the party. By a choice which became evident after Gutiérrez's return from Moscow in January, 1952, it was Fortuny's Octubre group rather than Gutiérrez's PROG group which emerged as the chosen instrument of International Communism in Guatemala. While this appeared more the settling of a friendly rivalry than a victory in a bitter factional battle, it is evident that Gutiérrez and his group assumed for the moment a secondary role in intra-party affairs although this is often obscured by the fact that because of their role in labor affairs and in Congress Gutiérrez and those associated with him receive more newspaper space than their superior officers in the formal party structure.

The case made to deny Fortuny's pre-eminence is centered on his alleged lack of intellectual attainments, his reported laziness and his reported lack of character. These arguments, however, are short of conclusive for they neglect the cardinal fact that Fortuny has had more experience and successes in Guatemalan political life than any other Communist leader: He was a 1944 founder of the VPL, twice Secretary General of the PAR; leader of the Vanguardia Democrática from its founding in 1947, and of the Partido Comunista de Guatemala from 1949 onward; and the winner in the settlement as to whether his PGT or Gutiérrez's PROG should be the chosen international Communist movement instrument in Guatemala. In the history of the Guatemalan Communist Party, as in the history of all Communist Parties since Stalin undermined Lenin's policies and overcame Trotsky, it appears risky to pre-suppose that the most intelligent and the most doctrinaire Communist must be the party leader.

2. Contacts with Moscow: Although none of the members of the PGT Political Committee are known to have visited Moscow before the 1944 Revolution, there has since been a continual flow of PGT leaders to the Soviet capital. At least six of the eleven have been there since the war. Pellecer was Secretary of Legation there in 1945 and went to Eastern Europe in 1949. Fortuny toured the "Peoples Democracies" in 1949 after attending the Paris Partisans of Peace Congress and quite possibly took in the USSR on his tour. He was on a trip to Moscow from November 5, 1953, to January 12, 1954. Gutiérrez went to Moscow in December 1951 and again in November 1953; Silva Jonama and José Alberto Cardoza went through the USSR on their way back and forth to the June and September Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conferences in 1952. José Luis Ramos was there 1953. Virgilio Guerra was scheduled to leave for Moscow in May, 1954. In addition, Oscar Edmundo PALMA, a member of the Central Committee, went to the Soviet Union after the April, 1953 meeting of the World Peace Congress in Budapest, and a number of Guatemalan youth and "peace" delegations have visited the USSR, China and the "Peoples Democracies" in 1952 and 1953.

Apart from these trips the PGT leadership is in contact with the main current of international Communism through participation in a variety of international conferences and congresses, sponsored by the WFTU, the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Students Union, etc. Fortuny, Gutiérrez, Silva Jonama, and Cardoza, as mentioned above, attended "Peace" meetings, while Gutiérrez has attended the WFTU Congresses in Milan (1949), Berlin (1951) and is now a delegate to the Vienna (WFTU) Congress. In addition to this attendance, there is a constant exchange of communications between the Vienna headquarters of the WFTU and Gutiérrez as CGTG Secretary General, some of which are published in the press as WFTU messages of "solidarity" with various Guatemalan strikes. Similar communications pass between Soviet international organizations, such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and their Guatemalan affiliates.

There are also, as described above, the frequent visits of Latin American Communist leaders, such as Dionisio ENCINA, Secretary General of the Mexican Communist Party, who attended the December 1952 PGT Party Congress.

Supplementing those personal contacts, the PGT leadership receives a flow of literature from Moscow as well as the headquarters of various Soviet-controlled international

organizations. To judge by the contents of the former party weekly Octubre and the present daily Tribuna Popular, these include the Spanish-language edition of the Cominform Journal "For A Lasting Peace, For a Peoples Democracy" published in Bucharest, and a limited file of the Soviet TASS news agency.

From these various sources, the PGT leadership is in constant contact with the twistings and turnings of Soviet tactics and is able to adjust its own policies accordingly. Though there are doubtless additional surreptitious channels of communications and Soviet control, as has proven the case in Communist parties elsewhere, these publicly recorded contacts appear sufficient to give the PGT adequate orientation.

C. PARTY MEMBERSHIP

1. Estimates Vary from 3000-4000: The PGT, a Communist party which here as elsewhere gives every evidence of valuing key positions over weight of members, has never publicly revealed the number of its members and any estimate above 3000 must at this stage be regarded as guesswork.

The public evidence on party membership[1] starts with the fact that the PGT in December, 1952, submitted the names, addresses, and identification card numbers of 532 members to the Civil Registrar to meet a requirement of the Electoral Law that this information be given on 500 or more members before a political party can be registered. Later, at a party Organizational Conference in August, 1953, the claim was publicly made that the party's membership had increased "over 100 per cent" since the previous December, a statement which, if taken at face value, would have made the party membership at least 1070 in mid-1953.

However, there is circumstantial evidence that the party membership was greater than 532 when the names were handed in to the Civil Registrar in December, 1952. The names of several national Communist figures, such as Victor Manuel Gutiérrez of the PGT Political Committee, were not included, possibly because it was not convenient to obtain the needed data from them, and in the months following the publication of this roster a score of other party members have been identified in the press. More importantly, logic dictates that the Communist leadership when required to produce only 500 names would not have needlessly exposed many more members to possible future action against them. Moreover, any secret members camouflaging under the labels of other parties or organizations would scarcely be exposed.

Thus, if party membership was greater than 532 in December, 1952, and the claim that it has since doubled is correct, the PGT would have counted more than 1100 members at the August 1953 Organization Conference. A party member was reported in the summer of 1953 to have asserted that Party membership stood at 3000, but it seems unlikely that even within the party more than a few persons have access to the party rolls. Nonetheless, it would appear a fair guess that the party numbered at least 2000 in mid-1953 and every indication, such as the November 1953 municipal elections, has been that the party has continued to multiply rapidly. A reasonable estimate of its strength in May 1954 would appear to be 3000-4000.

There is little doubt that the PGT is now in a stage of expanding membership and is tactically emphasizing a "mass" party rather than a select party. At the last party Congress in December, 1952, the need to recruit members was stressed and the party name was changed from the Comunista de Guatemala (PCG) to the PGT (Guatemalan Labor Party) in part because the word "Communist" in the party title was acknowledged to be a hindrance to its acceptance by the masses. This confirmed the decision taken at the time of the enactment of the Agrarian Reform law that June to expand the party and seemed a clear indication that the Party was willing to accept less than fully indoctrinated militants as members at this stage. The apparently successful recruiting drive doubling the party's size in seven

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(1) In assessing Communist strength in Guatemala it is necessary to discriminate between the category "PGT members" and the wider category of "Communists." As indicated above, all Communists in Guatemala are not necessarily members of the PGT and this subsection is addressed only to PGT members.

months tends to support this impression. The party has benefited in recruiting not only from its change of name but by its registration as a legal party in December, 1952, and by the many evidences that it enjoys the favor of the Arbenz Administration.

As to the composition of the Party membership, the National Conference on Organization in August, 1953, stated that 50% were urban and rural workers, 29% small farmers and tenants, and 21% middle class.

D. THE VEILED COMMUNISTS

1. The Non-Party Communists: In addition to the leadership and membership of the PGT, the party enjoys significant support from persons who are ideologically Communists but not openly PGT members, and from what is possibly an underground Communist group. This subject is naturally shrouded in secrecy and the publicly available information is limited, but any assessment of the overt party organization must recognize that it is only at the moment the instrument of international Communism and that, in any shifting developments of the future, a sizeable group of persons dedicated to Moscow's principles are available to carry forward the cause.

Among those who are most probably non-party Communists in important positions are Alfonso Solórzano and Abel Cuenca. The former was a member of the recognized Communist Party in Mexico and the latter was a Communist in El Salvador as far back as 1932, but there is no evidence that they have joined Fortuny's PGT. Solórzano, according to a wide variety of political observers, was expelled from the Mexican Communist Party which he had joined during his pre-1944 exile and association with Lombardo Toledano, but he considers himself ideologically a better Communist than the ruling members of the PGT, who in many cases were his pupils. Cuenca, likewise, is generally reported to be out of sympathy with Fortuny's group. Another of the same character is Roberto Alvarado Fuentes who is sometimes said, but with less consistency, to have been a Communist party member in Chile and is now closely associated with Solórzano.

The differences between these personalities and the leadership of Fortuny's PGT appear to be of an organizational and tactical order, for none of them are ever recorded to have entered into conflict with the thesis that Soviet-type Communism is inevitable and desirable and should be promoted in Guatemala. In June, 1952, Solórzano, Cuenca, and Alvarado Fuentes, then Secretary General of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), were principals in the establishment of the Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (PRG) as the "single revolutionary party" and thus, in essence, showed themselves as favoring the continued use of the Administration parties as the principal vehicle for furthering Communist objectives. Fortuny by that time was committed to the use of an organized Communist party as the principal vehicle, and his party, then the PCG, had the previous January received the endorsement of the Cominform Journal. On July 3, 1952 he launched an attack in Octubre on the PRG and "workers' leaders" (un-named but undoubtedly Solórzano, Cuenca, and Alvarado Fuentes) who had participated in founding the PRG and who he charged were "deviationists." Shortly thereafter, in a labor dispute in Solórzano's Institute of Guatemalan Social Security (IGSS), Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the PGT Communist who was advising the workers, in a radio address labelled Solórzano "another Ana Pauker," referring to the Rumanian Communist leader who had shortly before been sensationally purged. Pellecer renewed his attack on Solórzano in April 1954.

The fact that the Solórzano-Cuenca-Alvarado Fuentes group and others are "deviationists" from the tactical viewpoint of Fortuny's PGT does not necessarily imply that they are out of step with the long range purposes of the Moscow Communist movement. Overlooking the possibility that they are subject to separate instructions, the facts are that before and since the 1952 flare-up over the PRG, both groups have pulled together in the traces to achieve Communist objectives in the fields of local labor and political organizations, the publicizing of the "Peace" campaign and other Soviet propaganda objectives, and the orientation of the Administration's Social Security, Agrarian Reform and other programs along Communist lines.

2. The Intellectual Pro- [illegible] ts: Another group reinforcing the PGT is composed of young intellectuals who are [illegible] politics and follow the Communist line undeviatingly although they are publicly [illegible]te possibly privately, not members of Fortuny's

PGT. In many cases they were members of the University and schoolteachers groups from which the Communist leadership is drawn and in some cases they say, with conviction if possible self-deception, that they are "not Communists" although they meet every qualification except PGT membership. They are, in short, a group which was subjected to the same influences as the intellectuals who formed the PGT but they may have stopped short of party membership.

Among the typical members of this group is Julio ESTRADA de la Hoz, President of Congress in 1952-53, once a leading member of Alvarado Fuentes' faction in the PAR. As a leader of the PAR and one-time editor of the Diario de la Mañana, he has consistently followed the Communist line, although a lifelong friend and political associate has stated he is "not a Communist." Another of the former university group is Jaime DIAZ Rozzotto, Secretary General of President Arbenz' Executive Office and Secretary General of Renovación Nacional, a leftist Administration party. He professes not to be a Communist, although he was the first Secretary General of the Guatemalan "Peace" movement in 1949 and has since engaged in every major Communist-sponsored cause to the extent of welcoming the 1953 truce in Korea as another step toward the establishment of a "Socialist World."

Among schoolteachers, the intellectual Communist group counts Oscar JIMENEZ de León a leader of the pro-Communist wing of the RN; Héctor FION Garma, an RN Deputy who was active with Gutiérrez in the STEG teachers' union; and Alfonso CRANTES, ex-president of the National Electoral Board, a member of the PRG Political Committee, and President of the Communist-front "Casade Cultura."

Without the discipline inherent in PGT membership, the political orientation of this type of intellectual and his ardor for the Communist cause is constantly shifting. Some, such as Díaz Rozzotto, appear more openly identified with Communism as time evolves. On the other hand, in the past two years two have clashed with the PGT leadership: Amor Américo VELASCO de León was expelled from his key position as Secretary of Organization of the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG) in September, 1952 for attempting to counter PGT efforts to dominate that agricultural federation, and Alvaro Hugo SALGUERO was removed from the leadership of the PAR and later publicly accused the PGT of undermining him. Both had previously acted in harmony with Communist objectives.

3. A Possible Crypto-Communist Group: The effective ranks of the PGT are possibly further reinforced by crypto-Communists, some of whom are masquerading in ostensibly non-Communist organizations and some of whom may have been placed in the shadows where they would not be exposed directly in the always present possibility of an anti-Communist coup in this country. The names of only approximately 600 of the PGT's estimated 3000-4000 membership have been made public.

There is no public evidence of the existence of such a crypto-Communist group, but circumstances give grounds for suspicion. First, the PGT itself was by Fortuny's statement a secret group from 1947 to 1951 when it acted within the PAR and other political and labor organizations, and nothing in its subsequent action indicates abandonment of this tactic. Second, it is logical to suppose that a person holding a good position in the Administration parties or the Government would be advised to keep his membership in the PGT secret if publicly acknowledged membership would be a handicap to the use of his position for the PGT's purposes. Thirdly, a number of persons who were active in the Escuela Claridad and early Communist activities have vanished from the limelight. While a proportion may be accounted for by the announced purge of 1949 and other purges, some may well be kept in the background in intra-party activities to provide a nucleus of underground leadership in the event the party's position in Guatemala changes.

The non-party Communist of the Solórzano type, the Communist-oriented intellectual of the Estrada de la Hoz variety, and the possible member of a crypto-Communist group thus must be taken into account in evaluating the manpower available to the Communists, for doubtless any one of them is more valuable to the PGT in achieving its objectives than the larger numbers of farm workers blanketed into the party in the current membership expansion drive.

E. THE AIMS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. Subordination to Soviet Aims: The primary but seldom publicly professed aim of the PGT is to act in the role of the vanguard in Guatemala of the "inevitable" triumph of world communism led by the Soviet Union. While neither the party statutes nor the public statements of PGT leaders acknowledge a direct organizational subordination to the Soviet party-state, numerous party actions and statements testify to the ideological subordination of the PGT to the Soviet Union. For instance, in a message of October 2, 1952, to the Soviet Nineteenth Party Congress, the Guatemalan Communist Party stated, "Our Party salutes the indestructible unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is a guarantee of the successful construction of a Communist society in your homeland, a beacon throughout the world for workers. Inspired by your example, we will intensify our struggle for the national independence and happiness of our people."

More indirectly, the PGT daily acknowledges the Soviet Union's ideological leadership by adjusting its own party line with great sensitivity to the twistings and turnings of the Soviet line. Thus, in a few months early in 1953 the PGT's Octubre and other propaganda outlets blandly endorsed the accusations of Stalin's Government that "Jewish doctors" had plotted the death of certain Soviet leaders, reversed themselves after Stalin's death in March by endorsing the new line put out by Beria, Minister of the Interior and of State Security, that the doctors' confessions had been extracted by "impermissible means," and finally reversed themselves again by joining in Malenkov's accusations that Beria was a traitor. Such examples are repeated with each turn of the Soviet line.

The fact that the ultimate aims of the Guatemalan PGT are subordinated to the long-range Soviet aim of a Communist world has a direct effect on its immediate aims and tactics. The Guatemalan PGT acts within a global, not a local Guatemalan, political context. It thus conceives of the ultimate triumph of Communism in Guatemala as part of a successful worldwide advance of the Communist forces, and, as a disciplined battalion in the advance of an army, refrains from charging ahead blindly and adjusts its tactics and objectives to support the main effort, so the PGT subordinates its local effort to seize control of the Guatemalan Government to the wider consideration of assisting in the reduction of the stronghold of free nations grouped around the United States.

All of this is obscured and glossed over in the catch phrases of the Communist lexicon, but reflection bares the essential purposes of the PGT. On the international plane, the party has consistently put the "Peace" campaign as the central and orienting point of its activities and the "Peace campaign" is defined as "struggling against the imperialist warmongers" and "preventing the chaining of small nations and their resources to the imperialist war chariot." This is to say that the central point of the Communist program is to fight against the United States and to prevent small nations, like Guatemala, from collaborating effectively in the United States-led struggle against Soviet Communist advances. The PGT, thus adopts as its primary orientation that the defeat or isolation of the United States is the first prerequisite of triumph of Communism in Guatemala as elsewhere.

(Newspapermen and other observers of the Guatemalan scene have often given evidence of examining the "Communist" problem on a local rather than international plane. Their eyes frequently seem directed principally at the degree that the Guatemalan Communists exercise control of the Government and overlook the wider implications that this control is not necessarily the objective of Communism at this phase but an instrument to serve the broader purposes of Communist advance.)

2. The Domestic Program: Within the framework of advancing international Communism, the PGT has adopted a program in Guatemalan domestic affairs evidently calculated to disrupt the social and political structure and sever the links between Guatemala and the United States.

The party program, adopted at the 1952 Congress, is entitled "El Camino Guatemalteco," the "Guatemalan Way." It is in its currently applicable portions summarized in a report by Fortuny approved by the Central Committee at its plenary session May 16-17, 1953, consisting of seven points. These, in the stated order of importance are:

1. "The application of agrarian Reform must be carried on.

2. "Intensify the fight against foreign monopolies and increase the anti-imperialist sentiment of our people," especially the United Fruit Company, the International Railways of Central America, and the Empresa Electrica power and light company.

3. "Denounce with greater insistence the counter revolutionary activities of feudal imperialist reaction."

4. "Give increasing support to progressive measures undertaken by the democratic Government of President Arbenz," such as the highway to the Atlantic which will allow Guatemala, by competing with the U.S.-owned IRCA Railroad, to free itself from "monopolistic exploitation."

5. "Improve the living conditions of the masses," especially by struggling for a minimum daily rural wage of 80 cents and urban wage of $1.25.

6. "Cultivate and strengthen organic unity and united action in the working class," by fighting against diversionism in labor organization.

7. "Tighten the alliance between the workers and peasants."

In its totality this program can be seen as a shrewd adaptation of current Guatemalan conditions to the requirement of the long-range objective of Communist world domination and the intermediate aim of separating Guatemala from the Western powers. The PGT's party literature and the speeches of its leaders continually emphasize that conditions are not ripe for the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," that is, the seizure of power by the Communists: Guatemala must first liquidate its "feudal" agricultural social system and pass through "bourgeois revolution" and "capitalist" phase before this evolution can take place. In party doctrine, the function of the Agrarian Reform is to accelerate these social changes and thus pave the way for the lung-run triumph of Communism. But, in the short run, the Agrarian Reform serves as a punitive weapon against all the propertied elements, whose interests and traditions have historically been an important factor serving to cement Guatemala into the Western World. More directly, the PGT seeks to break down the Guatemalan-Western relationship by concentration on the fight against the economic interests of the United States in Guatemala ("foreign monopolies") and on support to the construction of competing Guatemalan "national" enterprises.

Nonetheless, while the Party is not prepared to initiate the repressive aspects of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," it is clear that the Party is achieving effective control of the Guatemalan political organizations as a means of carrying out its program. If it is completely successful in this, it will be the first time that a Communist-controlled state is established outside the Soviet sphere.

SECTION III

THE LEVERS OF POWER

THE LEVERS OF POWER

A. THE PRINCIPLES OF INDIRECT CONTROL AND THE NATIONAL FRONT

With its Political Committee as the nerve center, the PGT exerts dominant influence on the key policies of the present Guatemalan Government through a system of indirect control of, or influence on, determining units of the national political organism. The system employed may be likened to the works of a watch with the PGT Political Committee as the mainspring, the "mass" organizations as the first gears, and the Administration parties and some Government agencies as the secondary gears, the whole so meshed together that an impulse from the center is smoothly transmitted to distant entities which have no apparent connection with the party. Thus, for example, the Political Committee (the mainspring) might evolve a new aspect to its Agrarian Reform policy; this impulse would first be transmitted to the Communist leadership of the national labor federation, CGTG (the first gear); and it would finally go forward to those Local and Departmental Agrarian Committees (the secondary gears) which are under CGTG domination. Simultaneously the impulse would go from the Political Committee to PGT members in key positions on the policy-making "National Democratic Front" and in the National Agrarian Department and thence to the whole of the Department's machinery. This system of intermeshing gears has the advantage of providing a machinery with which the numerically small Communist leadership can effectively manipulate various organizations, many of whose members are not conscious of being used for Communist purposes.

The PGT has built up this machinery by a complex campaign of maintaining close relationship with the Administration; working harder than any other Guatemalan entity; infiltrating key Government agencies; establishing an interlocking directorate between the PGT Central Committee and the nation's labor, women's youth, and students' organizations, and achieving a position of pre-eminence in the "National Democratic Front" of Administration parties while shrewdly working against the consolidation of a non-Communist "revolutionary" movement.

B. PENETRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. The Favor of the Arbenz Administration: The good will and cooperation of President Arbenz and his Administration has been the PGT's main asset and remains so, although the PGT's growth in size and power is in great part plainly aimed at making it independent of the existence of a sympathetic Chief Executive. (e.g. now that the PGT controls the CGTG, it stands for less government "interference" in union affairs.) President Arbenz' propensity for Communists is an undisguised fact. The Communist party came into the open as the PCG at the beginning of his Administration and was entered in the Civil Registry without regard to the Guatemalan Constitutional injunction against "political organizations of a foreign or international character." He brought the Communist leaders into the political meetings of Administration parties which he holds in his office, and these parties, which he controls, openly supported Communist candidates in the January 1953 Congressional elections. (Fortuny in the Department of Guatemala and Pellecer in the Department of Escuintla). Fortuny is a leading member of his "kitchen cabinet" and professed Communists are employed in important positions in the public Administration. In his March 1953 Annual Message to Congress he served public notice that he would not suppress Communism and in effect re-emphasized this the following month when his Government withdrew from the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) in order to sidestep El Salvador's proposal that means to control Communism be discussed at its next meeting. In public ceremonies and on May 1 Labor Day demonstrations in 1953, he has publicly thrown his arms around Communist leaders in the Latin American fashion thereby identifying himself with them in the popular mind.

In his March, 1954, Annual Message to Congress Arbenz referred to the Communists as "democratic" and "progressive" and said that to isolate them would be equivalent to the suicide of the Revolutionary movement.

Finally, it is generally known that political parties in Guatemala, and particularly political newspapers such as the PGT's Tribuna Popular, cannot be successful without direct or indirect support of the public treasury, and this could not be given in appreciable measure without the approval of the Chief Executive.

The President's public speeches and actions indicate him as a leftist influenced by Marxist thought and an extreme nationalist but he has not defined his personal ideological orientation towards Communism. He has not publicly acknowledged aid to the PGT and his official position might be defined as one of denying that his Government is Communist while simultaneously defending the freedom of Communists to organize and engage in politics as any other citizens. He thus, publicly at least, implicitly accepts the Communists as an authentic domestic political party and not as part of the world-wide Soviet Communist conspiracy.

2. Penetration of Government Agencies: Shielded by the favor of the Chief Executive, the Communists have infiltrated their members and supported their sympathizers in key positions in the public administration, with special concentration on the Agrarian Reform machinery, the Government information and propaganda agencies, the wealthy Social Security system, and public education institutions.

The Cabinet of President Arbenz, as his Administration from time to time points out in refutation of charges that it is "Communist," does not and has never contained a known member of the Communist party. However, this statement is somewhat deceptive for the Guatemalan Cabinet is more of an executive than a policy forming body. In policy matters, the President consults regularly with the "National Democratic Front" of Administration parties and labor organizations on which PGT members hold four seats, and on which there are at least four Communist sympathizers of record of the ten members who attended meetings in early 1954. This "National Democratic Front" has rapidly replaced the Cabinet as a focal point of policy formulation.

The President also maintains contact with a number of personal advisers, a sort of "kitchen cabinet," in which Fortuny is probably the most prominent individual. Thus, for instance, when the Agrarian Reform Bill was submitted to the Cabinet prior to transmission to Congress in May, 1952, it had already been drawn up by the President and his advisers and the Cabinet merely played the role of a consultative body.

Below the level of the Cabinet the area of heaviest Communist infiltration is perhaps the Governmental machinery established to carry out the Agrarian Reform, which the PGT sets as its first task in domestic affairs. Despite the fact that only a small fraction of the names of the PGT members have been made public, a significant number of the employees of National Agrarian Department (Departemento Agrario Nacional) appear among them. The Department is headed by Major Alfonso MARTINEZ Estevez, an opportunist non-Communist who was President Arbenz' Private Secretary until July 1, 1952, but Waldemar BARRIOS Klée, the head of the Lands Section, who acts as Chief when Major Martínez is absent, is a PGT member. The Secretary General of this Department, through whom all papers are funneled, is Sra. Maria Jérez de FORTUNY, the latest of Sr. Fortuny's three wives. Of a score of Inspectors of the National Agrarian Department, seven are publicly registered PGT members and at least seven others have been identified as Communists. In addition, another dozen of the 350-odd National Agrarian Department employees are known members of PGT. A Guatemalan newspaper, the independent El Espectador of September 9, 1953, made the charge that "85 per cent" of all Departmental employees adhered to the PGT, a statement which is possibly an exaggeration but indicative of the Communist coloration that the Department has quickly taken on since its establishment in July 1952. A list of PGT members and Communist suspects in the National Agrarian Department is given in Appendix 4.

The leverage of the PGT over the Agrarian Reform is further enhanced by the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952, as amended. In addition to the National Agrarian Department, the law establishes Local Agrarian Committees, which pass in the first instance on petitions for the expropriation and distribution of land; Departmental Agrarian Commissions, which are the first reviewing authority; and a National Agrarian Council which is the final court of appeal under the President. The law, as amended, provided that 60 per cent of the personnel on local Agrarian Committees should be composed of representatives of the CGTG or CNCG; that one of the three members of the Departmental Agrarian Committee should represent the CGTG and another the CNCG;

and that one of the nine members of the National Agrarian Council (1) should represent the CGTG and two others the CNCG. As the CGTG is controlled by the PGT (its representative on the National Agrarian Council is José Luis Ramos, the Secretary of the PGT in charge of the party's Peasant Commission) and the CNCG is under Communist influence, the PGT Political Committee has considerable means of directing the course of and pace of the Agrarian Reform.

Despite the paucity of public documentation on PGT members, avowed Communists are perceptible in a number of Government posts outside of the Agrarian Reform machinery. Thus, for instance, Edelberto [illegible]res, Sr., the Nicaraguan Communist, is Chief of the publications house of the Min[illegible] of Public Education, and Communism is so influential among the teachers that Rafae[illegible]R, a registered PGT member who visited the Soviet Union in 1953, is Secretary G[illegible] the national teachers' union, the STEG. In the Ministry of Communications Carl[illegible]ARADO Jerez is chief of the Dirección General de Radiodifusión and director of the national radio station TGW. Under the Ministry of Economy and Labor, Hugo BARRIOS Klée, a PGT member and brother of Waldemar Barrios Klée of the National Agrarian Department, is Deputy Inspector General of Labor, and Humberto PINEDA, Labor Inspector in Chiulapa, Department of Santa Rosa, has also been identified as a PGT member.

Persons whose PGT membership has not been publicly avowed but who are fully Communist in their unstinting public praise of party ideals and the Soviet Union also occupy influential Government positions. Raúl LEIVA, a writer and poet who has been a leading Communist propagandist, is Chief of the Press Section of the President's Information Office (Secretario de Publicidad y Propaganda)and heads the Office when his Chief is absent. Otto Raúl GONZALEZ, a leading young Guatemalan poet, eulogist of conditions in Eastern Europe and participant in Communist causes, is now the representative of the Directorate General of Statistics on the National Agrarian Council, and has been a member of both the President's and the National Agrarian Department's Information Offices.

The Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS) appears to be a stronghold of the "non-party" Communists who support the PGT program but are not always organizationally at peace with Fortuny's dominant clique in the PGT. The Manager of the IGSS is Solórzano, whose continuing Communist ideology, reported expulsion from the Mexican Communist Party, and role in the crystallization of Communism in Guatemala, are described above. The personnel includes a number of Communist personalities, such as Sra. Laura Mallol de BERMUDEZ, a Chilean, who formerly taught in the IGSS School of Social Service and is now in the maternity service.

3. The PGT Position in Congress: In the legislative branch of the Guatemalan Government, the PGT has only four of the fifty-six deputies in the unicameral Congress, but these are in key positions. The four are Gutiérrez and José Alberto Cardoza, both representing the Department of Guatemala, César Montenegro Paniágua, representing the Department of Suchitepéquez, and Carlos Manuel Pellecer, representing the Department of Escuintla. Gutiérrez is First Secretary of Congress (1954-5) and Chairman of Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform (1952-4). José Alberto Cardoza has been Chairman of the Special Committee on Revision of the Labor Code (1952-4). Moreover, Pellecer during the 1953-4 sessions was perhaps the most vociferous Administration supporter and organizer on the floor.

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(1) The General Association of Agriculturists (AGA), a landowners' organization, has not appointed the representative to which it is legally entitled. There are thus in reality only eight members of the Council.

C. MANIPULATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

POLITICAL PARTIES

1. The "National Democratic Front": In the field of organized party politics, the Political Committee of the PGT exerts its indirect influence through the "Frente Democrático Nacional" (The "National Democratic Front") which is an alliance of the parties and labor groups supporting the Arbenz Administration: The Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), the Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (PRG), the Partido Renovación Nacional (RN) and the Communist Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) itself and of the CGTG and CNCG. The Front holds 51 of the 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress and virtually all Government jobs are filled with members of one or other of the parties.

The PGT effectively controls the personnel of the Front's managing body which meets with President Arbenz. In a typical meeting with the President in early 1954, the representatives were: For the PGT, Fortuny and Guerra Borges; for the CGTG Gutierrez and Max SALAZAR, both PGT members; for the CNCG, Leonardo Castillo Flores, 1953 visitor to Moscow and Oscar BAUTISTA; for the PAR, Julio ESTRADA de la Hoz, Communist-line intellectual and Marco Antonio FRANCO, 1953 visitor to the Soviet orbit; and for the PRG, Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, longtime political collaborator with the Communists, and Alfonso Solórzano, the "non-party" Communist Manager of the IGSS. (The two RN seats at this period were vacant due to a party split.)

In the field of ideology and party programs also, the PGT has established its ascendancy in the Front. The other parties, although labelling themselves "revolutionary," have found themselves since the 1944 Revolution handicapped by the fact that they produced no authentic native Guatemalan revolutionary ideology and had embarked on a period of social revolution without any navigational aids. In their early stage of development (Section I) their deficiency in this sphere was supplied first by returning Communist personalities, such as Solórzano and Alvarado Fuentes, and later by crypto-Communists such as Fortuny when he was Secretary General of the PAR. These advisers operated at that time within the Administration Parties but with the exodus of the Communist groups of Gutiérrez and Fortuny in 1949 and 1950 these parties became increasingly reliant for ideological guidance from the Communist movement on the outside. At first the older Administration parties tried to form alliances omitting the new Communist groups, but they failed to develop a non-Communist revolutionary ideology as cement, and the alliances one by one fell of their internal dissensions. In October, 1952, the Communist Party formally entered the "Democratic Electoral Front" for the Congressional elections of January, 1953, and since then the party programs of the PAR, PRG, and RN have increasingly become replicas of the current line of the PGT Political Committee. They not only embody the Communist concepts of such programs as the Agrarian Reform, but are sprinkled with such terminology as the "struggle for peace," "foreign imperialists," "monopolist exploiters," etc.

The ascendancy of Communist ideology in the "National Democratic Front" is attributable not only to the void left by the failure of a non-Communist ideology to evolve, but also to an active factor, the infiltration into the PAR, PRG, and RN leadership of Communist sympathisers, some of whom may be secret members of the PGT

The PAR is currently headed by Julio Estrada de la Hoz as Secretary General. His Communist orientation has repeatedly been shown by such acts as his signing, in June 1952, a message of solidarity with the North Korean Government charging that bacteriological warfare had been used in Korea.

The PRG is headed by Augusto CHARNAUD MacDonald as Secretary General. Currently the Minister of the Interior, he is a shrewd non-Communist politician who has, nonetheless, collaborated closely with the Communists. On his Political Committee he has Solórzano, Abel Cuenca, and Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, all of whom are closely identified with promoting Communist objectives.

The RN is currently split but its dominant figure over the past three years has been Jaime DIAZ Rozzotto as Secretary General. He is also Secretary General of President Arbenz' Executive Office (Secretario General de la Presidencia).

He was quoted in the Guatemalan press as stating on July 31, 1953 at a rally that the Korean Armistice "represented another step toward the achievement of a Socialist world," but he maintains, without definition of what he means, that he is "not a Communist."

2. The "Divide and Rule" Tactic: While the PGT thus exercises considerable influence over the "National Democratic Front" parties through ideology and sympathetic leaders, its party literature and its record give a strong indication that Fortuny and his colleagues are conscious that the rank and file of the PAR, the PRG, and the RN are not Communists and that the creation of a single non-Communist Administration party might result in a "petty bourgeois" party which the PGT could not control. They have therefore tried to keep the other forces of the "National Democratic Front" divided so that their support would be necessary to any faction within it. From 1944 until 1952, the issue of Communism itself was an important factor in keeping the parties divided as each party had a "pro-Communist" and a "non-Communist wing." The struggle of these two wings dominated the internal affairs of the PAR and the RN with the most pro-Communist faction gradually winning in both. In 1951, as part of this series of factional fights, Charnaud MacDonald withdrew from the PAR in protest against the re-election of Alvarado Fuentes as Secretary General and founded the Socialist Party.

A new form of organizational conflict arose on June 10, 1952, when Charnaud MacDonald, as Secretary General of the Socialist Party, and Alvarado Fuentes, Secretary General of the PAR, announced the fusion of their parties into the PRG which was to be the "single" revolutionary party. They invited the RN, the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL) and the Partido Integridad Nacional (PIN), but not the Communist PCG of the era, to join them, and all did so in short order. Fortuny apparently quickly saw that the PRG as the "single," non-Communist Administration party might overshadow his PCG, and on July 3 he launched an attack on it in the PCG newspaper Octubre charging that the party represented the small bourgeoisie and that the "workers' leaders" (i.e. Alvarado Fuentes and Solórzano and Cuenca who had joined him) were guilty of "rightist deviation." This attack, coupled with strong personal conflicts within the PRG, resulted in the withdrawal of the PAR and the RN later in July, 1952.

Following the destruction of the PRG as the "single" Administration party, the PAR was in the ascendancy in the latter half of 1952 and the early months of 1953. It was the principal victor in the January, 1953, Congressional elections, and had come into close alignment with the CNCG, the numerically strong agricultural workers' and small farmers' federation, which with Communist aid had been weaned from Charnaud MacDonald and the PRG. With the PAR thus threatening to become a dominant and unmanageable "non-Communist" Administration party, Fortuny and the PGT leadership began to give signs that they were seeking to undermine the PAR. The party was rocked by continual scandals in 1953 and by the spring of 1954 it had all but lost its opportunity to stand independently of the Communists.

The PGT policy thus gives every evidence of being intended to divide and rule the "National Democratic Front." It is, in short, a part of the PGT's struggle to increase its influence at the expense of its allies, but this struggle in practical politics has yet given no signs of transforming itself into an ideological conflict between Communists and non-Communists.

D. CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT

1. The Significance of Organized Workers in Guatemala: The organized labor movement in Guatemala in 1954 has become the Communist PGT's most important single instrument for shaping political developments of the country. The importance of organized labor in industry, commerce and agriculture is reflected in the fact that the Administrative Department of Labor of the Guatemalan Ministry of Economy and Labor reported in April 1953 that there were 100,000 registered union members in the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and the Confederación Nacional Campesino de Guatemala (CNCG). This figure compares with a total vote of about 415,000 in the Presidential election in 1950 and underscores an important factor in Guatemalan politics: that a political party can readily succeed in the present atmosphere if it is supported by organized labor.

Organized labor itself claims an even greater number of adherents. The CGTG in August 1953 claimed a membership of 104,000 and the CNCG in 1952 claimed 215,000 members, a total for both of 319,000 or a number equivalent to three-quarters of the 1950 vote. The discrepancy between the Administrative Department of Labor's figure of 100,000 and the two federations' claim of 319,000 is doubtless mainly accounted for by the latter's gross exaggeration, but a subsidiary factor is that there is a time lag between the organization of unions and federations and their registration. There are thus most probably more than 100,000 unionized urban and rural workers in Guatemala, though only a small proportion of that number could be considered as active in union affairs.

The labor movement has been primarily concerned with politics rather than pure labor matters since its inception in a modern form in 1944. To a large extent this was inevitable both because no labor organization of any complexion had much chance of establishing itself without collaborating closely with the Administration and because Communists and Communist sympathizers proved to be the only labor organizers prepared to set a new labor movement on its feet. By 1953, the CGTG and CNCG had become a key factor in politics: their representatives were in the majority on the Local and Departmental Agrarian Committees under the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law; Guillermo OVANDO Arriola, the CNCG Secretary for Agrarian Affairs, was President of Congress; and three CGTG and three CNCG officers(1) and several members of each organization were deputies in Congress.

2. Communist Control of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala: The CGTG, founded in October 1951, is Guatemala's national labor federation and its leadership is to all intents and purposes completely under the control of the PGT Political Committee. With the exception of a very few independent local unions, it represents all organized industrial, transportation, and commercial labor and has a considerable number of agricultural workers' federations, including the union of the workers at the United Fruit Company plantations. The CGTG affiliation with the WFTU and Vicente Lombardo Toledano's CTAL were accepted in 1953.

The key positions in the CGTG are all held by PGT members. Gutiérrez, a member of the PGT Political Committee and the head of the PGT Central Committee's Labor Union Commission, is its Secretary General. José Alberto Cardoza, also of the PGT Political Committee is First Vice Secretary General.. Pellecer, another PGT Political Committee member, is the most active of the Secretaries for Labor Disputes. Virgilio Guerra, of the Political Committee, is CGTG Secretary for Organization. Carlos Manuel Pellecer of the Political Committee is the leading Secretary for Labor Disputes. Maximiliano Salazar Garcia, listed as a member in the PGT's December 1952 petition for registration, is Secretary for Rural Workers Relations. Antonio Ovando Sánchez, the Communist who went to Moscow in the early 1930's, was a leading spirit of the "Escuela Claridad," Communist labor school after the 1944 Revolution, and now another PGT member listed on the party's registration petition, is Secretary for Laws and Resolution. Miguel Marmol, the Salvadoran Communist of the Escuela Claridad group, is from time to time reported in the press at CGTG headquarters, where he may be continuing the advisory function which he undertook for the CTG in 1944. A list of the officers of the CGTG is given in Appendix 3.

3. Communist Influence on the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala: The PGT exerts a strong ideological influence rather than organizational control over the CNCG, only one of whose present officers is publicly known to be a member of the PGT. The CNCG, founded in June 1951, is the national federation of campesino organizations, that is, organizations of hired farm workers, of small tenant farmers, and of small farmers, most of whom in Guatemala are Indians. Among farm laborers its activities overlap with those of the CGTG which is currently expanding its agricultural affiliates in connection with the Agrarian Reform Law. This has resulted in some

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(1) Gutiérrez, Pellecer, and Cesar Montenegro Paniagua of the CGTG and Ovando Arriola, Alfonso PORTILLO, and José Ernesto LANFUR Fuentes of the CNCG. The first three are PGT deputies, the last three PAR deputies.

(2) Berto Delio CASTRO, member of the CNCG Consultative Council.

organizational conflict and jealousies, none of which, however, have extended into the sphere of ideology. The CNCG's orientation has remained in harmony with the PGT Political Committee's program and, in October, 1953, the CNCG became affiliated with the WFTU and the CTAL, the labor Communist international organizations.

A good deal of the CNCG's Communist ideological orientation stems from its Secretary General, Leonardo CASTILLO Flores, a thirty-five-year-old[1] ladino schoolteacher. Although not a PGT member as far as is known, he is a Vice President of the National Peace Committee; was appointed a delegate to the abortive Continental Peace Congress in Montevideo in 1952 and a delegate to the WFTU's Third World Congress of Trade Unions in Vienna in October 1953; and went to the Soviet Union the following month. In July 1952 when Fortuny attacked leaders of the PRG as "deviationists" he specifically excepted Castillo Flores and the latter soon thereafter withdrew his support from the PRG and Charnaud MacDonald with whom the CNCG had formerly been closely politically allied. He pledged to devote himself entirely to support the "alliance of the workers and peasants," and was followed by Clodoveo TORRES Moss and Oscar BAUTISTA of the CNCG Executive Committee, and with their support succeeded in October 1952 in expelling Amor Velasco de León, the Secretary of Organization and number-two man of the CNCG, a left-winger who nonetheless resisted the organization's moves toward the PGT orbit. Despite a Communist tint to his political thinking, however, Castillo Flores at times has been in conflict with the PGT leadership.

At present, the CNCG is closely affiliated with the left wing of the PAR and the leaderships of the two organizations are interlocked. Castillo Flores is a member of the PAR Political Committee. Ovando Arriola, the ex-President of Congress (1953-54), is concurrently the CNCG's Secretary for Agrarian Affairs and the PAR's Secretary for Organization. Marco Antonio SOTO is the CNCG's Secretary for Agricultural Affairs and Credit and the PAR's Secretary for Peasant Affairs.

E. THE OTHER "MASS ORGANIZATIONS"

1. The Role of the "Mass Organizations": Around the solid core of the PGT and its position in the Government, the political parties and the labor unions, the PGT Political Committee has organized a periphery of other "mass organizations" consisting of intellectuals, youth, students' and women's groups. The principal ones are the Comité Nacional de la Paz (The National Peace Committee), the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), the Frente Universitario Democrática (FUD), the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca (AFG), the Confederación de Estudiantes de Post Primaria (CEP), and the Saker-Ti group of young intellectuals and writers.

These organizations serve multiple purposes for the PGT which dominates each one of them. For immediate use, they constitute a propaganda apparatus for disseminating the party line, sometimes tailored to the background of the membership, over a wider area than is covered by the other organizations under PGT guidance. At the same time, they are useful in adding their voices to those of labor organizations and political parties to provide the semblance of "popular support" for a PGT project, such as a protest against American "intervention" in Guatemalan affairs or a "Peace" petition. For use in the longer pull, these organizations provide an educational apparatus for training future party members and leaders. They provide the stage on which fledgling leftist extremists can be indoctrinated, tested and observed. Finally, by providing trips to numerous "Congresses" in Europe and elsewhere they provide ready contacts between the local Communist movement and the main currents of international Communism. The details of the financing of these trips is one of the obscurities of Guatemalan Communist activities, but the evidence indicates in outline that collections from the membership are augmented by funds or tickets supplied by the parent organizations in Europe.

These Guatemalan "mass" organizations all have certain common characteristics. They claim to be "non-partisan" organizations representing people without discrimination as to class, religion or political belief. On these grounds, they take in a good many non-Communist opportunists in the Administration's "revolutionary" movement who find the "mass organizations" an acceptable manner of recording leftist zeal. They also attract a fringe

(1)Born on November 25, 1917.

of the duped, the eccentrics, and the old-fashioned pacifists, and they have proven on a number of occasions not to be above using non-Communist names without permission.

They have another characteristic in common in that they virtually always contain a PGT member, under the discipline of the Political Committee, in a key position, usually as Secretary General or Secretary for Organization.

Most of the "mass organizations," moreover, share the characteristic of affiliations to a recognized international Communist organization, paralleling the CGTG's affiliation to the WFTU.

2. The Comité Nacional de la Paz: Guatemala's National Peace Committee, an affiliate of the World Congress of Peace, was established in its present form in Guatemala in 1949(1) at a meeting presided over by Fortuny after he, Guatiérrez and Solórzano attended the First World Congress of the Partisans of Peace. At that meeting Jaime Díaz Rozzotto, the present Secretary General of the President's Executive Office, was elected as the first Secretary General.

The present leadership of the National Peace Committee, elected on June 14, 1952, illustrates the PGT's technique of control. The President is Antonio CRUZ Franco, a leftist lawyer who was briefly on the Supreme Court in 1945, but the Secretary General is Mario Silva Jonama, the PGT Secretary for Education, who was in the Soviet Union in 1952. The Vice Presidents are Luis Cardoza y Aragón, a leading Communist-line Guatemalan poet and critic who served as Minister to Moscow in 1945; Gutiérrez, the PGT member who is Secretary General of the CGTG; Major Marco Antonio FRANCO Chacón, a leftist Army officer, PAR deputy and current President of Congress who went to Budapest in 1953; Sra. Elena de BARRIOS Klée, principal of the "Belén" Government Girls' school where Communist-line meetings are held, and wife of Waldemar Barrios Klée, PGT member and Chief of the Lands Section of the National Agrarian Department.

The other officers of the National Peace Committee are Secretary for Organization, Marco Antonio BLANCO, the PGT member who is an Inspector of the National Agrarian Department; Secretary for Propaganda, Oscar Edmundo Palma, a member of the PGT Central Committee, officer of the teachers' union STEG, and contributor in September 1953 of a first-hand account of Soviet "progress" to the PGT's Tribuna Popular; Secretary for Press, Raúl Leiva, head of the Press Section of the President's Information Office; Secretary for Finance, Sra. Atala VALENZUELA, a member listed by the PGT in its 1952 petition for registration; Secretary for Liaison (Relations) Carlos Alvarado Jérez, the Chief of the Directorate General of Radio Broadcasting of the Ministry of Communications who is an avowed Communist; and Secretary for Minutes Julio Ernesto JUAREZ. (A complete list of the organization's officers is given in Appendix 3.)

The National Peace Committee has subsidiary committees in the Departments and municipalities of the Republic (the President of the unit in the Department of Guatemala is Guillermo Ovando Arriola, the ex-President of Congress) and conducts a rather intensive activity which is re-enforced by the CGTG, the CNCG, the Administration political parties and the other "mass" organizations. It circulates petitions for peace, holds local and national peace congresses, releases statements on world events which receive prominent play in the leftist and Government press and publishes a leaflet-like periodical "Por la Paz" edited by Otto Raúl González.

In 1952 the Committee sponsored showings of the film, "Bacteriological Warfare in Korea" purporting to prove that the United States employed germ warfare during the Korean hostilities. Several of the showings were in Government schools.

On September 19, 1953, the National Peace Committee initiated a "Campaign for Negotiations" in response to the Budapest World Peace Council's Appeal for big power negotiations of outstanding international questions. It has set itself a quota of 125,000

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(1) An earlier "Committee for Peace and Democracy" was founded in September, 1948, in the presence of Roberto MORENO, reportedly sent by Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

signatures on a petition for such negotiations, a statistic which illuminates its present capacities.

The National Peace Committee also sponsored delegations to the various Congresses of the Soviet-dominated peace move t, notably the voyages of Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, at the time President of Congress, to the 1951 Vienna ace Conference; of Mario Silva Jonama and José Alberto Cardoza to the preparatory and full-dress Peking Asiatic and Pacific Peace Conferences in June and September 1952; and of Lieutenant Colonel Carlos PAZ Tejada, ex-Chief of the Armed Forces (1949); Major Mario Antonio Franco Chacón, the PAR deputy, and Oscar Edmundo Palma of the PGT, to the Budapest meeting of the World Council for Peace in June 1953. Lt. Col. Paz Tejada and Major Franco were elected at the World Peace Council at the last of these meetings.

3. The Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala: The AJDG, founded on December 21, 1947, is the Guatemalan affiliate of the international Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and may be considered the training ground for youth, some of whom may later be graduated to membership in the PGT.

The leading figure in the AJDG for some years has been Huberto Alvarado, a twenty-six-year-old member of the PGT's Central Committee and chief of that committee's Youth Commission. He has been several times Secretary General of AJDG (once in 1951) and still appears to guide its policies. In 1952-54, the Secretary General is Edelberto TORRES Rivas, who attended the Bucharest Youth Festival and went to the USSR in 1953. During his absence the Secretary Generalship passed to Bernado LEMUS, a registered Communist.

Another leading member of the AJDG is Hugo Barrios Klée, Deputy Inspector General of Labor, a PGT member, a delegate to the 1951 Berlin Youth Festival, and brother of Waldemar Barrios Klée, Chief of the Lands Section of the National Agrarian Department.

Statistics on the membership of the AJDG have not recently been publicized but its activities have been extensive. Newspapers report Departmental and local youth congresses and in February 1953 the AJDG was a principal sponsor of the "National Conference on the Rights of Youth." It is now instrumental in organizing a proposed "Festival of Friendship of the Youth of Central America and Caribbean", scheduled for December, 1954. It also publishes a monthly review headed "Alianza."

The AJDG has sent delegations to the Berlin Youth Festival in 1950 (headed by Huberto Alvarado), to the Bucharest Youth Festival in July 1953, and the Warsaw Students' Conference in August 1953. The delegations to the 1953 gatherings in the Soviet orbit went on, in many cases, to Moscow and toured the USSR.

4. The Frente Universitario Democrático: The FUD was founded on January 22, 1952, by a fusion of the Acción Democratica Universitaria (ADU) and the Vanguardia Universitaria (VU). It is an affiliate or candidate for affiliation, of the Communist International Students' Union (ISU) in Prague and represents the PGT's effort to keep alive in the University at San Carlos, Guatemala's national university, the Marxist current which was so influential in the crystallization of an organized political party. It is, however, in a minority position in the student body, over-shadowed by the moderate Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios (AEU) and rivalled by the more important Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas (CEUA), the leading student anti-Communist organization.

The present Secretary General of the FUD is Ricardo RAMIREZ, who attended the Defense of the Rights of Youth Congress in Vienna in 1953. He succeeded César Augusto CAZALI Avila, member of the National Agrarian Council, Secretary for Organization of the union of the National Agrarian Department's employees, and almost certainly a member of the PGT. He attended the IUS meeting in Bucharest in the summer of 1952 and later toured several of the "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe. He has written of his experiences there for the PGT Tribuna Popular and his signed statements on behalf of the FUD never deviate from the PGT line.

The FUD Secretary for Organization is Julio René ESTEVEZ who in the fall of 1953 visited the USSR and Communist China after attending the Third World Congress of Students in Warsaw in August. A list of FUD officers is given in Appendix 3.

Apart from the meeting in Bucharest which Cazali attended, the FUD has sent delegations to the 1953 World Youth Festival in Bucharest and the subsequent Students' Conference in Warsaw. Several of the delegates went on to the USSR and some to Communist China. In Guatemala it publishes a monthly review, Nuestra Lucha, which adheres to the Communist line.

5. The Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca: The AFD founded in 1947 is the Guatemalan affiliate of the Communist International Federation of Democratic Women (IFDW) and is closely connected with the PGT. One of the founding members is Sra. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, wife of the President.

The current Secretary General is Sra. Dora FRANCO y Franco, who has been active in Communist-line causes to the extent of traveling to European Communist-front congresses,(1) and who is almost certainly a member of the PGT. Another leading figure in the AFG is Sra. Irma Chávez de Alvarado, the Secretary for Organization, who is also the head of the Women's Commission of the PGT. She is the wife of Bernado Alvarado Monzón, the PGT Secretary for Organization. Sra. Maria Jérez de Fortuny, wife of the PGT Secretary General, herself Secretary General of the National Agrarian Department, is one of the AFG's Counsellors. The Secretary for Propaganda of the AFG is Sra. Elsa Casteñeda de Guerra Borges, the wife of Alfredo Guerra Borges, Secretary of the PGT temporarily in charge of Propaganda.

The AFG was particularly active in promoting the Communist campaign in 1952 to "save" the Rosenbergs, the convicted atomic spies eventually executed in the U. S. The organization's monthly magazine, Mujeres, follows the Communist line.

The AFG held its first National Congress on November 26-28, 1953, and it was addressed by Sra. de Arbenz.

6. The Confederación de Estudiantes de Post Primaria: The CEP is a highschool students organization which follows the PGT line closely and is favorably treated in the PGT publications, giving rise to a supposition that it is under the party's influence. However, none of its officers, who are young students, can be identified as PGT members.

7. Grupo Saker-Ti de Artistas y Escritores Jóvenes: The Saker-Ti (The Dawn) organized in December 1947 is a Communist-controlled group of young intellectuals in which leading spirits are Huberto Alvarado of the AJDG and chief of the PGT Cultural Committee's Youth Committee, and Hugo Barrios Klée. Like other "mass organizations," the Saker-Ti seeks to exploit non-Communist liberal sentiment, for example, praising the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, but in this case their tactics were exposed in an exposé by Manuel Mario HERRERA López, the organization's ex-Secretary of Organization, who resigned on January 2, 1953, and during the following July described the Saker-Ti as a Communist front in a series of articles for La Hora.

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(1) During several months in mid-1953, Sra. de URRUTIA, vice Secretary General, acted as Secretary General for unexplained reasons.

SECTION IV

THE PROSPECTS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY

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A. THE FUTURE OF THE PARTY IN GUATEMALA

1. A Basis for Evaluation: While it is risky to peer into the future for a glimpse at the probable lines of development of the Communist Party in Guatemala, it is possible to strike a balance sheet of the weaknesses and strengths of the PGT's position in the spring of 1954, and postulating and unchanged international situation and the absence of coup d'etat, arrive at a rough estimate of its capabilities. This estimate, spelled out in the succeeding paragraphs, indicates a probability of further increase of Communist power in Guatemala.

2. Weaknesses of the PGT Position: Despite the growth of the PGT as an organized party since President Arbenz came into office in 1951, and its controlling influence on Government policy, the Administration parties and labor and "mass organizations," the PGT's position in the Guatemalan political organism is still subject to some theoretical weaknesses.

The first weakness of the PGT is the degree of its dependence on the goodwill of the Guatemalan Government, particularly of the President, and at least the neutrality of the Guatemalan Armed Forces. In spite of its considerable strides towards an independent organization with genuine strength, in over three full years since coming into the open in Arbenz' Administration, the PGT could not operate on its present scale unless it received help from the Administration. The young PGT thus is faced with the danger of severe restrictions if not extinction of its activities in the event of an unfavorable change of Administration, by revolution or by other means. This danger is compounded by the fact that the PGT has yet made no palpable inroads on the Guatemalan Army.

A second weakness of the PGT is its lack of a sufficient Marxist-indoctrinated following. Despite the growing number of party members and the thousands influenced through the political, labor and mass organizations, the PGT still appears to lack a wide enough trained personnel base from which to draw even the small number of militants necessary to carry out its program efficiently. This is indicated by the fact that the PGT uses the same individuals in a multiplicity of jobs. Gutiérrez, for example, is obliged to be simultaneously a party official, head of the labor movement, a deputy in Congress, and a leader of the Peace movement. This lack of trained personnel derives not only from the youth of the PGT, but also from conditions in Guatemala, which lack any significant tradition of social revolution.

The third weakness of the PGT, a corollary of the second, is that it has to face the ever-present danger that the main stream of the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 will turn into a purely opportunist channel and swamp Communism. The "non-Communist" political groups supporting the Arévalo and Arbenz Administrations have always had a large content of opportunism characterized by a good deal of uncomprehending lip service to Communist slogans and much real concentration on graft and political chicanery. The PGT is in a minority position where failure to manipulate these anarchical currents to its advantages might result in its being overcome by them. PGT leadership, to judge by party writings, is quite conscious of this danger. It appears to be the main reason that the PGT has worked against the consolidation of a single official "revolutionary" party, such as the PRI in Mexico. It is also a reason that the PGT has combatted rival revolutionary doctrines which might attract some support, such as the "Aprista" doctrine in the political sphere and Peron's ATLAS in the Labor field.

The fourth weakness of the PGT is the imperfection of its own internal organization. Its leaders are young and, compared to the Communist parties in the industrial countries, inexperienced. There is the danger of internal dissension and, although it has not yet resulted in a major purge, there are several hints that there is some basis for possible future contention. Fortuny has stated publicly that there was a purge at the clandestine

First Party Congress in 1949 but he did not reveal the grounds for it. From 1950 until early 1952, Fortuny and Gutiérrez evidently pursued the same objective but with different tactical emphases, the former standing for an open, labelled Communist party and the latter for a Communist party under another name (the PROG) pending further training and indoctrination. This difference was resolved by a compromise: Fortuny's party emerged as the recognized party but adopted some of Gutiérrez' viewpoints by changing the party name to the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). It is an open question, however, whether this compromise will survive over the years the shifting tactics and fortunes of international Communism. Fortuny and his associates now make up the Secretariat of the PGT while Gutiérrez and his are on a lower echelon. Meanwhile, Solórzano and others of the original Communist movement appear to be out of the PGT altogether and apparently continue to adhere to the older doctrine of promoting Communist doctrines from within the Administration groups. At present there is no shred of evidence that any of these groups are pursuing a Trotskyist or other "deviationist" policy and there are evident advantages to the Soviet international Communist movement to have alternatives in choosing factions in Guatemala. However, it is a matter for speculation whether the party could remain organizationally unshaken under the impact of a major change in the Guatemalan domestic situation or a change in Soviet policy.

The fifth weakness of the PGT is the degree to which Guatemala's political climate has changed since 1944 and especially since 1951 when the Arbenz Administration came into power. The emergence of a professed Communist party has caused a polarization of political opinion with most of the formerly economically powerful interests arrayed against the Party and the Government which aids it. The balance of opinion in the San Carlos University has swerved from its 1944 high of woolly leftism to a point where it is a stronghold of anti-Communist and anti-Government sentiment despite its vociferous pro-Communist minority. The professional and business classes which welcomed the end of the period of dictatorship in 1944 and acquiesced in its early phases of the Revolution's social reforms, have balked at what they regard as the extremist currents that have taken over the Revolution. The Roman Catholic Church in Guatemala has always opposed Communism and its anti-Communist message has gained wider acceptance as Communist advances have impressed themselves on the public mind. The Archbishop of Guatemala, MSGR. MARIANO ROSSELL ARELLANO, in his 1954 Easter Pastoral Letter called for a "National Crusade Against Communism." The independent press, which has the great majority of Guatemalan newspaper circulation, is solidly against the PGT and has made Communism the central domestic political issue in Guatemala. The PGT thus now faces a considerable array of hostile forces, a development it recognizes under the terminology of the "sharpening of the class struggle."

The final weakness of the PGT is that it is a distant satellite of the Soviet Communist center and derives its energy and cohesion from it. In the last analysis, if international developments were to lead to an internal explosion in the USSR or a material weakening of the strength it transmits abroad, the PGT would be in danger of losing its cohesion, though the fragments of frustration, anti-capitalism and perverted nationalism which form it might later reform as the satellite of another virulent "ism."

3. Strength of the PGT's Position: While the weaknesses of the PGT are largely theoretical and dangerous to the party only if certain hypothetical events occur, its strengths are concrete and of immediate value with the result that in the balance the indications for the next few years are that the PGT will advance in its program, if there is no external or accidental interference in its progress.

The first asset of the PGT is that it has the initiative in Guatemalan political life and has already developed a momentum which would be difficult to stop. The Arbenz Administration has committed itself to a "reform" program, the ideological content and rationalization of which has been largely the result of the PGT's manipulation of the "revolutionary movement." Thus while the Administration retains the mechanical means to suppress Communism (e.g. by withdrawing support or using the Army) it could scarcely do so without emasculating the program to which it has dedicated itself. Arbenz himself said as much in his 1954 Message to Congress when he said isolation of the "democratic and progressive forces" (i.e. the Communists) would be equivalent to the suicide of Guatemala's revolutionary movement.

The second asset of the PGT is the virtually total lack of organized opposition. Like the Administration parties, the Opposition groups merely react to the PGT initiative and have no positive program of their own. Moreover, the propertied classes from which the

Opposition would naturally draw its strength are prisoners of their property: they do not, it appears, dare invite retaliation by fully supporting Opposition organizations unless there is a prospect of immediate, safety-giving success. This has been mainly responsible for the phenomenon that the Partido Unificación Anticomunista (PUA) and the Comité Cívico Nacional (CCN), the main anti-Communist groups, have not risen to match the growing PGT strength but, on the contrary, have become poorer and weaker with every PGT advance. This timidity on the part of the potential Opposition has been accentuated by the strong and often publicly expressed attitude of the Administration equating "Anti-Communism" to subversion of the Constitutional order, and by the Administration's intimidation tactics such as arresting anti-Communist leaders on charges of implication in anti-Government disturbances. Moreover, the independent press which is the mainstay in keeping anti-Communism alive itself is prevented from being fully effective by fear of Government reprisals as well as from a lack of full comprehension of Communist tactics.

In 1953-54, the authorities and the PGT have cooperated in a concerted drive against focal points of opposition. After an uprising at the provincial town of Salama on March 29, 1953, leading figures the PUA, CCN and the students' anti-Communist groups CEUA were jailed or driven into exile. More anti-Communist leaders were arrested or went into exile after the Government alleged in January 1954 that it had uncovered an "international plot" against it. In the first months of 1954, the principal anti-Communist radio stations were raided by masked hoodlums without police interference, or their owners or managers were intimidated by the authorities.

Finally a major asset of the PGT is that the working out of the existing Government programs (which it had a large share in shaping) is virtually certain to lead to an increase in Communist strength. The Agrarian Reform, for instance, has not only cut into the economic strength of the landowning class but brought on a decline in investment weakening the business classes. In rural areas it is educating farm workers to the attitude that they must cooperate with the Communist and Communist-influenced Agrarian authorities and at the same time it is paradoxically uprooting tradition-bound Indian laborers who do not favor the new reform but who give indications of becoming a drifting, discontented group susceptible to manipulation by extremists. Likewise, the attack on foreign companies on extreme nationalist grounds stimulated by the PGT serves a double purpose, for at once it weakens the links with the United States and weakens those concepts of property, equity and law which serve to block the way to the eventual Communist triumph.

B. GUATEMALAN COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA

The present and possible future successes of Communism in Guatemala have a wider significance than the degree to which the PGT fulfills its Guatemalan program. Foremost among the long range benefits of the PGT's experience to international Communism is that under the shelter of the Guatemalan Government, a Communist Party has been able to perfect techniques for operation in the Latin American environment, and especially for exploiting the revolutionary-nationalistic currents which are now near the surface throughout most of the area. Guatemala differs in degree but not in kind from most of her sister Latin American Republics and, under propitious circumstances, international Communism may be expected to adapt the lessons learned in Guatemala to other areas. If Moscow establishes that a Communist controlled state can be maintained without the direct or threatened protection of the Red Army, it will have opened new doors to expansion and conquest.

There is already evidence that Guatemala is being used as a base for the spread of Communism, especially to the rest of Central America. The country has become a focal point of Communism for neighboring areas. Miguel Marmol and Virgilio Guerra, the Salvadoran Communists, are at the moment active in the Guatemalan labor movement; Abel Cuenca, a Communist or at least a thoroughgoing sympathizer, is active in political life; and fourteen young Salvadorans imprisoned in their country in September 1952 for Communist activities (though stating they are not Communists) arrived in Guatemala in August 1953 under the leadership of Manual Otilio HASBUN, ex-President of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students. In May, 1954, Obdulio BARTHE, the Paraguayan Communist leader, was accepted as a refugee in Guatemala. The "Asociación Democrática Salvadoreña," an exile organization, has its meetings announced in the PGT's Tribuna Popular.

The Nicaraguan Communist and pro-Communist group is headed by Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, Edelberto Torres, Sr., and Armando Flores Amador (who sometimes signs as Armando AMADOR). This group is involved in the "Movimiento de Nicaraguenses Partidarios de la Democracia," an anti-SOMOZA organization headed by Leonte PALLAIS Tiffer.

Leftist Honduran exiles have organized a Guatemalan affiliate of the Partido Democrático Revolucionario Hondureño which sends out Communist-line manifestos to the press under the signature, as of August 30, 1953, R. AMAYA Amador as Secretary General.

Several Dominican exiles have been involved in a local Comité de Exilados Dominicanos, some members of whom, including a Felix DOCOUDRAY, are also members of the pro-Communist Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano which publishes, since August 19, 1953, a monthly magazine Orientación in Guatemala City.

The local Communists have made a particularly successful attempt to split the local group of Peruvian Aprista exiles. The main body, "Comité Aprista en Guatemala," formerly under Dr. Andrés TOWNSEND Escurra, remained faithful to an anti-Communist as well as an "anti-imperialist" line, but a splinter group named the "Movimiento Popular de la Liberación Nacional" under Eduardo JIBAJA has cooperated with the Communists. There seems little doubt that the Guatemalan authorities favor the latter as they helped it to stage its 1953 observance of Peru's Independence Day on July 28 and Jibaja is employed by the Government newspaper Diario de Centro América.

The local leftists have also cultivated the local exile branch of the Venezuelan Partido Acción Democrática but without apparent success as yet in subverting it to Communist uses. The leader is Dr. Luis M. PENALVER, ex-Vice Rector of the Central University of Venezuela.

More directly it is known that officials of the PGT, including Bernardo Alvarado Monzón and Alfredo Guerra Borges, have attended meetings of Communist-front parties in the other Central American Republics and are in correspondence with the leaders of those parties, presumably serving as advisers in a manner similar to that in which more experienced Communists in earlier times aided the growth of the Communist Party in Guatemala.

The variety of Communist and leftist political exiles in Guatemala and the links between the PGT and Communist-front parties in other countries thus provide the skeleton of a system by which the Guatemalan experiment could be exported to other Latin American countries.

Already there are indications that Guatemala is being used as a base against her neighbors. The attempt to assassinate President Somoza of Nicaragua in April 1954 involved among the plotters Jorge RIVAS Montes, Francisco IBARRA Mayorga and other revolutionaries who until shortly before the plot had enjoyed the protection of the Guatemalan Government or had travelled in and out of Guatemala. The disturbances which broke out in May 1954 in Honduras, resulting in a well organized strike, were preceded by the assignment in March and April of special Guatemalan Consuls in what were to become the strike areas and four days before the disturbance broke out, a Guatemalan military airplane landed in the area without clearance.

The Guatemalan potential to move directly or indirectly against its anti-Communist Central American neighbors, was materially enhanced on May 15, 1954 by the arrival in Puerto Barrios of the Swedish ship ALFHEM carrying two thousand tons of arms loaded in the port of Stettin in Polish administered territory.

APPENDIX I

THE GUATEMALAN LABOR (COMMUNIST) PARTY

Functions of Party Officials

APPENDIX I

The Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party

Functions of Party Officials

NAME	APPROX DATE OF BIRTH	POSITION IN PARTY	PARTY FUNCTION	MASS ORGANIZATION POSITION	GOVERNMENT POSITION
José Manuel FORTUNY	1916	Secretary General; Member Political Committee (PC); Member Central Committee (CC)			
Bernardo ALVARADO Monzón	1925	Secretary of CC; Member of PC; Member of CC	Chief of Organization of Commission of CC		
Alfredo GUERRA Borges	1925	Secretary of CC; Member of PC	Chief (Temporary) of Propaganda Commission of CC; Editor of Tribuna Popular		
Mario SILVA Jonama	?	Secretary of CC; Member of PC Member of CC	Chief, Education Commission of CC	Secretary General National Peace Committee	
José Luis PAMOS	1922	Secretary of CC; Member of PC; Member of CC	Chief, Pesants (Campesino)Commission of CC	Vice Secretary for Agrarian Affairs, CGTG	Member, National Agrarian Council
J.Antonio ARDON	?	Member of PC; Member of CC			
José Alberto CARROZA	1918	Member of PC; Member of CC		Vice Secretary General CGTG; Secretary General Federación Artes Gráficas	Deputy
Virgilio GUERRA Méndez	1906	Member of PC; Member of CC		Secretary General Sindicato de Trabajadores de Madera y Vidrio (Carpenters); Member CGTG	
Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ	1922	Member of PC; Member of CC	Chief,Labor Union Commission of CC	Secretary General CGTG; Vice President National Peace Committee	Deputy
Carlos Manuel PELLECER Durán	1920	Member of PC; Member of CC		Secretary for Labor Conflicts CGTG	Deputy
Carlos René VALLE y Valle	1925	Member of PC; Member of CC	Chief, Finance Commission of CC; Business Manager Tribuna Popular		

APPENDIX II

THE GUATEMALAN LABOR (COMMUNIST) PARTY

Brief Biographic Sketches of Principal Leaders

NAME	APPROX DATE OF BIRTH	POSITION IN PARTY	PARTY FUNCTION	MASS ORGANIZATION POSITION	GOVERNMENT POSITION
Huberto ALVARADO	1927	Member of CC	Chief, Youth Commission of CC	Member, Executive Committees AJDG and Saker-Ti	
Irma Chávez de ALVARADO Monzón	?		Chief, Women's Commission of CC	Secretary for Organization AFG	
Oscar Edmundo PALMA	1930	Member of CC		Secretary for Propaganda; National Peace Committee	

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA May, 1954

José Manuel FORTUNY Arana Guatemalan
Secretary General of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party

Fortuny was born in Cuilapa, Guatemala on March 22, 1916, apparently of a lower middle class family. He received his primary and secondary education in Cuilapa and at the Instituto Normal Central de Varones in Guatemala City. He attended San Carlos University, Guatemala's national university, off and on from 1934 to 1944 where he studied law, but never received his degree. In 1938 he was also studying in the National University of El Salvador. In 1940 he won a national poetry competition.

In 1941-2 Fortuny was employed in the press section of the British Legation. From 1938 to 1942 he ran a local radio news program called the Diario [illegible] Aire. In 1942 he obtained employment in the radio department of Sterling Products, I[illegible]re he wrote advertising copy. He meantime continued his law studies part time in the San [illegible]os University.

During and after the June uprising and October revolution in 1944, Fortuny became active in politics. After the uprising he became Vice President of the "El Derecho" association of law students, a newly formed organization that opposed the government. Later that year he was a founding member of the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL) a students' political party, and an editor of its new newspaper El Libertador. Later in that year he was elected a Deputy to Congress on the FPL ticket, the FPL then being the principal revolutionary party. His term was from 1945 to 1949. He was at various times a member of the Committee on the Interior, on Labor and Social Affairs, and Secretary of the Congress. In March 1945 he voted to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.

In 1947 he became a leader of the leftist Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), which he had joined when the FPL and PN fused to found it. He was twice the PAR Secretary General, held various other offices in the party, and edited the party newspaper.

As he later publicly stated, on September 28, 1947, while still a member of the PAR, he became a founder of an inner group known as the Vanguardia Democrática of which he was elected Secretary General the following year. He dates the founding of the Guatemalan Communist Party from 1947, but it was not until May 1950 that he and a group of followers resigned from the PAR and openly announced an intention to establish a Communist Party. The group founded a Communist newspaper named Octubre and were known as the "Octubre Communists," to distinguish them from the Communist group around Victor Manuel Gutiérrez, then Secretary General of a Stalinist party called the Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (PROG). About April 1951, Fortuny began to sign communications as Secretary General of the Communist Party, and that party emerged into the open in June 1951 at a rally in honor of the first anniversary of the founding of Octubre.

In April 1949, Fortuny attended the First World Peace Congress at Paris, and later visited the Soviet orbit, paying particular attention to agrarian reform matters.

In December 1952, at the Second Communist Party Congress, the party was renamed the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo PGT) and Fortuny was again elected Secretary General. He flew to Moscow on November 5, 1953 returning on January 12, 1954.

Fortuny first married the sister of Francisco Fernández Foncea, at present a PAR Deputy, later married the half sister of Colonel Carlos ALDANA Sandoval, present Minister of Communications, and since May 1953 has been married to María Jerez de Fortuny, Secretary General of the National Agrarian Department. His brother, Alfonso Fortuny, was a PAR Deputy and Secretary of Congress. Another brother, Rodrigo Fortuny, was listed as a Labor Inspector in February, 1954.

May, 1954

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Bernardo ALVARADO Monzón — Guatemalan
Secretary (for Organization) of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Alvarado Monzón was born about 1925, reportedly in Mazatenango, the son of Bernardo Alvarado Tello, Minister of Justice in 1920 and one time Rector of the University of San Carlos, Guatemala's National University, who was arrested in 1934 in connection with a bomb plot against President Ubico, and of Sra. María Josefa Monzón de Alvarado.

He was about 18 years old during the 1944 Revolution and plunged into leftist politics in collaboration with José Manuel Fortuny, now Secretary General of the Guatemalan Labor Party. Like Fortuny, he was a law student at the University of San Carlos and he held under the Arévalo Administration Government jobs as a history teacher in the Instituto Nacional Normal de Varones and in the publicity department of the Ministry of Economy.

In December 1947, he became a founding member of the Alianza Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), the local affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth and became active in the Partido Acción Revolucionaria in which he became a member of the National Executive Committee, Secretary for Social Affairs (1948), a candidate for Congress from Huehuetenango (1948) and Secretary for Youth Affairs (1950). In the party he became identified with Fortuny's "left wing." He became, like Fortuny first and Pellecer later, Director of the PAR newspaper El Libertador, and became an editor (under Julio Estrada de la Hoz as Editor-in-Chief) of the Diario de la Mañana when it appeared as the organ of the leftist parties on August 20, 1949. He has also been active in the Saker-Ti, a Communist oriented organization of young artists and intel - lectuals.

In September 1949 he went to the "American Continental Peace Congress", in Mexico as a delegate of the AJDG and special reporter of the Government-owned Diario de Centro América. In the Spring of 1950 he went to Habana ostensibly as a student but was arrested and expelled by the Cuban security police on suspicion of Communist activities.

In May 1950 he submitted his resignation to the PAR along with Fortuny and others who are now professed Communist leaders. The group led by Fortuny established a newspaper, Octubre, and became known as the Octubre Communists. In April 1951, the month after Arbenz came into office, the group began publicly to use the style "Communist Party of Guatemala" and Alvarado Monzón began to sign as Secretary for Organization, the second ranking party position. The date of his election is not recorded. In December 1952 at the Second Communist Party Congress, he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the newly-styled Guatemalan Labor Party and the Central Committee in turn elected him a Secretary and head of the Commission on Organization.

Meanwhile, he had been active in union affairs. He was a member of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Intelectuales y Artísticos Revolucionarios (STIAR) of which Alfredo GUERRA Borges, now Secretary (for Propaganda) of the Guatemalan Labor Party, was Secretary General (1950). He became Secretary for Press, Propaganda, and Information of the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) led by Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez (1950) and a member of the Sindicato Nacional de Periodistas Guatemaltecos (SNPG), the Communist-line newspapermen's union (1951). In February 1951 he was the labor union representative on the Board of Directors of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security.

His wife, Irma Ofelia Chávez Castillo de Alvarado is also member of the Central Committee of the Guatemalan Labor Party and head of its Women's Commission. She is a leader of the Communist-front women's organization Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca (AFG), the local affiliate of the International Federation of Democratic Women.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

May, 1954

José Antonio ARDÓN — Honduran
Member of the Political Committee of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party

Ardón is a Honduran by origin and reportedly a tailor by trade. He was on the Advisory Committee of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (1947). He became active in the leftist revolutionary movement and rose in 1949 to be Secretary for Social Matters of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR). On May 25, 1950 he resigned from that party with Fortuny and became an editor of Octubre, the Communist newspaper founded in June 1950. In December 1952 when the Communist party changed its name to the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) at its Second Congress, Ardón was elected to the Central Committee which in turn elected him to the Political Committee.

Ardón is the Secretary General of the PGT Departmental Committee for the Department of Guatemala, a post to which he was last reelected on March 20, 1954.

May, 1954

José Alberto CARDOZA A. — Guatemalan
Member of the Political Committee of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

J. Alberto Cardoza was born in Guatemala about 1918 and appears to have entered the printers' trade.

His career after the October 1944 Revolution was dedicated primarily to trade union work. He was active in the Sindicato de Artes Gráficas (SAG) of which he is now Secretary General. He was an officer of the Federación Sindical de Guatemala (FSG) which was founded in 1946 as Guatemala's second labor union federation and eventually its Secretary for Propaganda (1949-50). In October 1951 when the FSG joined Gutiérrez' Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) as the single national labor federation, Gutiérrez became its Secretary General and Cardoza his Deputy as First Vice Secretary General, a post to which he was reelected in January, 1954. In 1952 he was listed as business manager of the irregular CGTG publication Unidad. In February 1953 Cardoza founded and became Secretary General of a printing trade workers' federation under the CGTG composed of his SAG and the linotypers' union SOL.

In party politics Cardoza emerged in 1950 as a member of the Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (PROG), a Communist-type party newly founded by Gutiérrez. He became its first Vice-Secretary General. When Gutiérrez returned from Moscow in January 1952, dissolved the PROG and joined Fortuny's Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG), Cardoza followed him. In December 1952, when the PCG held its Second Party Congress and changed its name to the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), Cardoza was elected to its Central Committee which in turn elected him to the Political Committee.

Cardoza was elected to Congress as a Deputy from the Department of Guatemala in November 1950 for the term 1951-55. He was proposed by Fortuny's Comité Político Nacional de los Trabajadores but as this organization was not registered and could not put up candidates, he ran on the ticket of the administration parties. In Congress, Cardoza became, in the 1952 and 1953 sessions, Chairman of the Special Committee on Revision of the Labor Code.

While in Congress, Cardoza attended the September 1952 Pekin "Peace" Congress, going and coming through the Soviet Union and the "People's Democracies."

On March 28, 1953 he married Srta. Yolanda RODRIGUEZ A.

May, 1954

Alfredo GUERRA Borges — Guatemalan
Secretary (for Propaganda) of Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Guerra Borges was born in Guatemala on February 2, 1925, legally the son of Luis GUERRA and Maria Luis BORGES. His early life is not a matter of public record although he spent 1946-47 on a Government scholarship in Chile where, in his own words, "I learned to fight."

He was 20 years old when the June and October 1944 Revolutions ended for the moment a long period of dictatorship in Guatemala. Like Fortuny, Alvarado Monzón and others, after the Revolution he was a law student at San Carlos University (Guatemala's national university) and plunged into leftist activities. In between the two 1944 uprisings, he was a founding member of the Frente Popular Libertador and an editor of that party's El Libertador. He was an early member of Saker-Ti, the left-wing organization of young artists and writers, and one of the first leaders of the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática (AJDG), the local affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth, founded in December 1947. He was active in the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), the leftist administration party first in 1947 as a representative of students at the party convention and rising at one time to be a member of its Political Committee in 1950. He was active in the Peace movement which got underway in Guatemala in 1949 after José Manuel Fortuny returned from the first Paris "Peace" Congress. He was an organizer of the 1949 "American Continental Peace Congress" at Mexico City and an officer of the Guatemalan National Peace Committee.

During this period, Guerra Borges was on the public payroll of the Arévalo Administration. He was an announcer on the national radio station TGW, Secretary of the Guatemalan Embassy at San Salvador (1949), editor in chief of the Diario de Centro América, then the official gazette (1949-50), and a Labor Inspector of the Ministry of Economy and Labor (1951).

He also was active in labor union work, being Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Intelectuales y Artísticos Revolucionarios (STIAR) in 1949-50, STIAR representative and Secretary of Conflicts of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) in 1950, and a member of the Consultative Council of the Sindicato Nacional de Periodistas de Guatemala in 1951.

In May 1950, along with Fortuny and others who afterwards became the Communist party, he resigned from the PAR. This group established and edited Octubre and became known as the Octubre Communists. In addition to his work as editor during this year Guerra Borges served as Director of the "Jacobo Sánchez School," the Communist indoctrination school, before it was closed down by the authorities. In April 1951, the month after President Arbenz took office, Fortuny began to style himself Secretary General of the Communist Party of Guatemala and Guerra Borges shortly afterwards began to sign himself Secretary for Press and Propaganda. The date of his election to this office was not made public. At the Second Communist Party Congress in December 1952 which changed the party name, he was elected to the Central Committee which in turn elected him a Secretary; chief ad interim of the Party's Propaganda Commission and Director of Octubre, its party newspaper.

He was married to Elsa Casteneda de Guerra Borges, a registered Communist who is active in party affairs, and is Secretary for the propaganda of the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca (AFG), the Guatemalan affiliate of the Communist-controlled International Federation of Democratic Women.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA May, 1954

Virgilio GUERRA Méndez Salvadoran
Member of the Political Committee of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Virgilio Guerra, born in 1906 in Chalchuapa, El Salvador, is a carpenter and labor leader who is older and has more years of Communist service than any member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo's Political Committee. He is reported to have been involved in Communist activities in Salvador as far back as 1932 when General MARTINEZ shattered the Communist movement.

Following the October 1944 Revolution, Guerra came to Guatemala and emerged in 1945 in the Escuela Claridad, a Communist-oriented labor leaders' training school formed within the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) and directed by Abel CUENCA, another Salvadoran driven from his country in 1932 for Communist activities. The Escuela Claridad was closed by government order in 1946 as a political organization of a foreign or international character." In 1947, he was Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores en Madera y Vidrio, the carpenters' union affiliated with the CTG. In October 1947 the Arévalo Administration expelled Guerra, Cuenca and other foreign Communists and Communist suspects, but he soon returned to the country. He has since been expelled several times from El Salvador (1948,1951).

Guerra remained active in labor union affairs. He was identified as Secretary General of the Wood and Glass Workers' Union in 1950 and has been active in the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG), the Communist-controlled national labor federation. He served as CGTG adviser to the union of workers of the United Fruit Company in their 1953 labor contract revision negotiations. In January, 1954, he became Secretary for Organization of the CGTG.

He was identified as an employee of the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security in 1948 and 1949.

May, 1954

Víctor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbín Guatemalan
Member of the Political Committee of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Gutiérrez was born on January 10, 1922 at Barberena, Guatemala, of preponderantly Caucasian Spanish-American stock. He was educated at the Central Normal School in Guatemala City, entering in 1935 and graduating in 1939. He then became a schoolteacher. During his youth Gutiérrez is reported to have been a devout Catholic but later turned to Marxism.

After the October 1944 Revolution, Gutiérrez started on his trade union and political career. Trade unions had been illegal under the previous regime and this was the time that they began to spring up in Guatemala. In 1945 he was a founding member of the teachers' and educational workers' union STEG, becoming its Secretary General and representing the STEG on the Executive Committee of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG), founded early in 1945 as the first labor federation. The CTG established a labor training school, the Escuela Claridad at which Communists indoctrinated labor leaders. This caused quarrel in the CTG with the result that a dissident group withdrew to form the Federación de Guatemala (FSG). Gutiérrez then rose to be Secretary General of the CTG which increasingly Communist orientation while the FSG also gradually came around to the unist viewpoint. Both affiliated with the WFTU and Vicente Lombardo Toledano's CTAL, in Mexico City. Gutiérrez attended the conference of Educational Workers and Teachers in Mexico City in 1946 as representative of the STEG and the CTAL Congress there in 1948 as representative of the CTG, becoming a member of the CTAL Central Committee. In 1949 he attended the First World Congress of the Partisans of Peace in Paris with Fortuny and Solorzano in April, returned to Guatemala, and went to Europe again to attend the WFTU Congress in late June and early July.

In May 1951 Lombardo Toledano and Louis SAILLANT, Secretary General of the WFTU came to Guatemala to attend the Congress of Latin American Air and Land Transport Unions and a plan was drawn up to recreate a single Guatemalan labor federation. This was established in October 1951 under the title of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and Gutiérrez was elected Secretary General, an office to which he was reelected in January, 1954. In his personal quality he attended the CTAL Congress in Santiago, Chile in March 1953. The CGTG did not become affiliated with the WFTU and CTAL until later in 1953.

Meanwhile Gutiérrez had also been active in party politics. He was an early member of the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL) which along with the Renovación Nacional (RN) formed the principal support which installed Dr. Juan José Arévalo as President in 1944. Gutiérrez became a member of Congress from the Department of Guatemala and in 1946 took part in the enactment of the Labor Code. The FPL and the RN merged to form the PAR, and Gutiérrez belonged to that party until September 1949 when he withdrew. In June 1950 he founded and became Secretary General of the Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (PROG), a party designed to further the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist education of its members. On July 8, 1951 Gutiérrez admitted openly (in a press interview) that he was a Communist.

In November or early December 1951 Gutiérrez proceeded to Moscow after having attended the Berlin WFTU Congress as a "guest," the CGTG then not being affiliated. Upon his return in January 1952, he announced the dissolution of the PROG and advised its members to join the Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG) which Fortuny had brought into the open the previous year. In December 1952, when the PGT held its Second Congress and changed its name to the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), Gutiérrez was elected to the PGT Central Committee which in turn elected him to the Political Committee and made him chief of the Central Committee's Labor Union Commission.

In 1950, Gutiérrez supported Arbenz' candidacy for the Presidency as Secretary for Propaganda of the Comité Político Nacional de los Trabajadores and was himself elected to Congress from the Department of Guatemala on the ticket of the PAR and the RN but he later aligned himself with the Communist PCG and its successor the PGT. In 1952, he was Chairman of the Special Committee on Agrarian Reform which guided the Guatemalan Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952 through Congress. He was re-elected to this chairmanship in 1953.

He left Guatemala in September, 1953, to attend the WFTU's Third Congress in Vienna where he was named a member of the WFTU's Executive Committee. He then proceeded to the USSR, returning to Guatemala on November 29, 1953.

Gutiérrez is unmarried and his nearest relative is Anita S. v. de Gutiérrez, understood to be his mother, a devout Catholic.

May, 1954

José Luis RAMOS — Guatemalan
Secretary (for Peasants' Affairs) of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Ramos was born about 1922. Data on his parentage, birthplace and education are not available.

His activity since the 1944 Revolution appears to have been largely in the labor union field, with special reference lately to agricultural workers' unions. He was identified as Secretary for Communications of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) in May 1948, Secretary for Liaison of the CTG in February 1949, and Secretary for Peasant Affairs of the same organization in May 1950. He was the CTG delegate to the 1949 Congress of the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Panama, the Panamanian CTAL affiliate, and Secretary General of the Political Action Committee of the CTG in 1950. When the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) was formed in October 1951, he was named Vice Secretary for Agricultural Relations serving under César Montenegro Paniagua, the Communist Deputy. In May 1952 he was also elected Secretary for Training of the Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG), the peasants' federation, but dropped

this position sometime in 1953. In January, 1954 he was named an additional Secretary of the CGTG, a less important position than he formerly held. In 1950 he was identified as a member of the Alianza Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG).

Until 1950 Ramos was a member of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) but in May of that year along with Fortuny and others he resigned from the party and established a newspaper called Octubre; the group became known as the Octubre Communists. When the Communist Party came into the open on June 21, 1952, he was identified as a member of the Political Committee and on November 7, 1951, he was selected to speak for that Committee in eulogy of the 1917 Russian Revolution. At the Second Communist Party Congress in December 1952, where the name Guatemalan Labor Party was substituted, he was elected to the Central Committee which in turn elected him a Secretary and a member of the Political Committee. He was also named to head the Central Committee's Farm Workers Commission. At the Congress, he reported on the progress of the Agrarian Reform.

On July 1, 1952 Ramos was designated as the CGTG representative on the National Agrarian Council, the supreme policy board of the Agrarian Reform under the President.

In October, 1953, Ramos attended the WFTU Congress at Vienna and went on to the USSR, returning to Guatemala on November 29, 1953.

May, 1954

Mario Alfredo SILVA Jonama — Guatemalan
Secretary (for Education) of Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Data on Silva Jonama's birthdate and birthplace are not available. Circumstantial evidence - such as newspaper photographs, the dates of his association in youth movements, and his profession as a teacher - would indicate that he is now in his late twenties or early thirties and that he is of lower middle class origin.

After the 1944 Revolution, he was a leading member of youth and labor groups from which the present Guatemalan Communist party leadership was drawn. He was connected with the Escuela Claridad, a Marxist labor indoctrination school which operated within the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG) until it was closed by the authorities in 1946. Along with such personalities as Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez and Rafael Tischler, he was an early leader of the teachers' union STEG. He was a guiding spirit of the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), the local affiliate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth founded in December 1947, and was later publicly accused by an ex-AJDG Secretary General of having been a founder of a Communist unit within the organization. In 1947 he became a member of the CTG Consultative Council. He was elected a member of the "Committee for Peace and Democracy" founded in September 1948 and was elected to various successor "peace" organizations until the present when he is Secretary General of the National Peace Committee. With Fortuny, he was also active in the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), the leading adminstration party, rising to become Secretary for Propaganda (1950).

During this period, Silva Jonama held a series of Government positions under the Arévalo administration. He was a teacher in the Instituto Normal Central de Varones until March 12, 1948 when he was appointed Under Secretary of the Ministry of Education. He resigned this position effective November 5, 1948 to run for Congress from the Department of Guatemala but was not elected. He was then appointed to a position in President Arévalo's office of Publicity and held it until May 1950, the month he became an avowed Communist.

In May 1950, with Fortuny and others he resigned from the PAR and the next month the group founded a Stalinist newspaper, Octubre, and became known as the "Octubre Communists." In the Spring of 1951, after the inauguration of Arbenz as President, the group began to label itself publicly as the Communist Party of Guatemala, and when it appeared in a public celebration on June 21, 1951, Silva Jonama was identified as a member of the Political Committee of the Communist Party. When the Party held its Second Congress in December 1952

and adopted the name of Guatemalan Labor Party, he was elected to the Central Committee which in time elected him a Secretary, a member of the Political Committee, and head of the Party Education Committee.

Since the Communist party came into the open, Silva Jonama appears to have been assigned to "peace" organization work and party indoctrination. Since 1952 he has been Secretary General of the National Peace Committee. In late May or early June of 1952, he led a Guatemalan delegation to the Preparatory Meeting of the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference at Peking, visited Moscow and the "people's democracies" and returned to Guatemala around the first of October. At the Congress of December 1952, he was selected to make a report on party work in the ideological field.

May, 1954

Carlos Manuel PELLECER Durán — Guatemalan
Member of the Political Committee of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Pellecer was born at Antigua, Guatemala on January 17, 1920, the son of a middle class family. He reportedly entered the Escuela Politécnica, Guatemala's military academy, but left apparently for personal reasons, and entered the Instituto Nacional Central de Varones to study to become a teacher. About 1939 while still a young man he was expelled from the country for activities against the Government of President Jorge Ubico and lived in Mexico where he was a laborer, miner and teacher.

After the June 1944 uprising which forced President Ubico out, Pellecer appeared in Guatemala and was one of the founding members of the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL), one of the first of the leftist "revolutionary" parties. He participated in the October 1944 Revolution which swept out General Ponce, Ubico's successor, and was elected as an FPL Deputy to Congress in December 1944 for the 1945-49 term. At this time he also became prominent in labor organization work on the Pacific coast, particularly in the United Fruit Company's plantations around Tiquisate where he was reputed to be the chief instigator of the 1949 strike.

His first round of radical activities in Guatemala was brought to an end in late Spring of 1945 when he resigned from Congress and went to Moscow as Secretary of the new Guatemalan Legation there. At the time he publicly denied being a Communist. The Mission at Moscow was short-lived and in late 1945 he was transferred as Secretary of the Legation in Paris where he remained until October 1948, sometimes serving as Chargé d'Affaires. There he engaged in such activities as touring the "peoples democracies" of Eastern Europe, planning for the transfer of Spanish Republican refugees to Guatemala, mixing in Paris Communist circles and giving 30,000 francs to the Greek Communist-led guerillas. There are indications that during this period of the Arévalo Administration he was deliberately being kept abroad because of his radical views.

Upon termination of his assignment to Paris in 1948, Pellecer went to a Warsaw youth conference as a representative of the Alianza de la Juventud Demócratica de Guatemala (AJDG). Returning to Guatemala, he assumed the government position as Chief of Travelling Cultural Missions (1948-49) and resumed his political and labor activity. He became a Director of the PAR newspaper El Libertador and began organizing agricultural workers unions for the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG). This was a period in which he made fiery Communist-line and anti-American speeches. He also became the PAR delegate to the National Electoral Board. He was sent back to Europe at the end of 1949 for a second tour as Secretary of Legation at Paris, but the French authorities refused to accept him and the British Government did likewise when it was proposed to send him to the London Legation.

Returning to Guatemala a second time in 1950 he continued his work as a labor leader, as an officer of the CTG. With Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez he worked for the establishment of a single labor union federation. When this was established in October 1951, he was elected Secretary of Conflicts, a position whose duties involve advising union locals in strikes and other labor disputes. Since then he has been involved in most of the principal labor disputes of the country, serving as adviser and in effect leader of the

unions, notably in the United Fruit Company dispute of the Sp[illegible] 1952 and the Empresa Eléctrica dispute of the Summer of 1953. He was named Director [illegible]he Editors Council of the CGTG organ Unidad founded in 1952. He was reelected CGTG Secretary for Conflicts at that Organization's Congress in January 1954.

The exact moment that Pellecer became an avowed Communist has not been precisely established. His speeches took on a more and more overt Stalinist coloration in the later stages of his diplomatic career and his work for the CTG; he was sometimes referred to in the press as a Communist and did not apparently object. In February 1951 he addressed a public meeting in the name of Fortuny's "Octubre group" of Communists which at that time were organizationally separate from Gutiérrez' PROG. When the Octubre Communists held a public meeting on June 21, 1951 he was identified as a member of the Political Committee; when the Second Party Congress, which renamed the party the Guatemalan Labor Party, met in December 1952, he was elected a member of the Central Committee, which in turn elected him to the Political Committee.

May, 1954

Carlos René VALLE y Valle — Guatemalan
Member of the Political Committee of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party

Valle was born in 1925 and educated in Guatemalan schools, finishing in the Law Faculty of the University of San Carlos from which, however, he appears not to have graduated.

Only 19 when the October 1944 Revolution broke out he did not immediately become politically prominent. While continuing his studies, he apparently joined the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), a youth organization formed in December 1949 and soon active as a training school for future Communist leaders. He became the AJDG's Se Secretary for Organization in 1949. In the Spring of 1950, he was arrested in Habana, Cuba, with Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, present Secretary of Organization of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (the Communist-party - PGT) and deported as a Communist suspect. He supported himself from the public payroll as an employee of the Ministry of Education (1950) and of the now defunct National Petroleum Institute (identified 1950, 1952).

In politics, he was a member of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) until May 25, 1950, when he resigned with Fortuny and participated in the founding of the Communist newspaper Octubre. He became its business manger and kept that position on its successor, the Tribuna Popular established in August 1953.

On June 21, 1951, at the celebration of Octubre's first anniversary, Valle was identified as a member of the Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG) and when that party held its Second Congress in December 1952 and renamed itself the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), he was elected a member of the Central Committee which in turn re-elected him to the Political Committee. He was also renamed Chief of the party's Finance Commission.

May 1954

Huberto ALVARADO — Guatemalan
Member of the Central Committee, Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

Huberto Alvarado (also erroneously referred to as Humberto Alvarado) was born about 1927. Further data on his origin is not available.

After the 1944 Revolution his activities have been primarily connected with various youth activities and journalism. As a university student in the humanities he was a founder of the Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG) in 1947 and was its Secretary General in 1951-52. He was accused in 1950 by Jose H. Zamora, an ex-AJDG Secretary General

of starting a Communist group in the organization. He attended the Berlin World Youth Festival in 1951.

He has also been active in the Saker-Ti group of young artists and writers at least from 1948 contributing liberally to its page in the official Diario de Centro América and editor of the organization's magazine.

Alvarado has also been active in the "Peace" movement. He was a member of the Comité Guatemalteco de Partidarios de la Paz in 1950, the AJDG representative on the Comité Juvenil Nacional Pro-Paz formed in November 1951, and has since taken part in the major "Peace" activities.

He has been an employee of the President's Publicity Office (1949-52) and an officer of the Sindicato Nacional de Periodistas de Guatemala (SNPG), the Communist controlled newspapermen's union (Secretary of Organization, 1949).

In December 1952, at the Congress of the Communist Party he was elected to the Central Committee and placed in charge of that Committee's Youth Commission.

APPENDIX III

OFFICERS OF COMMUNIST-DOMINATED GUATEMALAN LABOR AND "MASS" ORGANIZATIONS

OFFICERS OF
NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE
Elected June 14, 1952

Antonio CRUZ Franco	President
Luís CARDOZA y Aragón	Vice President
Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ *	Vice President
Marco Antonio FRANCO	Vice President
Elena de BARRIOS Klée **	Vice President
Leonardo CASTILLO Flores	Vice President
Mario SILVA Jonama *	Secretary General
Marco Antonio BLANCO *	Secretary of Organization
Oscar Edmundo PALMA *	Secretary of Propaganda
Raúl LEIVA	Secretary of Press
Atala VALENZUELA *	Secretary of Finance
Carlos ALVARADO Jerez ***	Secretary of (Foreign) Relations
Julio Ernesto JUAREZ	Secretary of Minutes

* Members of the Communist Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo

** Wife of Waldemar Barrios Klée, a PGT member

*** Avowed "Communist", though not specifically a member of the PGT.

OFFICERS OF
CONFEDERACION GENERAL DE TRABAJADORES DE GUATEMALA (CGTG)
January 1954

Víctor Manuel GUTIERREZ **	Secretary General
José Alberto CARDOZA *	First Vice Secretary Genera
José Luis CACEROS	Second Vice Secretary Gene
Hermógenes MONTERROSO	Vice Secretary for Organization
Eustaquio HERRERA	Secretary for Propaganda
German Tovar	Vice Secretary for Propaganda
Rafael SOLIS Barrios	Secretary for Finance
Mariano ARANA	Vice Secretary for Finance
Eduardo MENDIZABAL	Secretary for Liaison
Rodolfo AGUILAR Gonzalez	Vice Secretary for Liason
Virgilio GUERRA	Secretary for Organization
Marcos A. CUELLAR Lorenzana	Secretary for Culture and Social Welfare
Guillermo Max GONZALEZ	Vice Secretary for Culture and Social Welfare
Maximiliano SALAZAR GARCÌA *	Secretary for Agricultural Relations
Cereamundo AYALA	Vice Secretary for Agricultural Relations
Carlos Manuel PELLECER *	Secretary for Labor Disputes
Francisco GONZALEZ	" " " "

* Known member of the PGT
** Chief of the Labor Union Commission of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)

Francisco RUSTRIAN	Secretary for Labor Disputes
Ricardo MENCOS	" " " "
César MONTENEGRO Paniagua	" " " "
Antonio OVANDO Sanchez *	Secretary for Laws and Resolutions
René AQUINO	Vice " " " " "
Victor A. LEAL	Additional Secretary
Cuero Narcisco ESCOBAR	" "
Jeromin BARRENO	" "
Florencio ULIN	" "
Humberto SAMAYOA	" "
Victoriano RUIZ	" "
Julio DIAZ H.	" "
C. Enrique McDonald	" "
Antonio LUCERO	" "
Fernando VALDES Diaz	" "
José Luis RAMOS *	" "
Enrique GOMEZ	" "
Antonio MOLINA	" "
Concepción Castro de MENCOS	" "
Rafael DIAZ Ajá	
José L. de LEON Aguilera	
Armando TORRES	
José Luis CINTO	
Rafael MARIN Coronado	

* Known member of the PGT

OFFICERS OF
ALIANZA FEMENINA GUATEMALTECA (AFG)
November 28, 1953

Dora FRANCO y Franco *	Secretary General
Irma Chávez Castillo de ALVARADO **	Secretary for Organization
Elsa de GUERRA Borges *	Secretary for Propaganda
Esther de URRUTIA	Secretary for Peasant Affairs
Concepción Castro de MENCOS	Secretary for Workers Affairs
Carmen MORAN	Secretary for Children's Affairs
Lola (Lolita) de MORALES	Secretary for Finances
Helma CAMARGO	Secretary for Records
Lily de ALVARADO ****	Director of the AFG Review
María Jerez de FORTUNY ***	Counsellor
Pierrette de Diaz Rozotto	"
María Castillo	"
Victoria Moraga	"
Ligia de Garcia	"
Maximinia Valdes	"
Laura de Pineda	"

* Communist
** Head of Women's Commission of Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT); wife of Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, PGT Secretary for Organization
***Wife of José Manuel Fortuny, PGT Secretary General
****Wife of Carlos Alvarado Jerez, Communist Director General of Radio Broadcasting

OFFICERS OF
FRENTE DEMOCRATICO UNIVERSITARIO (FUD)
(January, 1954)

Ricardo Ramirez	Secretary General
Julio René ESTEVEZ Rodriguez*	Secretary for Organization
Héctor Simon CABRERA Guzmán	Secretary for Propaganda
Luis F. REINA Rosal	Secretary for Finances
Carlos MENENDEZ	Secretary for Records

* Visited Soviet Orbit in 1952 and 1953 respectively.

APPENDIX IV

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

OF THE

NATIONAL AGRARIAN DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX IV

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE NATIONAL AGRARIAN DEPARTMENT

(September 1953)

A. Employees Publicly Registered or Publicly Avowed Members of PGT:

1. Waldemar BARRIOS Klée, Chief of Lands Section, Acting Chief of the Department when the Chief is away
2. Natzul AGUIRRE Cook, Inspector
3. Marco Antonio BLANCO, Inspector
4. Florencio MENDEZ, Inspector
5. Juan Rafael VITTORAZZI, Inspector
6. Rafael TISCHLER, delegate of the Department to the Directorate General of Fundamental Education
7. Eugenio ARRIVILLAGA Véliz, Credentials Officer, Secretariat of the Department
8. Roberto BRAN Maldonado, Registrar, Legal Office of the Department
9. Jorge VILLAVICENCIO Barroquín, Survey Chairman (Cadenero), Measurements and Calculations Sections
10. Eduardo SOSA Montalvo, Computer, Measurements and Calculations Section
11. Oscar Antonio SALAZAR, Inspector
12. Hugo CARRERA, Inspector
13. Gustavo Adolfo GAITAN, Inspector

NOTE: All but two of the forenamed appeared on the list of PGT members submitted by that party to the Civil Registrar in December 1952 and published in La Hora of December 27, 1952. The two exceptions are Natzul Aguirre Cook who avowed PGT membership in a press interview and Waldemar Barrios Klée who has repeatedly been identified as a party member.

B. Probable PGT Members:

1. María Jerez de FORTUNY, Secretary General of the Department, wife of José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of the PGT and in her own right Secretary for Finance of the Alianza Femenina de Guatemala (AFG)
2. Justo Rufino ARGUETA, Inspector, stated to be a PGT member in the September 8, 1953 El Espectador; Vice Secretary of Finance of the CGTG
3. Rubén CASTELLANOS, Inspector; Secretary General of the Departmental PAR organization in San Marcos (1952); left PAR Political Committee 1953; denounced by an acquaintance as a Communist as far back as 1950

4. Roberto CABRERA, Inspector, stated to be a PGT member in El Espectador, September 8, 1953; member of the STEG teachers' union and SAKER-TI intellectuals' group

5. Victor GIRON Cabrera, Inspector; stated to be a PGT member in El Espectador, September 8, 1953; formerly Secretary General of the Departmental RN organization in El Quiché

6. Claudio MIRANDA, Inspector; described as a Cuban and stated to be a PGT member in El Espectador September 8, 1952

7. Luis MOLLOTTO, Inspector, stated to be a PGT member in El Espectador, September 8, 1953

8. Roberto GAITAN, Inspector; stated to be a PGT member in El Espectador, 8, 1953

C. Possible Communists:

1. Mario SOSA, Chief Inspector of the Department, stated to be a PGT member in the September 8, 1953 El Espectador, although he has stated he is not; a Honduran who has been involved in Communist-line activities.

2. Jorge ALVARADO Monzón, Inspector; brother of Bernardo Alvarado Monzón, Secretary for Organization of the PGT

3. Luís Felipe LOPEZ Martínez, urban expert, Office of Dwellings and Public Services of the Department; possibly identical with "Luis López" who was registered as a PGT member in that party's petition to the Civil Registrar in December 1952

4. José Felix REYES Arriola, topographer, Office of Dwellings and Public Services of the Department; possibly identical with "José Reyes" appearing on the above-mentioned list.

ANNEX C

SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO GUATEMALA

June, 1954

SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO GUATEMALA

A. The Alfhem Case

The shipment of arms from the Soviet orbit to Guatemala on the Swedish flag vessel Alfhem was the outcome of clandestine negotiations between agents of the Guatemalan government and Czechoslovakian diplomatic and commercial agents. The chartering, loading and sailing orders of the Alfhem were deviously contrived by the Soviet orbit supplier so as to conceal the true origin, nature and destination of the cargo. The operations of unloading and transferring the cargo in Guatemala were covered with secrecy, under close military guard, by the Guatemalan government.

The Alfhem sailed under blind orders on a misleading course. Neither the captain nor the crew knew their true destination until within hours of Puerto Barrios. Neither the captain nor the crew knew for certain their cargo. Their suspicions were aroused, however, by the weight and dimensions of the cases and the strength of the packing. The crew was not surprised when the ship was met by military officers and placed under armed guard. Since that time the Guatemalan Government and military officials, by inference and direct statement, have admitted that the Puerto Barrios consignment consisted of arms.

In spite of the carefully concealed financial and shipping arrangements, the false cargo manifest of the Alfhem, and the extraordinary security precautions maintained by the Guatemalan government over unloading the cargo at Puerto Barrios, the details of the transaction have become known. The facts bearing on the case are set forth below.

Guatemalan Negotiations for the Alfhem Shipment

Negotiations for the extraordinary arms purchase appear to have been carried out in Prague during January and February, 1954, by Major Alfonso Martinez, apparently dealing at high levels of the Czechoslovakian State hierarchy as a personal agent of President Arbenz. Although bearing a military title, Major Martinez has no close relations with the Army, but occupies a politically important government post as Chief of the National Agrarian Department.

Jose Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT), spent two months in Moscow just prior to the journey which took Major Martinez to Prague. During the same period, arrangements were consummated for the formal establishment of diplomatic relations with the Communist satellite government of Czechoslovakia, and the Minister of that country presented his credentials to the President of Guatemala on January 29, 1954. The date of this diplomatic accord coincided with Major Martinez's mission in the Czechoslovakian capital, where he remained from January 21 to February 9.

Arrival and Unloading at Puerto Barrios

1. When the M/S Alfhem arrived at Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954, it was met by the Minister of Defense of Guatemala, Col. Jose Angel Sanchez; the Director of the National Agrarian Department, Major Alfonso Martinez; and other government officials. Col. Sanchez made arrangements for 15 flat cars and as many box cars and locomotives as would be required to move the cargo without delay and asked to have the ship docked immediately. No ship's documents, manifests or bills of lading were presented or shown civilian port and railroad officials.

2. Effective discharging began on 16 May on a 24 hour a day schedule, and was completed on Sunday, 23 May. The first train with eight cars left Puerto Barrios at midnight, 16 May. The Ministry of Defense also obtained six rail motor cars with trailers for handling troops and piloting the trains with the special government cargo. An escort of soldiers and officers accompanied each train.

3. From the time of the ship's arrival until unloading was completed no effort was spared to assure the rapid discharge of cargo and its safe transport to Guatemala City. A guard of troops was maintained so that it was impossible for unauthorized persons to approach the discharge area. There were twenty to thirty guards on the

dock at all times, a fact made the more conspicuous by the absence of any military personnel on or about the eight or ten other vessels in the harbor at the same time. The cargo was discharged directly into railway cars with the ship's derricks, and military guards were on duty on all railway cars, checking the cargo into them. Regular port and railroad employees were allowed to continue their normal work, but strangers were barred from the area. Even the local shipping agent was prohibited from boarding the ship and was not given access to its papers.

Admissions Regarding Receipt of Arms by Guatemalan Officials

1. Guatemalan official efforts to maintain secrecy and to preserve the fiction that an innocuous carro of machinery was brought by the Alfhem were quickly nullified, not only by the flow of rumor at the harbor, which began even before the ship's arrival, and by the evident special concern of the Guatemalan Army chiefs to take the cargo immediately under their control, but by the characteristic shape and dimensions of the items unloaded, although everything was closely boxed. Members of the Alfhem crew had had previous experience in freighting arms and were reported as saying about the port that while they were told the shipment was machinery they believed it to be armaments.

2. By 18 May, the Swedish Foreign Office informed the press that the Swedish Government was satisfied by reports from its own diplomatic sources that the Alfhem carried a cargo of munitions. The charterer of the vessel nevertheless denied that the cargo consisted of arms. But the vessel's owners, convinced that the cargo had been loaded under false description, then cancelled the charter, on 21 May, at Stockholm.

3. Public interest in the subject was now high in Guatemala as well as abroad, and official statements admitting receipt of arms finally began to appear. Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello admitted in a press interview on 21 May that the Alfhem cargo consisted of arms. On 22 May the official government paper, Diario de Centro América, and also the paper, Nuestro Diario, carried statements by the Minister of Government, Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, referring to "the shipment of arms" to Guatemala City. On 24 May Nuestro Diario published an interview with Toriello in which Toriello said he had discussed with U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy "a shipment of arms recently acquired by the Guatemalan Government." On 25 May El Imparcial quoted Toriello as stating that the Alfhem was "the only ship which would bring arms" to Guatemala. On 26 May, the official Diario de Centro América published a statement by Major Enrique Parinello, Army Chief of Staff, in which he referred several times to the arrival of an arms shipment. On 23 May, in Mexico, Guatemalan Ambassador Roberto Alvarado Fuentes admitted in a press interview given the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior that arms had been received. He also implied that the arms embarked on the Alfhem at Stettin were of Czechoslovakian origin.

History of the Alfhem Consignment

As bits and pieces of information from Stockholm, London, and Czechoslovakia came out, together with the ship's log, sailing orders and falsified manifest, the history of the Alfhem shipment emerged as detailed below:

1. The M/S Alfhem was chartered to Alfred Christensen, Stockholm, by Angfartygsaktiebolget Bohuslandska Kusten, of Sweden. Although Alfred Christensen signed the Time-Charter Agreement as charterer of the M/S Alfhem, there is no doubt that he acted as a cloak or agent for the Czechoslovakian firm, CECHOFRACHT, which is identified in Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin No. 281, Prague, February 1950, as a Czechoslovak corporation for foreign trade. The London representative of CECHOFRACHT paid funds for the hire of the M/S Alfhem to the London firm, E. E. Dean & Company, which transferred them to Christensen through a London bank. This transfer of funds was accomplished by means of a "straw charter" arrangement between E. E. Dean & Company and Christensen. After E. E. Dean & Company became suspicious regarding the nature of the cargo shipped on the M/S Alfhem, the "straw charter" between that firm and Christensen was cancelled.

2. The Alfhem departed Uddevalla, Sweden, on 6 April for Copenhagen for bunkers and provisions, then proceeded to Stettin, Poland. Before leaving Uddevalla, the Captain was told by a representative of the charterer that a small part of the cargo might be "second-class explosives". The loading at Stettin was performed on a

24 hour a day schedule and according to the Captain, was handled by a Polish Government agency, "Morska Agencia". This agency was responsible for the bill of lading and manifest; the Captain merely accepted it. From Stettin, the Alfhem returned to Copenhagen Roads but it did not enter the port. Without returning to home waters, the Alfhem then proceeded 17 April toward Dakar "for orders", but received orders enroute, on April 23, to proceed to Curacao, Dutch West Indies, for orders. On May 7, it received orders to proceed to Puerto Cortes, Honduras, for orders, and on May 13, to proceed to Puerto Barrios, for unloading. It arrived at Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954.

Transshipment of Cargo

1. Although the Guatemalan Government has tried to diminish the importance of the Alfhem cargo, the shipment is known to have contained about 15,424 cases weighing about 4,122,145 lbs., or about 2061 short tons in all. It has been reported to include rifles, machine guns, artillery and miscellaneous other types of military equipment.

2. All of the cargo from the Alfhem was removed under military guard in IRCA freight cars. Of a total of 123 freight cars used to transship the cargo within Guatemala, 119 went directly to Guatemala City. The contents were loaded on to trucks and delivered to the First Regiment (Guardia de Honor) and Second Regiment (Base Militar) of the Guatemalan Army. The remaining four cars were taken to a siding near the Puerto Barrios airport. From these cars 200 packages weighing 53,799 lbs. were transferred by air to unknown points.

Financial Arrangements

1. In March 1954 the Bank of Guatemala sold foreign exchange in the amount of $6,064,000 compared with average monthly sales for the previous year of less than $1,000,000. The monthly sales of the Bank of Guatemala have exceeded $2,000,000 only twice in the last two years.

2. Also during March, Guatemala completed an unusual and complicated financial transaction in which about $4,000,000 was transferred from the accounts of the Bank of Guatemala in the United States through European banks. The foreign exchange involved in this transaction was several times the normal monthly foreign exchange sales by Guatemala, and careful arrangements were made to cloak what was going on. The transaction was split up and funnelled through a number of banks in several separate steps.

Strength of Guatemalan Armed Forces Before Arrival of M/S Alfhem

1. Guatemalan military and quasi-military forces, the strongest of any country in Central America, are believed to consist of about 9,000 to 10,000 men in the Army, Air Force and Civil Guard. This number is considerably greater than the number of men estimated to be under arms in Honduras (approximately 3,000); Nicaragua (approximately 3,000); and El Salvador (approximately 5,000). Costa Rica and Panama are believed to have forces of about 1,500 to 2,500 men, respectively, but these forces are not organized as regular armies.

2. It is estimated that the Guatemalan Army had one and one-half times the number of small arms needed to equip its military personnel before the arrival of additional armament from the Soviet bloc.

3. Before the arrival of the M/S Alfhem, Guatemala is estimated to have possessed more artillery pieces, including armored vehicles, than any other country in Central America.

B. Other Guatemalan Attempts to Purchase Arms

Guatemalan attempts to purchase arms from non-Soviet sources have been directed chiefly towards commercial dealers or suppliers. Most European governments do not sell arms

directly to other countries, and the United States Government makes them available only to those countries which are parties to the Rio Treaty. However, even if Guatemala were a party to this Treaty, the United States would, as a matter of policy, withhold arms from Guatemala because of the danger that they might be used to advance the Soviet conspiracy. Most Governments do have requirements for licensing arms shipments procured through commercial channels. For the foregoing reasons Guatemala, directly or indirectly, has from time to time made application to foreign governments for licenses to export arms or has approached them informally to ascertain what their attitude would be towards licensing particular shipments. In some cases, particularly in recent months, the governments concerned have disapproved the applications; in others they have indicated that they did not look with favor upon the export of military materiel to Guatemala and the prospective sellers have voluntarily desisted from pursuing the matter further.

The Guatemalan Government, either directly or through agents, has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the following aircraft since December 1953 from the sources indicated in parentheses:

F-51	Gruman F-8-F	AT-6	Jet Aircraft
10 (United States)	10 (United States)	6 (United States)	12 (Great Britain)
18 (Sweden)		8 (Sweden)	
22 (France)		24 (Africa)	
50	10	38	12

Total: 110

In addition to aircraft, the Guatemalan Government has been interested in obtaining military vehicles, particularly armored vehicles, as well as a miscellaneous assortment of guns and munitions. Among the principal arms dealers in Europe with whom the Guatemalan Government has dealt have been the REXIM company in Geneva and the CFNAR company in Rome. An account of transactions with these two firms is set forth below.

On January 23, 1951, a purchasing contract was drawn up between the Department of Finances of the Guatemalan Army and Hubert Fauntleroy Julian, President of the Black Eagle Airlines, Inc., of New York City for 12 new armed half-tracks M2A1 valued at $10,500 apiece. On April 18, 1952 the Guatemalan Ministry of National Defense issued a certificate naming Julian as its authorized arms purchasing agent and on the same date the Ministry of Defense wrote a letter to the firm of REXIM, S.A. in Geneva ordering the 12 half-tracks and other arms for the Guatemalan Army. The order of April 18, 1952 was subsequently amplified by additional orders and letters, and appropriate arrangements for payment were made.

By February of 1953, the Guatemalan Government had on order with REXIM, and largely paid for, at least the following arms and munitions:

12 half-tracks
8 tons half-track spare parts
48 half-track spare tires and tubes
8 Humber armored cars
Spare parts for the Humber cars
16 tons of military truck spare parts
(delivered to Guatemala in October 1953)
12 Oerlikon 20mm cannon (delivered to
Guatemala in July 1952)
25,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition
1,000,000 rounds of 7mm ammunition
50,000 rounds of cal. 50 machine gun ammunition
100,000 rounds of cal. 30 machine gun ammunition
2,000 60mm mortar shells
2,000 81mm mortar shells
100,000 rounds 7.7mm ammunition
10,000 rounds 12.7mm ammunition
12 machines for loading machine gun belts

Since 1950 Julian has been trying to obtain arms for Guatemala from the Gestioni Navi Recuperi Marittami ed Affeiri (GFNAR) company in Rome. In 1950 Julian succeeded in obtaining the following arms from GENAR which were actually delivered to Guatemala:

12 Breda machine guns, 12.7mm
12 Breda machine guns, 7.7mm
24 tripods for the above
12,000 rounds 12.7mm ammunition
60,000 rounds 7.7mm ammunition
1 Mauser cannon, 20 mm
1,000 rounds 20mm ammunition

In November of 1952 Julian as the agent of the Guatemalan Government attempted to obtain more munitions from GFNAR. On December 8, 1952, Julian wrote GFNAR that after leaving Rome he had gone to visit the REXIM firm in Geneva and had instructed REXIM to transfer to GFNAR the full amount of money to cover most of the order for ammunition previously placed with REXIM. On July 2, 1953, there appeared in the offices of GFNAR at Rome, two officials of the Guatemalan Government, Col. Carlos Enrique Diaz, Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, and Dr. Humberto Garcia Galvez, Chief of Protocol, who emphasized the Guatemalan Government's interest in acquiring this order of ammunition through Julian and left a memorandum with GFNAR to that effect.

From July to October 1953, Julian and Ambassador Cosenza Galvez carried out transactions with GFNAR arranging the details of purchase and shipment. On October 30 the 25,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition, for which $18,600 had been paid were shipped to New York from Naples on the S. S. Knut Bakke, where the shipment was seized because it had been imported into the United States in violation of U.S. munitions control law.

GFNAR was unable to complete the ammunition order and the remaining funds were returned to REXIM.

During August and December of 1953 the Guatemalans procured from Sweden, through the Hamburg firm of H. F. Cordes Company, the following arms and ammunition:

288,310 rounds of 9mm (delivered to San José, Guatemala, August 23, 1953)
200 sub-machine guns "MP-40" (delivered to San José, Guatemala, December 17, 1953).

The following order was also obtained by the firm of H. F. Cordes for Guatemala from a French manufacturer:

130 automatic pistols (delivered to Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, November 6, 1953.

The Guatemalan Government has made a number of attempts to acquire arms in the United States. Many of them are not a matter of official record because the firms approached never submitted a formal application to the United States Government for an export license. A tabulation of applications actually filed by commercial dealers and received by the United States Government for licenses to export arms to Guatemala from the United States since January 1953 follows immediately below. The application covering 10 F-51 aircraft, which was disapproved by the Department of State in February of 1954, is the same as that indicated in the paragraph on aircraft above.

Quantity	Items	Date Received
200	Thompson sub-machine guns	12/53
250,000	Cartridges, caliber .45	1/53
	Misc. aircraft parts	2/53

Quantity	Items	Date Received
200 200 400,000 500,000	Garand rifles) Thompson sub-machine guns) Cartridges, caliber .30) Cartridges, caliber .45)	3/53
	Misc. aircraft tires and tubes	3/53
	Misc. aircraft parts	4/53
	Misc. aircraft parts	4/53
4 3	Engines for M3A1 light tank) sets rubber tracks for M3A1 light tank)	1/53
10	Revolvers, caliber .38	6/53
	C-47 aircraft spares	6/53
90,000	lbs. blasting powder (road construction)	7/53
4 3	Engines for M3A1 light tank) sets rubber tracks for M3A1 light tank)	6/53
44	Rifles, caliber .22	7/53
30,000	cartridges, caliber .22	7/53
100,000	Cartridges, caliber .22	8/53
8	Pistols, various caliber	7/53
	Misc. aircraft parts	7/53
	Misc. aircraft tires and tubes	8/53
	Misc. aircraft parts	8/53
10	Revolvers, caliber .38	8/53
	Misc. spares for Beechcraft	7/53
210	Aircraft tires and tubes	8/53
1	K-17 aerial camera	7/53
1	Taylorcraft	10/53
	Spares for Piper aircraft	12/53
1	K-17 aerial camera	12/53
10	F-51 aircraft	1/54
210	Aircraft tires and tubes	12/53
	Misc. aircraft spares	3/54
	C-47 aircraft spares	3/54
30,000	kgs blasting powder (road construction)	3/54

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis shows only part of Guatemala's arms procurement effort. It can be safely assumed that there have been many additional attempts to acquire arms, some of them doubtless successful, which have not come to the attention of the United States Government. Nevertheless, this study does show that the Guatemalan Government, since the Arbenz Administration came into power and continuing right up to the present, has persistently sought to acquire large quantities of arms abroad. All evidence points to the fact that Guatemala is continuing these efforts to build up its military strength.